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ABSTRACT
This th##i# 1# an examination of thraa main aapaots 
of Bum#*a moral philosophy# the distinotion batwaan tha nat- 
vral and artificial virtnea, tha operation of sympathy, and 
tha notion of tha general point of view. It begins with 
an examination of Hume's concept of a virtue, concluding 
that a virtue is to be analysed as a disposition to have 
certain kinds of motives. The natural virtues and the ar­
tificial virtues are then examined separately, the motives 
underlying both are analyzed, and It is decided that these 
motives must be described in terms of purposes. Although 
the motives underlying the natural virtues are seen to 
fulfill t%ro criteria that Bums sets forth, the motives 
underlying the artificial virtues are seen to meet neither. 
The artificial virtues are shown to be distinct virtues, 
rather than redirected natural virtues.
The chapter on sympathy outlines the mechanics of 
this operation with reference to four different classes 
of virtues. It also deals with a disagreement between 
Ingemar Hendenius and Pall Ardal, two commentators on 
Bums's moral philosophy, as to whether the operation of 
sympathy is a necessary condition of all moral evalua­
tion. It is argued that if the operation of sympathy 
is considered without reference to the taking of a gen­
eral point of view, Hendenius' argument appears to be 
valid, but that in the end Ardal is actually correct.
The notion of a general point of view is then analysed, 
is shown to be a necessary condition of all moral evaluation.
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and la than raXatad to tha distinction between the natural 
and the artificial virtues. It is finally concluded that 
the concept of an artificial virtue, the operation of sym­
pathy and the notion of a general point of view between 
them give an account of the requirements for being a moral 
agent.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
The vork that follows 1» an examination of three 
different aspects of Hume's moral philosophy# the notion 
of a moral virtue and the distinction between natural and 
artificial moral virtues; the concept of the operation of 
sympathy; and the doctrine of the general point of view.
In concentrating on these topics I an departing somewhat 
from the usual area of study of Hume's moral theory, but 
I would justify this departure on the grounds that the 
areas I have concentrated on are of importance not only for 
a complete understanding of Hume's theory, but also for 
moral theory in general, and have been unjustly neglected •
A good deal of what I say in this thesis could be 
regarded as a sequal to a recent book published on Hume's 
moral theory# Pall S. Ardal's Passion and Value In Hume's 
Treatise. This excellent book is an account of the psycho­
logical elements underlying moral evaluation, and in partic­
ular, of the role of the passions in moral evaluation. I 
refer to this work often, with occasional disagreements, 
and have adopted a large part of the analysis presented in 
it as a basis for my discussion of the three topics mentioned 
above, and of the relationships between them# What I have 
written could be regarded as a middle course between Ardal's 
work and the topics most often considered with reference to 
Hume; that is, a middle course between a discussion of 
Hume's psychology and a discussion of such technical points 
in Hume as the fact-value distinction, or whether he should 
be called a subjectivist or a utilitarian. What I have
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done le concider the psychological element# which appear to 
be a central part of Hume's account of morality, and examine 
hie account of morality in light of these elements, choosing 
for my examination the three concepts which appear to me to 
constitute between them the essential elements of Hume's ac­
count. Most other points which might be considered, and are 
usually considered, are interesting in themselves, but as a 
ground for understanding the theory which Hume presents, 
they are secondary.
It has, of course, been frequently noted that Hume's 
account of morality is to be regarded more as descriptive 
than prescriptive. Hume conceives his task to be to give an 
account of how people actually do^  make moral evaluations, and 
of the elements which enter into such evaluations, rather 
than to give an account of how they should do so. He thus 
does not appear to be laying down conditions which are nec­
essary to moral evalution, with the intention of instructing 
his readers on how to go about this very human enterprise.
He seems rather to regard it as obvious that this enterprise 
has been going on for a long period of ti^@, and that the 
task of the philosopher is at most to lay bare the presuppo­
sitions of the enterprise, as it has been engaged in#
But nature may also be opposed to rare and unusual* 
and in this sense of the word, which is the common 
one, there may often arise disputes concerning what 
is natural or unnatural.... We may only affirm on 
this head, that if ever there was anything, which 
cou'd be call'd natural in this sense, the sentiments 
of morality certainly may* since there never was any 
nation of the world, nor any single person in any na­
tion, who was utterly deprived of them, and who never, 
in any instance, shew'd the least approbation or 
dislike of manners. These sentiments are so rooted 
in our constitution or temper, that without utterly 
confounding the human mind by disease or madness, 'tie 
impossible to extirpate and destroy them. (7.474)
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there is jaet so much vice or virtue in any char­
acter, as every one places in it, and.,.*tis impos­
sible in this particular we can ever be mistaken*
(T.547)
The general opinion of mankind has some authority 
in all cases* but in this of morals 'tie perfectly 
infallible. (T.552)
Notwithstanding the nature of the philosopher's task, as 
Hume conceives it —  that of introducing the experimental 
method of reasoning into moral subjects, his account does 
include some features of moral evaluation which he clearly 
regarde as necessary conditions of moral, in contrast to 
non-moral, evaluation, and so some of his points could be 
regarded as logical. I have in mind here such claims as 
that the operation of sympathy and the taking of a general 
point of view are necessary conditions of moral evaluation. 
Although there is some possibility that this is a causal 
claim and thus merely a description of the normal process 
of events, it makes more sense if regarded as a logical 
claim, distinguishing moral from non-moral evaluation. Even 
so, such logical elements are drawn from a claimed observa­
tion of the common opinion in the area of morality.
Hume's account of morality is Interesting and worth 
considering because, for one thing, he places at the center 
of morality a certain kind of psychological element* dis­
positions, and thus allows more room in morality for things 
important to it other than talk of rules and actions. The 
moral virtues which are analysable as dispositions to have 
certain sort of motives make up this central portion of 
morality, since it is in reference to the virtues which a 
man possesses or fails to possess that he is the object of 
moral approval or disapproval, and it is these virtues which
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are the object of moral evaluation. Thus the virtues are of 
essential importance whether one considers morality from the 
point of view of the agent, or from the point of view of the 
observer, who Is engaged in moral evaluation. This emphasis 
of dispositions in Hume's theory means that more attention is 
paid to a man's character, in the sense of his normal or nat­
ural, perhaps even unreflective, motives for acting, than on 
his adherence to rules. This position is, obviously, closer 
to Aristotle's than to rant's. One might express this by say­
ing that, to Hume, what is primarily Important in morality is 
what sort of person a man is, and it is primarily as an ex­
pression of character that his actions matter. It is on the 
basis of what sort of person he is, that his actions are eval­
uated, and not on the basis of his actions that a man is eval­
uated. This is putting the point more simply than it should 
be put, but this is the general tendency of Hume's account.
To say that Hume's account de-emphasixes the notions 
of rules is not to claim that Hume does not regard rules as 
being of any importance. His distinction between the natural 
and artificial virtues makes it quite clear that he believes 
rules to be of importance for certain aspects of morality, 
exemplified by the artificial virtues, and not for others, 
basically exemplified by the natural virtues. Since the 
natural virtues could be regarded as the foundation of morality, 
and the artificial virtues as a sophistication or elaboration 
of this foundation due to certain inconveniences in the opera­
tion of the natural virtues, one could claim that rules play 
no role in the basis of morality, although they play an essen­
tial role in a civilised moral attitude. The role that rules 
do play, however, éven in the area of the artificial virtues.
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is nowhere nearly as significant as the role which rules would 
play in a more Kantian theory. Although the artificial vir­
tues could not exist without the prior existence of certain 
rules or conventions, and the motives underlying such virtues 
include an essential reference to such rules, a man is not 
judged, in Humean terms, on how well he conforms to the rules, 
or on how significant the concept of duty is to his motives.
The notion of doing one's duty for its own sake, or following 
rules for their own sake, is essentially foreign to Hume's 
account.
The notion of the general point of view presents an­
other aspect of the role of rules or conventions in Hume's 
moral theory, but like the role of artificial virtues, it must 
be regarded as secondary to the basic theory and a device for 
solving problems which arise in the natural or unsophisticated 
arousal of moral feelings. Although the taking of such a point 
of view becoues, for Hume, a necessary condition of truly moral 
evaluation, its importance in the theory is second to that of 
the arousal of the appropriate feelings. This secondary role 
of rules or conventions to feelings is typical of Hume's approach 
to moral theory, and is presumably the reason why he has often 
been regarded as a subjectivist.
Another philosophically interesting feature of Hume's 
account of morality is the notion of a continuity between moral 
and other sorts of evaluation. Like Aristotle, and unlike Kant, 
Hume was very impressed by the continuity of approval between 
moral and non-moral contexts. He did not appear to think that 
there was an ultimate difference between these kinds of approval, 
although some difference was allowed for by the notion of the 
general point of view, and he argued that some bases on which
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this distinction had formerly been made were clearly spacious. 
Thus he gave an account of moral approval in the context of 
approval in general, and frequently drew analogies between 
moral and other sorts of approval, such as aesthetic. This 
is important since it allows one to view morality not as a 
separate part of one's existence, or a feature of life which 
is opposed to, or a source of possible conflict with, the 
(Other features, but rather as an intrinsic part, not so much 
different froa other features, as continuous with these other 
features. This is not to suggest that conflicts are not pos­
sible, but just that such conflicts are no different than any 
other sorts of conflicts people have between different kinds 
of desires or motives. Morality is not some force which fights 
against, or controls a man's baser instincts; it is just as 
much natural to man as any other sorts of motives or desires, 
and is homogeneous with these other sorts of motives or desires. 
Thus, Cume's theory looks at morality in the light of the rest 
of man's characteristics, and fits it in among them. Moral 
approval or disapproval is just another kind of approval or 
disapproval, and not much different from the other kinds.
The theory about the operation of sympathy is an im­
portant part of the continuity of moral life with the rest of 
life. It is the operation of sympathy that allows one's nat­
ural concern for, and interest in, the well-being of other 
people, to be extended beyond one's immediate circle of rela­
tions and friends. Thus, although in a moral judgment one 
must extend oneself beyond this immediate circle, the opera­
tion of sympathy allows that the factors which come into play 
are no different than the factors which concern one in one's 
immediate circle. Thus the operation of sympathy allows one
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to extend one's feelings of benevolence beyond those people 
towards whom they are normally directed, for example, and 
allows one to disapprove morally of characters who have 
caused pain to strangers, as well as to people for whom one 
has a natural concern. The operation of sympathy, in ex­
tending one's interests beyond one's immediate circle, or 
sphere of Interest, allows one to see that to become a moral 
agent is not to move into another realm, different from the 
area in which one's natural limited benevolence and concern 
operates, but is rather to extend this realm to include a 
wider range of people.
These features of Hume's moral theory then; the 
putting of a psychological element at the centre of morality, 
the de-emphasizing of the role of rules in morality, and the 
view that moral and non-moral life and moral and ooa-moral 
approval are continuous entities, make it, 1 think, both 
philosophically Interesting and worth considering as saying 
something significant about morality which can be missed in 
concentrating too strongly on the notion of duty and on the 
fact-value distinction.
It is customary to defend one's choice of either the 
Treatise or the Enquiry as the main subject of one's study, 
when considering Hume's moral theory. My own defense might 
be considered rather weak; I have always found the account 
given in the Treatise more interesting, and so decided to 
concentrate on it. In point of fact, the notions of sympathy 
and the general point of view are more fully accounted for 
in that work, and the distinction between the natural and 
artificial virtues is only there made explicitly. Given my 
view that these constitute important elements in understand-
12.
Ing Huiae's theory, ay choice of source appears inevitable.
The quotations from the Treatise and the Enquiry are 
taken from the Solby-Bigge editions of 1964 and 1963 respec­
tively of these two works, and the page references given 
refer to these editions.
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CHAPTER 2 
The Moral Virtuea
The baeio concent in Hume's account of morals is that 
of a moral virtue. The virtues are, as the word might suggest, 
those characteristics of men which are the objects of moral 
approval or disapproval, within the class of virtues, Hume 
makes a distinction between those which he calls "natural", 
and others whloh he calls "artificial”. This distinction 
between the natural and the artificial virtues is of crucial 
importance in Hume's moral theory, and most of the other 
points that I will be considering In this thesis follow from 
this distinotion, and from the notion of an artificial virtue.
I shall thus spend some time discussing virtues in general, 
and the artificial virtues In particular.
The first point, then. Is to become clear about what 
Hume means when he talks about virtues. If we start with the 
premise that the virtues are those characteristics of men 
which are subject to moral approval or disapproval, it ap­
pears that the virtues are to be analysed in terms of motives.
'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we 
regard only the motives that produced them, and 
consider the actions as signs or indications of 
certain principles in the mind or temper. (T.477)
The objects of moral approval or disapproval are thus motives, 
rather than actions. However, it is not just any particular 
motive that is praised or blamed, and thus counted as a vir­
tue or vice.
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis 
only as a sign of some quality or character. It 
must depend upon durable principles in the mind, 
which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into 
the personal character. Actions themselves, not
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proceeding from any constant principle, have no in­
fluence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and
consequently are never consider'd in morality. (T.575)
Tha relevant motives are thua "constant principles", and not 
particular motives. In general, I would prefer to call them 
dispositions, and thus claim that the virtues and vices are 
dispositions to have certain sorts of motives. A man would
then be said to have the virtue of benevolence if he had a
disposition to have the sorts of motives one would character­
ize as benevolent, and not if he merely on one or a few occa­
sions had such motives.
Although such dispositions are the basis of moral 
judgments, in the sense that they form the virtues and vices 
which are the objects of moral approval Oy disapproval, they 
cannot themselves include a reference to moral approval or 
disapproval. Hume is quite clear and emphatic on this point.
DO action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless 
there be in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct froN the sense of its morality. (T.479}
and I
Wherein consists this honesty and justice, which
you find in restoring a loan, and abstaining from
the property of others? It does not surely lie in 
the external action. It must, therefore, be plac'd 
in the motive, from which the external action is 
deriv'd. This motive can never be a regard to the 
honesty of the action. For 'tis a plain fallacy to 
say, that a virtuous motive is requisite to render 
an action honest, and at the same time that a regard 
to the honesty is the motive of the action, we can 
never have a regard to the virtue of an action, un­
less the action be antecedently virtuous. Ko action 
can be virtuous, but so far as it proceeds from a 
virtuous motive. X virtuous motive, therefore, muit 
precede the regard to the virtue; and 'tis impossible, 
that the virtuous motive and the regard to the virtue 
can be the same. (7.480)
This does not mean that it is impossible to act from a motive
which involves the recognition of the moral worth of the plan
of action, but rather, that first of all, such a motive is
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Impossible unless there is an antecedent motive for perform­
ing such actions, and second, that acting from much a motive 
is not characteristic of a virtue, Hume argues that;
the’, on some occasions, a person may perform an 
action merely oat of regard to its moral obligation, 
yet this still presupposes In human nature some 
distinct principles, which are capable of producing 
the action, and whose moral beauty renders the ac­
tion meritorious. (T.479)
On the same page he appears to suggest that a person acting
from such a "second order" motive is not really a suitable
object for moral approval#
A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper,
is still pleae'd to perform grateful actions, and 
thinks he has, by that means, fulfill'd his duty.
(T.479 italics mine)
It thus appears that a virtue can b© characterized as a dis­
position to have motives of a certain type, which motives do 
not involve a reference to the moral value of tha action to 
bo performed, or to the moral value of acting from such a 
motive.
This characterization is constructed from various 
points that Hume makes about virtues and moral evaluation. 
Unfortunately, there is some conflict between my character­
ization, and other points which Hume makes on the subject 
of moral virtues, which can be brought out by discussing his 
refusal to make a distinction between moral virtues and nat­
ural abilities. This refusal arises from the argument that 
moral virtues and vices are to be identified not by reference 
to their internal characteristics, but by reference to the 
feelings of moral approval which they arouse in the observer. 
The first problem in dealing with this argument is therefore 
to understand what Hume means by the feelings of moral ap­
proval and disapproval. This is not as easy as it might
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first appear.
The only thing that la really clear is that feelings
of moral approval are a species of pleasure, and of noral
disapproval, a species of pain.
Every quality of mind is denominated virtuous, 
which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as 
every quality, which produces pain, is call’d 
vicious. This pleasure and this pain may arise 
from four different sources. For we reap a 
pleasure from the view of a character, which is 
naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to 
the person himself, or which is agreeable to 
others, or to the person himself, (T.531)
These moral distinctions arise from the natural 
distinctions of pain and pleasure; and when we 
receive those feelings from tho general consid­
eration of any quality or character, we denominate 
it vicious or virtuous, (T.608)
At first the reader is led to believe that the feelings of 
moral approval and disapproval are peculiar kinds of pleas­
ure and xain, and can, in a sense, be identified phenomenol- 
ogically, and distinguished from other feelings of pleasure 
and pain.
For, first, 'tis evident, that under the term 
pleasure, w# comprehend sensations, which are 
Very uifferent from each other, and which have 
only such a distinct resemblance as is requi­
site to make them be express'd by the same ab­
stract term,... Nor is every sentiment of pleas­
ure or pain, which arises from characters and 
actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes us 
praise or condemn, (T.472)
The position expressed in this passage, that feelings of
moral approval and disapproval are distinguishable from and
different than other feelings of pleasure or pain, appears,
at least to this reader, to be the one presupposed by large
portions of Hume's moral theory. however, it does seem to
be abandoned by hume at at least one point.
It may, indeed, be pretended, that the sentiment 
of approbation, which those qualities {the natural
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abilities] produce, besides its being Inferior, 
is also somewhat different from that, which at­
tends the other virtues. But this, in my opin­
ion, is not a sufficient reason for excluding 
them from the catalogue of virtues. Each of the 
virtues, even benevolence, justice, gratitude, 
integrity, excites a different sentiment or feel­
ing in the spectator. (T.607)
All the sentiments of approbation, which attend 
any particular species of objects, have a great 
resemblance to each other, the* derived from dif­
ferent sources. (T.617)
Unless every feeling of pleasure or pain is to be 
identified with moral approval or disapproval, a position 
that I do not believe that Hume espouses (although certain 
passages might lead one to this conclusion), X can only 
derive two consistent positions from the above series of 
passages. Either all qualities of mind produce those feel­
ings identified as moral approval or disapproval, a class 
of differing but still identifiably similar feelings, and 
thus all qualities of mind are virtues or vices; or, al­
though the various virtues or vices produce different feel­
ings of pleasure or pain, those qualities of mind called 
virtues or vices produce feelings of pleasure or pain suffi­
ciently alike to one another and different from the feelings 
of pleasure or pain produced by other qualities of mind that 
they can be distinguished on these grounds. In the latter 
case, Hume could then argue that the natural abilities, for 
example, produce in the spectator feelings of pleasure or 
pain similar to those produced by the moral virtues, and 
dissimilar to those produced by other qualities of the mind. 
It is not clear to me which position Bums actual]^ holds in 
this section, but my general impression is that the former 
is more likely. The latter position presents problems of 
phenomenological identification of feelings which are almost
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insurmountable. It also suggests that there are some qual­
ities of mind which Hume would not consider to be virtues 
or vices. Given the prodigious list of characteristics Bums 
classifies as virtues (industry, perseverance, patience, 
activity, vigilance, application, constancy, temperance;
(T.610/611), I think this is unlikely. At the very least,
I cannot imagine a quality of mind which would be sufficiently 
unlike these as not to be called a moral virtue.
There are thus two identifiable positions in Hums's 
writings about the nature of the moral virtues and vices, 
and how they are to be identified. The first is that moral 
virtues and vices are distinguished by the peculiar feelings 
of pleasure and pain which they produce in the observer.
The second is that all qualities of mind are classifiable 
as virtues and vices, since they all produce feelings of 
pleasure and pain which are different from one another, but 
yet sufficiently alike to be classified as virtues and vices.
In both of the cases, the virtues and vices are identified 
by the feelings produced in the spectator rather than by the 
internal characteristics which they share, but the first case 
suggests the possibility that perhaps not all qualities of 
mind are virtues and vices, while the second case appears to 
rule this possibility out. If the second position is Hume's, 
there seems very little point in his arguing that virtues 
and vices are identified by the feelings of moral approbation 
and disapprobation which they arouse in the observer, since 
this line of argument would appear to be of value only if 
there were a distinction to be made between qualities of mind 
which ame, and qualities which are not, virtues and vices.
The peculiar feelings of pleasure and pain which are identified
19.
with moral approval and disapproval, since they differ accord­
ing to the quality being observed, could be peculiar only in 
the sense that they are aroused by qualities of mind, and 
thus feelings of moral approval or disapproval could be iden­
tified as being those which are aroused by the observation of 
qualities of mind. This position would still allow Hume to 
argue that the feelings of pleasure and pain indicative of 
moral approval or disapproval are phenomenologically different 
from the feelings of pleasure and pain aroused by other activ­
ities than observing qualities of mind, or by the observation 
of things other than qualities of mind, such as works of art* 
However, this would not be important for distinguishing moral 
virtues and vices since they can be distinguished as being any 
qualities of mind capable of arousing pleasure or pain in the 
observer,
I have taken the time to distinguish these two separate 
positions for two reasons. The first is that I think they are 
both used by Hume in his rejection of the distinction between 
natural abilities and moral virtues. The second is to consider 
whether my own characterization of the moral virtues fits in 
batter with one rather than the other. It will be remembered 
that I characterized the moral virtues and vices as being dis­
positions to have certain kinds of motives, these motives not 
including any reference to the moral value of the action to 
be performed. Such dispositions are quite clearly classifi­
able as qualities of mind, so that they would be consistent 
with either of Hume's identified positions in that regard. It 
is also not impossible that such dispositions could arouse, 
and be the only qualities of mind which did arouse, the pecul­
iar feelings of moral approval or disapproval. However, this
20,
would be a very difficult point to establish, since there 
seems to be no logical connection between being such a dis­
position and arousing such feelings. This connection would 
then have to be established empirically, and although Kume 
does appeal to introspection at nany points in his theory, 
this is rather a large point to establish by so notoriously 
difficult a process as introspection. Thus, although there 
is nothing inconsistent about conflating my characterisation 
of moral virtues or vices with Hume's first possible position 
of identifying virtues and vices, to do so would raise a num­
ber of difficult problems,
Hume's second possible position is that all qualities 
of mind are identifiable as virtues or vices, since they all 
arouse feelings of pleasure or pain which are sufficiently 
alike to allow them to be classified together in this fashion. 
This would be inconsistent with my characterisation, since 
all qualities of mind are not dispositions to have certain 
sorts of motives; only a small number of qualities of mind 
fit that criterion. However, it would bo possible to qualify 
the second position I have attributed to Hume, and say that 
virtues and vices are those quail ties of mind (which are dis­
positions to have certain sorts of motives) which arouse feel­
ings of pleasure and pain in the observer. To qualify the 
position in this way might rule out some of the possible 
qualities of mind which Hume would include among the virtues 
and vices, but I do not myself regard this as a serious dis­
advantage, since the list seems unnecessarily broad in seme 
aspects. It would at the same time make coherent Hume's 
claim that it is motives which are the object of moral ap­
proval and disapproval, I thus think this qualification would
21.
be a fair representation of Hume's actual position on the 
identification of moral virtues and vices, as well as being 
consistent with ray own characterisation of these virtues and 
vices as dispositions to have certain motives. If we adopt 
this position we are, however, still left with the problem 
of what to make of Hume's claim that the feelings aroused 
by moral virtues and vices are peculiar kinds of pleasure 
and pain, and that the moral virtues and vices are to bo 
identified by means of these peculiar kinds of pleasure and 
pain. The best I can do is suggest that Kume meant that 
those qualities of mind which fit the criteria for moral vir­
tues and vices do, as a matter of fact, arouse the appropriate 
distinctive feelings, and that the problem of proving this 
point was just not considered in any detail.
Having made this point, it is now time to consider 
Hume's rejection of the distinction between natural abili­
ties and moral virtues. Hume uses a number of different 
arguments to reject the distinction. Perhaps it is best to 
begin with what he considers to be the reason why the distinc­
tion was made in the first place. The origin of the distinc­
tion between moral virtues and natural abilities, Hume claims, 
lies in the distinction between voluntary and Involuntary 
properties of men.
"Men have observ'd, that tho' natural abilities and 
moral qualities be in the main on the same footing, 
there is, however, this difference betwixt them, that 
the former are almost invariable by any art or industry; 
while the latter, or at least, the actions, that proceed 
from them, may be chang'd by the motives of rewards 
and punishments, praise and blame." (T.609)
However, he does not regard the voluntary-involuntary distinc­
tion as relevant in the area of morality, on two Important 
but different grounds. First, he argues
22.
"that many of those qualities, which all moralists, 
especially the antients, comprehend under the title 
of moral virtues, are equally involuntary and neces­
sary, with the qualities of the judgment and imagina­
tion." (T.603)
This might be regarded as an argument from precedent, which
night be persuasive, but not necessarily compelling. It is,
however, in line with Hume's empirical approach to morals,
his purpose being to describe what included in morality,
rather than to prescribe what ought to be included in morality.
His further comment, that
"as men, in common life and conversation, do not 
carry those ends in view, but naturally praise or 
blame whatever pleases or displeases them, they do 
not seem much to regard this distinction, but con­
sider prudence under the character of virtue as 
well as benevolence, and penetration as well as 
justice." (T.609)
is part of the same argument.
The second argument, however, supplies a reason for
not making the distinction.
"I wou'd have any one give me a reason, why vir­
tue and vice may not be involuntary, as well as 
beauty and deformity. These moral distinctions 
arise from the natural distinctions of pain and 
pleasure; and when we receive those feelings from 
the general consideration of any quality or char­
acter, we denominate it vicious or virtuous. Kov 
I believe no one will assert, that a quality can 
never produce pleasure or pain to the person who 
considers it, unless it be perfectly voluntary in 
the person who possesses it." (T.6C8)
In other words, tiume is here arguing that the distinction 
between qualities which are regarded as vittues or vices 
and qualities which are not, is made on the basis of whether 
or not they produce in the observer the feelings of pleasure 
and pain which are called moral approval and disapproval.
It is not made on the basis of a distinction between volun­
tary and involuntary qualities. If we accept Hume's position 
here on the distinction between virtues and vices, and
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non-moral qualities, which is the first position outlined 
in the previous section, there are several ways of criticis­
ing his conclusion. One is to argue that involuntary qual­
ities never arouse the distinctive feelings of moral approval 
or disapproval. At least one critic of Hume, Pall Ardal, 
considers that this line of argument is not open to us, or, 
at the least, would be unsuccessful if pursued. Ardal argues 
that
"According to Hume, and in this I think he is right, 
we cannot choose to evaluate in one way rather than 
another, although we may choose to use evaluative 
language for the purpose of encouraging certain be­
haviour and discouraging other behaviour.
That is, the production of feelings of moral approval or dis­
approval is independent of whether or not we regard the quality 
in question as involuntary. The most we can do is to choose 
not to use evaluative language, or not to praise and blame, 
if we consider the quality involuntary, on the grounds, pre­
sumably, of futility. Ardal also argues, to support the 
claim that we do, in some cases, morally disapprove of a per­
son in reference to some involuntary quality which he has*
"The trouble...is that the really hardened criminal, 
the person who is beyond redemption, does no more 
respond to threats and encouragement than the addict.
The argument here is that since we disapprove morally of the 
really hardened criminal, whose vice is involuntary, in the 
sense that it is beyond redemption, we clearly do not restrict 
moral approval or disapproval to voluntary characteristics.
On these grounds then, it appears that if we accept that vir­
tues and vices are distinguished from other qualities on the
^Ardal, Pall, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1966* p. 160.
^Ibid., p. 160.
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basis of their ability to arouse particular feelings,then
whether or not these qualities are voluntary is irrelevant,
X think, however, that more can be said on this
topic than either Eume or Ardal have admitted. The source
of moral approbation according to Hume is the agreeableness
or usefulness of the quality in question*
Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, 
which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every 
quality, which produces pain, is call'd vicious.
This pleasure and this pain may arise from four 
different sources. For we reap a pleasure from 
the view of a character, which is naturally fitted 
to be useful to others, or to the person himself, 
or which is agreeable to others, or to the person 
himself, (T.591)
It is, however, according to the position X believe Hume is
using as the basis of his argument here, a particular kind
of pleasure which must be given by these qualities, and not
just pleasure in general, before the quality is denominated
virtuous.
For, first, 'tis evident, that under the term 
pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are 
very different from each other, and which have 
only such a distinct resemblance as is requi­
site to make them be express'd by the same ab­
stract term,... Nor is every sentiment of 
pleasure or pain, which arises from characters 
and actions, of that peculiar find, which makes 
us praise or condemn. (T.472)
Hume's position is that it is this peculiar kind of senti­
ment which can be aroused by the consideration of involuntary 
qualities. This position is an empirical one, which presum- 
abl ycould only be supported or refuted by some sort of em­
pirical evidence. Hume's usual source of such evidence is 
introspection, about which argument is virtually impossible. 
Ardal attempts, in the quotation given above, to present 
empirical evidence of a rather more arguable nature, when he 
presents the case of the hardened criminal, surely, however.
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what Is relevant about the hardened criminal is not that we 
do not believe that he could reform now, but that we believe 
that his situation is the result of certain choices which he 
made in the past, and our moral disapproval is based on the 
belief that he voluntarily chose the wrong thing at some time 
in the past. I do not think that Ardal's example actually 
shows what it is purported to show, and in the end I am not 
convinced by either Ardal or Bums on this point. However, 
it still remains to me to show that moral approval or disap­
proval is not, or could not be, aroused by involuntary qual­
ities of mind. I do as a matter of fact think this to be 
the case, and I also think that several things that Hume him­
self says could be interpreted so as to suggest that he at 
least lays the ground for making this point.
Both Ardal and Hume separate moral approval and dis­
approval from praise and blame, in the sense that neither of 
them believe that amenability to praise or blame is a neces­
sary condition of being the object of moral approval or dis­
approval. Hume, for example, argues that:
Ken have observ'd, that tho* natural abilities and 
moral qualities be in the main on the same footing, 
there is, however, this difference between them, that 
the former are almost invariable by any art or in­
dustry; while the latter, or at least, the actions, 
that proceed from them, may be chang'd by the motives 
of rewards and punishments, praise and blame. Hence 
legislators, and divines, and moralists, have prin­
cipally applied themselves to the regulating these 
voluntary actions.... (7.609)
Be goes on to argue, as quoted earlier, that although it is 
only some qualities which are alterable by means of praising 
and blaming , this does not constitute a good reason for 
limiting the class of moral virtues and vices to these qual­
ities. He does of course say that we "praise or blame" 
involuntary qualities (7.609) which might appear to contradict
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the point I am making here, but I think that what he means
by "praise and blame" in this case is simply to feel moral
approval or disapproval. His point is thus that we feel 
moral approval towards both voluntary and involuntary qual­
ities, although we only attempt to alter behaviour by means 
of praising and bla*ning in the ease of voluntary qualities. 
Whether or not the behaviour is alterable by praising and 
blaming is a different point from, and certainly not a . 
necessary condition of, feeling moral approval or disap­
proval.
Ardal likewise argues, as I have said above, that:
we cannot choose to evaluate in one way, rather than
another, although we may choose to use evaluative 
language for the purpose of encouraging certain be­
haviour and discouraging other behaviour.*
It thus appears to me that there are two distinct questions 
to be discussed here: are praising and blaming only appro­
priate in cases wher¥ we think that the behaviour is in some 
sense voluntary, and ought the appropriateness of praising 
or blaming be considered a necessary condition of feeling 
moral approval or disapproval. The second question is 
equivalent to asking whether a quality's being voluntary 
ought to be a necessary condition of feeling moral approval 
or disapproval towards it, if the answer to the first ques­
tion is "yes".
In answer to the first question, I do think that 
praising and blaming are appropriate only in cases where 
we think that the behaviour is in some sense voluntary, 
whether or not the person praised or blamed is presently 
amenable to praise or blame. It is certainly true that
^ibld., p. 160.
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we may praise a person for having a good singing voice, 
but surely we do this as contrasted with admiring his 
voice, on the grounds that we believe he has put some ef­
fort into training or developing this voice. This point 
can be made more clear if we contrast this praise with the 
notion of praising someone for being sir feet tall. There 
is something intuitively unsatisfactory about the latter 
notion, and surely it lies in the distinction between volun­
tary and involuntary qualities. The point becomes stronger 
with a consideration of the notion of blaming. To blame a 
person for possessing an involuntary quality seems contra­
dictory —  the notion of blaming only seems appropriate when 
we believe that the possession of a quality has been in some 
sense the result of some voluntary choice or action on his 
part. Thus, I would argue that praising and blaming presup­
pose some aspect of voluntariness, and Z would further ar­
gue that moral approval and disapproval are intrinsically 
linked with the appropriateness of praise and blame.
The reason Z would want to argue this is that I 
think there is a worthwhile distinction to be made between 
moral and non-moral approval and disapproval. X do not 
think that the distinction is in any way clear-cut, so that 
one could definitely declare in all cases that one's ap­
proval was either clearly moral or non-moral. However, I 
think that there is a difference between, say esteem and 
moral approval, or admiration and praise. The distinction 
rests on a distinction between involuntary and voluntary 
qualities. Just as we admire, rather than praise, a person 
for having a certain physical characteristic, our feeling 
of approval towards him would be more appropriately classified
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as non-moral rather than moral. There is an important link 
between the appropriateness of praising and blaming, and 
feeling moral approval or disapproval. One basis for clas­
sifying feelings of approval as moral lies in the appropri­
ateness of praise and blame, and, unlike Hume, I believe 
that most people do make the distinction on this basis when 
talking about moral, as contrasted with non-moral approval 
or disapproval. There is a basis here, which Uuae does not 
employ at all, for distinguishing between moral approval or 
disapproval and non-moral approval or disapproval. It is 
certainly true that non-moral approval or disapproval can 
be aroused by involuntary qualities, on the basis of Hume's 
criteria: their usefulness or agreeableness to the person 
himself or to others, but non-moral approval or disapproval 
can be distinguished from moral approval or disapproval, on 
the grounds that a necessary, although not sufficient con­
dition of moral approval or disapproval is that the quality 
in question is voluntary. The distinction, if made in this 
way, has nothing to do with the phenomenological character­
istics of the feelings of moral and non-moral approval or 
disapproval, but is based on the nature of the qualities 
being judged.
Hume's position to this point could be summarized 
as: no worthwhile distinction between moral virtues and 
natural abilities can be made on the basis of an examina­
tion of virtues and abilities themselves, and the only way 
to make a distinction between moral and non-moral qualities 
is on the basis of whether they arouse the peculiar feelings 
of moral approval or disapproval. The question of whether 
or not the qualities are voluntary or involuntary is entirely
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Irrelevant. My position, on the other hand, is that moral 
approval or disapproval is not identified solely by intro­
spection, but involves a logical question...that moral, in 
contrast to non-moral, approval or disapproval is inappro­
priate if the qualities being approved or disapproved are 
not voluntary. It is a logical question and not merely a 
phenomenological one.
Making a distinction between voluntary and involun­
tary qualities does not, however, necessarily rule out any 
of the list of virtues which Hume gives. For example, he 
argues that "constancy, fortitude, magnanimity* are moral 
virtues, and yet are involuntary. (T.608) I would want to 
argue that they are not totally involuntary, although they 
may not be ^  voluntary as cleanliness, for example. I am 
not entirely sure what Hume means by "constancy", but sus­
pect he may mean something like consistency in attitude.
If this is what it does mean, then it is of course true 
that some people tend naturally to be more consistent than 
others. However, we do regard consistency as a "skill" 
which it is possible to develop. Teachers of philosophy 
are constantly urging consistency upon their pupils. If 
he means by "constancy" something like fidelity to principles 
or people, then once more we have an example of a character­
istic. V# recommend to people,on the assumption, I believe 
justified, that it is one which can be developed, even if 
originally present in an iddividual only to a small degree. 
Fortitude and magnanimity are likewise surely character­
istics which can be developed, although they may orfginâlly 
exist in different degrees in different people. They are 
thus not entirely involuntary.
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Besides arguing that a distinction between voluntary 
and Involuntary qualities does not provide a ground for dis­
tinguishing between qualities of mind which are subject to 
moral approval and disapproval, -and qualities which are not,
Hume also argues that there is no real distinction to be made 
in any case between voluntary and involuntary qualities. If 
no such distinction is possible, then clearly it cannot be 
used as a basis for distinguishing appropriate objects of 
moral approval or disapproval. Eurae's objection to this dis­
tinction is based on his analysis of "free will" and "neces­
sity".
As to free-will, we have shewn that it has no 
place with regard to the actions, no more than 
the qualities of men. It is not a just conse­
quence, that what is voluntary is free. Our ac­
tions are more voluntary than our judgments; but 
we have not more liberty in the one than in the 
other. (T.609)
I have always found the account given in An Enquiry Concern­
ing Human Understanding of the lack of opposition between 
free will and necessity more clear than the one given in the 
Treatise, and I shall thus draw on it make the following 
points.
Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation 
arises entirely from the uniformity observable in 
the operations of nature, where similar objects are 
constantly conjoined together, and the mind is de­
termined by custom to infer the one from the appear­
ance of the other. These two circumstances form the 
whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter....
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever 
allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these 
two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions 
of men, and in the operations of the mind; it must 
follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doc­
trine of necessity, and that they have hitherto dis­
puted, merely for not understanding each other. (E.VIII,I, 64
Hume here argues that the uniformity of human behaviour, of
which he gives examples gathered from several times and
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place#, supplie# us with ample reason for maintaining that 
the voluntary actions of men are "governed" by necessity, 
given that "necessity" involves no more than constant con­
junction and the readiness of the mind to move from one to
the other of two constantly conjoined events#
Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction be­
tween motives and voluntary actions is as regular 
and uniform as that between the cause and effect in
any part of nature; But also that this regular con­
junction has been universally acknowledgcdamong man­
kind. (B.VIII,I,69)
Necessity in human action thus involves nothing more than
the constant conjunction of motive and action, free-will
also involves nothing which conflicts with this account of
necessity.
for what is meant by liberty, when applied to vol­
untary actions? Me cannot surely mean that actions 
have so little connexion with motives, inclinations 
and circumstances, that one does not follow with a 
certain degree of uniformity from the other, and 
that one affords no inference by which we can con­
clude the existence of the other. For these are 
plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, 
then, we can only mean, a power of acting or not 
acting, according to the determinations of the will.
(£.VZIZ,I,73)
Thus, in reference to what Hume here calls the "voluntary* 
actions of men (by which he appears to mean those actions 
which men do unforced by any other physical body), there is 
no distinction between those done freely and those done under 
necessity. If this is true, then, as he himself concludes, 
it makes no sense to distinguish in the case of qualities 
of mind, between those which are free (or "voluntary"), and 
those which are under necessity (or "involuntary"), in order 
to distinguish those which ought to be subject to moral ap­
proval or disapproval, and those which ought not.
His position is of course very close to the one which 
william James in his essay "The Dilhmma of Determinism" called
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"soft determinism", although Rune does not go on to make the 
point normally made by modern "soft deteminists", that al­
though all events may be part of a causal relationship, there 
still remain many human actions which can be counted as in 
some sense voluntary, and which can be significantly distin­
guished from other human actions which could be classified as 
involuntary. His conclusion is rather closer to that James 
called "hard determinism", in that he abandons the distinc­
tion altogether as useless. Z myself would argue for the po­
sition of modern "soft determinism", and maintain that it is 
possible to make a voluntary-involuntary distinction with 
reference to human actions and motives, and, of course, that 
such a distinction is sufficient to be the basis of a distinc­
tion between qualities which are properly subject to moral 
approval or disapproval, and those qualities which are on the 
other hand subject to an approval or disapproval more properly 
classified as non-moral. Once again, I would not claim that 
the distinction is in any sense clear cut and easy to apply, 
but just that it can, albeit fussily and with some difficulty, 
be made.
Bums's argument in this section is not only that the 
notion of voluntariness is irrelevant to distinguishing be­
tween qualities which are subject to moral approval or dis­
approval and those which are not, but al9P, that no useful 
distinction can be made between moral virtues and natural 
abilities on such a basis. He used two different arguments# 
that moral virtues are distinguished from other qualities 
of mind by whether or not they arouse the appropriate feel­
ings of moral approval or disapproval, and not by any char­
acteristics they may have beside this power, and that, in any
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case, all qualities of mind are equally voluntary and/or in­
voluntary, so that the distinction is meaningless. I have 
argued against both of these positions, and maintain, in op­
position to Hume, that a distinction can be made between 
voluntary and involuntary qualities of mind, and that such a 
distinction is relevant for distinguishing between moral and 
non-moral approval or disapproval, at least to the extent 
that it is a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition 
of moral approval or disapproval that the quality so approved 
or disapproved be voluntary. I would also maintain that it 
is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of a mental 
quality's being a moral virtue in contrast to a natural abil­
ity, that It be voluntary. 1 do not think, however, that 
there exists any simple set of criteria to distinguish vir­
tues from natural abilities, although there appear to be some 
clear cases of qualities which are virtues and not simply 
natural abilities (benevolence) and some clear cases of 
qualities which are natural abilities and not virtues (the 
ability to sing well). A few of the features of a quality 
which might be taken into account in attempting to formulate 
such a distinction are# the extent to which a quality can 
be developed by most people (it seems to me that we expect 
most people to be able to develop any particular quality we 
call a moral virtue), the value or usefulness of the quality 
in question (some qualities, such as a particular charming 
habit, might be open to development by most people, but seem 
too trivial to be called moral virtues) and the extent to 
which a particular quality could be said to be an exemplifi­
cation of motives (benevolence might well be analysed as the 
disposition to have certain kinds of motives, the ability to
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be a mathematician surely could not). Just how these vari­
ous factors might be weighed and taken into account in de- 
termin ih? whether a particular quality is a virtue or a 
natural ability is probably impossible to outline in any 
great detail or exactness* However, I would submit that 
they are all relevant.
Hume, however, when he claims that a distinction be­
tween moral virtues and natural abilities is specious and 
irrelevant, would appear to be denying that any of these 
factors have any relevance in distinguishing moral virtues 
or vices. However, certain things that he says about moral­
ity and the virtues would suggest that he seems to consider 
at least some of them relevant.
At this point 1 would like to refer to a point I 
made earlier in this chapter, when I distinguished two sep­
arate positions which Hume appeared to hold with regard to 
the nature of the virtues and vices. The first position 
was that virtues and vices were distinguished purely on the 
grounds of the sensations of pleasure or pain which they 
cause in the observer. It is upon this position that Hume's 
arguments against distinguishing between virtues and natural 
abilities have been based. It will be remembered, however, 
that there is a second position derivable from Hume's many 
comments on the subject, in brief, that moral virtues are 
those qualities cf mind which can be analysed as being dis­
positions to have motives of a certain type, and which cause 
in the observer feelings of pleasure, which vary slightly 
according to the virtue in question, but which are suffici­
ently similar as to be recognisably feelings of moral ap­
proval. The important point for the question under discussion
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here Is that moral virtues are dispositions to have certain 
kinds of motives. Thera are a large number of qualities of 
mind which can only with the greatest difficulty be regarded 
as fitting that analysis. One might consider wit or charm 
of this class, or the ability to do mathematics. It seems 
to me that this would provide an excellent basis for distin­
guishing between moral virtues and natural abilities, at 
least to the extent that some qualities of mind which are 
not analysable as dispositions to have certain sorts of mo­
tives, and hence not as moral virtues, would be classifiable 
as natural abilities.
In reference to another of the factors that I sug­
gested might be relevant in distinguishing between moral 
virtues and natural abilities, that of the value or useful­
ness of the quality involved, I again think Bume suggests 
that this factor plays a role in moral evaluation and hence 
might be useful for distinguishing moral virtues and vices 
from other qualities of mind. One of the most important 
reasons why we regard certain qualities of mind with moral 
approval is that they are useful. To quote again a passage 
already referred toi
Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuoua, 
which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every 
quality, which produces pain, is call'd vicious.
This pleasure and this pain may arise from four 
different sources. For we reap a pleasure from 
the view of a character, which is naturally fitted 
to be useful to others, or to the person himself, 
or which is agreeable to others, or to the person 
himself. (T.591)
His position appears to be that if a quality is useful or
agreeable, then it is morally approved of, and if it is not
just useless, but actually detrimental, or disagreeable,
then it is the subject of moral disapproval. If this is the
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case, then these criteria leave open the possibility of there 
being qualities of mind which are neither useful nor detri­
mental, but merely useless, and qualities of mind which are 
neither agreeable nor disagreeable, but neutral. Moral eval­
uation of such qualities would appear to be Inappropriate, 
on Hume's own grounds, and such qualities of mind would be 
neither moral virtues nor moral vices. Although I do not 
think, that this distinction would provide a particularly 
useful basis for distinguishing between moral virtues and 
natural abilities (there is no reason to believe that natural 
abilities are on the whole neither useful nor agreeable), it 
at least allows one to argue that Hume's own position allows 
for distinguishing moral virtues and vices from other qual­
ities of mind.
In conclusion, then, I have tried to show two things, 
with reference to a possible distinction between natural 
abilities and moral virtues; first, that I think that Hume 
is wrong in dr^^ing that such a distinction can be made, or 
that it is irrelevant, if made, to morality, and secondly, 
that Hume's own account of morality suggests that he himself 
either implicitly makes the distinction, or that, at the 
very least, supplies grounds for making it. I think Hume 
is actually inconsistent in this matter. His arguments about 
moral approval or disapproval being applicable only to mo­
tives (T.477) appear to be irreconcilable with the sections 
of the Treatise where he argues that physical attributes, 
among other things, are the subject of moral approval or 
disapproval (T.614ff). I would regard the former position 
as being more acceptable.
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, Hume
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makes a distinction botween two kinds of moral virtues, the 
natural virtues and the artificial virtues. I zegard this 
distinction as of crucial Importance to his account of mo­
rality. I would like to make a few preliminary general points 
about this distinction before beginning a detailed analysis 
of the natural and artificial virtues. As Pall Ardal makes 
quite clear,* he does not mean by "artificial" either "un­
real" or "unnatural to human beings" but rather "produced by 
human Inventiveness". It should be pointed out here that 
genetic or historical explanations of the development of the 
artificial virtues are largely irrelevant in Hume's account; 
he is primarily interested in the analysis of these virtues 
as they presently exist. An artificial virtue is one
"that produces pleasure and approbation by means 
of as artifice or contrivance, which arises from
the circumstances and necessity of mankind." (T.477)
These artifices or contrivances appear to be rules, either
legal or conventional, which govern the conduct of men. The
rules, reference to which is an intrinsic part of the motives
underlying the artificial virtues, in a manner which will be
discussed later,
"are artificial, and seek their end in an oblique 
and indirect manner, nor is the interest, which 
gives rise to them, of a kind that cou'd be pur­
su'd by the natural and inartificial passions of 
men." (T.497)
The artificial virtues are not foreign to man, but require 
some social structure and some agreed set of rules or con­
ventions before they can exist.
It should not be assumed from this, however, that 
Hume is positing the existence of some sort of Rousseau-like
p 162.
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statecf nature in which the natural virtues would exist, 
without any artificial virtues. Nor is he arguing that rules 
or conventions never have any relevance to the practice of 
the natural virtues. Certain of the natural virtues, such as 
generosity, for example, would a good deal of the time involve 
the notion of property, which presupposes some social conven­
tions. The difference between the natural and the artificial 
virtues on this point is that in particular cases the natural 
virtues may involve reference to rules or conventions, where­
as the artificial virtues necessarily involve reference to 
such conventions. The difference will be seen partly in the 
typical motives underlying these classes of virtues. The 
motives underlying the artificial virtues necessarily involve 
reference to a social convention, the motives underlying the 
natural virtues do not, although the exercise of the natural 
virtues often requires a social structure. As well Hume does 
appear to believe that education is sometimes necessary in 
the development of the natural virtues.
Thus, it is possible to get clear, on a somewhat 
superficial level, what the distinction is. The artificial 
virtues are dependent upon some "artificial contrivance" in 
order to exist and be put into practice; that is, they re­
quire "artificial" rules or conventions in a social struc­
ture, whereas the natural virtues do not. A comparison of 
justice, Hume's paradigm example of an artificial virtue, 
and benevolence, one of the natural virtues, will make the 
point more clear. Before a man can deliberately perform a 
just act, as a just act, and not as an act which accident­
ally conforms to the rules of justice, for example, one in­
volving the transfer of property, he must know what the laws
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or rules are of the society of which he is a member. If he 
does not know the laws or rules, the action ha performs nay 
or may not be just, but he cannot have deliberately performed 
a just act. On the other hand, a man can deliberately per­
form an act of benevolence, for example, one of relieving 
suffering, without knowing what the laws or rules of his 
society are. Laws, rules, or conventions are not necessary 
for benevolence, whereas they are necessary for justice.
This description is obviously open to qualifications, but 
it should be sufficient to give a general idea of the dis­
tinction which Hume makes. A more detailed account of this 
distinction will follow from an analysis of the natural and 
artificial virtues.
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CHAPTER 3 
Thm Mature! Vi.rtumg
name gives, in various places throughout the Third 
Booh o.” the Treatise, a long list of the qualities of mind 
he considéra to ho natural virtues: humanity (relief of 
suffering), beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, 
moderation, equity, constancy, fortitude, magnanimity, pru­
dence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, entcr- 
prize, meekness, dexterity, cleanliness, wisdom, gooT-sense, 
wit, eloquence, and good hunour. Aa could ba expected frora 
my previous comments, I view thlm list as unnecessarily broad, 
even though I have excluded the qualities mentioned in that 
unfortunate section where îîumo discusses bodily attributes 
(T.614 ff) and appears to include such items as regularity of 
features, broad shoulders, firm joints, and taper legs among 
the natural virtues. I see no good purpose which might be 
served by considering each of the virtues listed, to deter­
mine whether they ought to be included within a list of moral 
virtues... some I think might well be eliminated, but the point 
is not very important.
The first thing that ought to bo considered is the
motives characteristic of the natural virtues, since virtues
are to be analyzed in terms of motives. In the case of each
of the natural virtues there is, Kume claims, an appropriate
natural motive;
no action c?n ie virtuous, or morally good, unless 
there be in human nature gome motive to produce it,
distinct from the sense of its morality. (T .479)
In the case of the virtue of benevolence, for example, there 
is a natural motive to perform the sort of action which is
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called benevolent, or rather, a disposition to have the nat­
ural motive to perform tho sort of action called benevolent. 
This motive does not involve the notion of performing a mor­
ally good action, that la, this natural motive cannot be 
analyzed as a combination of the desire to perform a specific 
action and the desire to perform a morally good action. It
is not clear from the text what the nature of this natural
motive is. To iknow from the small amount of detail available 
that it must be some sort of natural motive end that it can­
not be a regard to the virtuousness of the action:
the virtuous motive must be different frora the
regard to the virtue of the action. (T.478)
The following model might begin to give us some sort of idea
of the characteristic motive underlying a natural virtue; a
man has a virtue if and only if he has a settled disposition
to do acts of a certain type, each of which acts he wants to
do because he has a certain sort of thought concerning that
act and/or its circumstances; and in no case is that thought
the thought "doing this would be an instance of benevolence
(for example)” or "doing this would be the morally right thing
to do". Bume argues at one point that;
A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, 
isetill pleas'd to perform crateful actions, and 
thinks he has, by that means, fulfill'd his duty..,*
But tho', on some occasions, a person may perform 
an action merely out of regard to its moral obliga­
tion, yet this still supposes in human nature some 
distinct principles, which are capable of producing 
the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action 
meritorious. (T.479) italics mine
The first part of the quoted passage does appear to suggest
that a man who performs an action because (from the motive
that) the action in question is one typical of a particular
virtue, does not have that virtue and is not deserving of
moral approval (if we take the notion of not having fulfilled
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cr.Q*s duty to be equivalent to not being deserving of noral 
avqroval), However, given that, the second sentence right 
he taken to suggest that a ran ray perform an action out of 
regard to its moral obligatoriness, and still be the subject 
of moral approbation, provided that ho has at sore tire 
(v'hether this may be only once, or frequently, is another 
question, although the notion of a disposition suggests fre­
quently) , performed the action from some other motive than 
a regard to its moral worth. However, none of this is at 
all helpful in attempting to reconstruct the nature of the 
motive which must underlie a natural virtue; it only makes 
clear that Ilume thought there must be such a motive.
The paradigm example of a natural virtue in the 
Treatise is the virtue of benevolence. Benevolence is actu­
ally a rather wide-reaching virtue, seeming to include a 
large number of different features,
from theso principles (sympathy and the general 
point of view) wa may easily account for that 
merit, which is commonly ascrib'd to generosity 
humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fi- 
delity, zeal, «1 i ff in ter e stfic.no s s, liberality, and 
all those other qualities, which form the charac- 
tcr of good and benevolent. (T.6C3)
However, in general it appears to be analyzed by Hume as cer­
tain sorts of desires, broadly described as the desire for 
the happiness of the person who is the object of the desire.
Certain calm desires, which, tho* they be real 
passions, produce little emotion in the mind....
These desires are of two kinds; either certain 
instincts originally implanted in our natures, 
such as benevolence and resentment, the love of 
life, and kindness to children.... (T.417)
The passions of love and hatred are always fol­
lowed by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence 
and anger. (T.367)
According as wa are possess'd with love or hat­
red, the correspondent desire of the hkppiness
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cr misery cf the person, who 1b the object of
thasa passions, arises in the mind. (T.368)
To ba banavolant, than, is to dasira that paopla be happy, 
and the banavolant man is tha man who dasiras tha happiness 
of other people. Tha problem with this analysis, however, 
is that tha dasira that paopla ba happy does not quite count 
as being a motive, and not even clearly as being a disposi­
tion to have certain sorts of motives, since it is certainly 
conceivable that a man might dasira tha happiness of others 
without aver choosing to do anything to contribute to that 
happiness. Such a man would not really have tha virtue of 
benevolence, if that is to ba analysed in terms of disposi­
tions to have certain sorts of motives, and, as a matter of 
fact, I would doubt whether we would want to call such a man 
benevolent in any case.
Perhaps considering the problem from the point of 
view of an agent in a specific situation would further help 
to clarify the question. Let us then consider a man seeing 
another man in trouble of some sort, say drowning. It ap­
pears to me that the agent could have several different 
sorts of motives, all concerned with the rescue of the other 
man. For example, the agent could want to jump into the 
lake after the man, could want to rescue the man in some way 
or another, could want to do the right thing in the situa­
tion, which may or may not bo rescuing the man, could want 
to jump into the lake after the man because this would be 
a way of rescuing him, or could want to rescue the man if 
the man promised a healthy reward. The question low is, 
which of these motives could be considered^ to fit the classi­
fication of a natural motive underlying tho virtue of bene­
volence. We can first of all easily eliminate the motive.
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wanting to do tho right thing in tho situation, since this 
is cloarly a motive concerned with the moral worth of the 
action, which name has not allowed, 'J,anting to rescue the 
nan for a reward can also, I think, be eliminated, since it 
looks nore like a motive underlying tha vice of greed rather 
than the virtue of benevolence; it is simply inappropriate, 
Jloae of the other three possible motives I have listed can 
be 30 easily rejected as tlie appropriate natural motive. 
However, the first one suggested, wanting to jump into the 
lake after the man, I think will also fail to fit the classi­
fication, If a virtue is to be analyzed in terms of a dis­
position to have certain sorts of motives, then a disposition 
to jump into lakes after people will not quite do as an ap­
propriate underlying motive for the virtue of benevolence* 
it see’ns at least somewhat incomplete. Jumping into lakes 
after people is an appropriate motive only in certain partic­
ular situations* when people are actually in the water and 
In danger of drowning, A man v^ ho attempted to rescue people 
only in that situation and in no other would surely not be 
regarded as having tho virtue of benevolence, (Ee would 
probably be regarded as being at least slightly mad, but this 
is another question, with which I am not here concerned),
■ha are thus left with two possible motives from the 
list I suggested,,.wanting to rescue the man in soma way or 
another, and wanting to jump into tha lake after the nan be­
cause it would ba a way of rescuing bin. There seems to me 
to be very little difference between these two. Both are 
examples of the dasira to rescue the drowning man, thé second 
one having added a specific way of going about fulfilling 
this desire, I would thus suggest that wanting to rescue the
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drowning man might ##rvo as tha appropriate natural motive 
underlying the virtue of benevolence. However, expressing 
it in that way leaves my argument open to the same criticism 
I made above, that the desire to rescue a drowning man is 
only appropriate in particular situations, that is, when 
there is actually a man in danger of drowning, and that we 
would not regard a man as benevolent who only wanted to 
rescue drowning men, and was not concerned with rescuing men 
in burning buildings, for example, or was not interested in 
helping people unless they were in danger of dying. However, 
I think that wanting to rescue a drowning man can be sensibly 
described as being an example of wanting to help a person in 
difficulties; wanting to rescue a drowning man would be the 
sort of motive appropriate to the virtue of benevolence.
The point of this discussion is that if, as Hume 
claims, the natural virtues are to be analysed in terms of 
particular sorts of motives, the only sorts of motives which 
would fit his requirements are those of the sorti wanting to 
help a person in difficulties, or wanting some person to be 
happy, (in these circumstances) which amounts to the same 
thing. The virtue-motive must embody the general aim, such 
as helping a person in difficulties, it will not have been 
captured in a description of the specific intention to act, 
such as "jumping in to save this man". That is, the motives 
underlying the natural virtues are best described in terms 
ofçtipral purposes, rather than the intentions to do specific 
actions. Thus a man having the virtue of benevolence would 
be a man having a disposition to have motives to help people 
or make people happy; a man with the virtue of frugality, to 
save money; a man with the virtue of industry, to work hard.
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and 80 forth. Nona of these motives necessarily involve ref­
erence to the moral worth of these purposes, which meets one 
of Hume's requirements, and all of them could be described 
as being "natural", in the sense that the thought characteris­
tic of the motive makes no necessary reference to any rule or 
convention, which is what Hume appears to require to call a 
motive natural. Z discussed this point in Chapter 2 above. 
There is still the problem about whether the motive to help 
people in difficulty is a sort of general desire, or whether 
it is better analyzed as a number of specific desires in 
specific situations; that is, does the benevolent man, for 
example, have a general desire to help people, which he puts 
into practice when appropriate situations arise, or is it 
just the ease that when the appropriate situation arises, he 
then has the specific desire to help people in that situation. 
Clearly both eases are as a matter of fact possible, but the 
question is whether one or the other better accords with 
Hume's theory, as what he means by a natural motive. He 
several times refers to "principles" in the human mind as 
being the true object of moral approval or disapproval#
(T.575, T477, T608). It is on the basis of these sorts of 
comments that Z have been discussing the virtues as being 
dispositions to have certain kinds of motives, since the 
emphasis on character and certain principles suggests that 
Hume does not regard a single instance of a morally desirable 
motive as being indicative of the possession of a virtue. 
However, it is also possible that he would not regard a 
collection of particular motives of a certain kind as indic­
ative of character, but rather a more general sort of motive, 
of the wanting to help people in general sort. The general
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desire to help people might, in other words, be better de­
scribed es a principle, or character, than would a series 
of particular desires to help people in particular situa­
tions*
There are certain situations in which the distinction 
Z have been suggesting could not be clearly made. For ex­
ample, a man may always, when faced with a situation where 
another person needs help, want to help him, without being 
aware of a general desire to help people. However, if he 
always did, then it would seem very strange to say that he 
did not have a general desire to help people; it is not clear 
what more would be necessary to having such a desire (and 
at least in such a case it looks as though awareness of one's 
desires is surely not a necessary condition of having them).
On the other hand, a man may frequently desire to help people, 
but only in certain sorts of situations, and never in other 
sorts, as in my previous example of a man who only wants to 
help people who are drowning. Of this man it would appear 
not to be true that he had a general desire to help people, 
and thus there is a distinction to be made between having a 
general desire to help people, ànd having, in particular 
situations, the particular desire to help people in those 
situations. Perhaps the distinction to be made is not be­
tween general and particular desires, but rather between, 
on the one hand, the man who either has a general desire to 
help people, or else, in a wide and frequent variety of 
situations, has particular desires to help people in those 
situations, and, on the other hand the man who only has the 
desire to help people in a limited number of situations.
Zt would seem to me to make sense to say that the former
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man had a disposition to have motives of a particular sort 
which would characterise him as being benevolent, whereas 
the latter man did not. Zt also seems to me that both the 
man who had a general desire to help people which was put 
into practice or action in a variety of different situations, 
and the man who, in a wide variety of different situations, 
frequently had the specific desire to help people in those 
situations, would be exhibiting the certain character o^ prin­
ciple which Hume requires for moral approval. Looked at in 
these terms, the distinction between a general desire, and 
a disposition to have specific desires of a certain kind, 
seems insubstantial. What is necessary, however, is that the 
specific desires should embody a general purpose.
It might be objected that describing the motives 
underlying the virtues in terms of purpose might be bringing 
in a consideration of the moral value of action, in the sense 
that a desire to help a person in difficulties might involve 
implicitly the belief that to do so would be morally admi­
rable. However, I do not i%nk that this is necessarily the 
case. Surely one can want to help people In difficulty, 
because they are in difficulty, without the prior recogni­
tion that this would be morallypraiseworthy; and even if a 
sophisticated or selfconscious agent were disposed to have, 
together with this motive, the thought "this action is morally 
praiseworthy", it is not this thought that is operative in 
the motive of benevolence, but the thought, "this man needs 
help". The same I think is true of the other natural virtues 
such a frugality and industry; the desire to save one's 
money or work hard is surely possible without the belief that 
it is morally right. The artificial virtues present some
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complications with respect to this point, but I shall discuss 
them later in the following chapter.
Although this analysis of the virtue of benevolence 
goes beyond the one I ascribed to Hume at the beginning of 
this chapter, in that it contains rather more elements than 
simply the desire that other people be happy, I do not 
think it conflicts with that original account. As I noted 
at that point, the desire that people be happy does not in 
itself entail any particular motives, but the sort of motives 
I have suggested that the benevolent man might well have 
would certainly be typical of a man who desiresother peoples' 
happiness. Given that there are other reasons, taken from 
Hume's own points on other aspects of morality and moral 
assessment, for analyzing virtues in terms of dispositions 
to have certain sorts of motives, I think my account here 
of a typical motive, or a typical sort of motive, fits the 
general outline of Hume's theory without any difficulties.
In maintaining that the virtues are analysable in 
terms of motives which necessarily do not have reference to 
the moral value of the action to be performed, but which are 
in some sense natural to men, Hume is of course taking a po­
sition about moral philosophy diametrically opposed to the 
positions of deontologists such as Kant. Obedience to duty 
is not to Hume the primary moral value, —  it holds, as a 
matter of fact, a very insignificant place in his moral 
theory. According to Hume, a man is morally admirable not 
if he consciously does his duty, but if he has certain 
qualities of character. This aspect of Hume's theory per­
haps makes it easier to understand why he regards the volun­
tary-involuntary distinction, which X discussed in the
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previous chapter, as Irrelevant. He appears to regard moral 
worth in a nan not as eonething that must be developed, but 
as something that he has. This is not to say that Hume would 
argue that moral virtues cannot be developed, but that his 
primary concern is with virtues as they do exist in men.
There seems to be no over-riding reason presented in Hume's 
work to deny that a man might develop a moral virtue, but I 
would think that Hume would not regard him as actually having 
it until such time as he had the appropriate motives without 
considering whether the action was morally correct...the 
Aristotelian notion of developing a virtue through habit does 
not seem ruled out.
On the basis of what little Hume actually says, then, 
I have attempted to construct some sort of picture of what 
he would have regarded as the motives underlying the natural 
virtues. I would next like to consider, in the same way, 
the motives underlying the artificial virtues.
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CÎIAPTEH 4 
The Artificial Virtues
Hume's paradigm example of an artificial virtue Is 
the virtue of justice, and I shall direct most of my discus­
sion in this chapter to that particular virtue. However, he 
does give examples of a number of other artificial virtues, 
such as promise-keeping, allegiance to one's country, chas­
tity and modesty. The important point about the artificial 
virtues is that they depend for their existence upon some 
artifice or contrivance of society.
there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and 
approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, 
which arises from the circumstances and necessity 
of mankind. (r.477)
These rules or conventions are not natural, in the way that 
the laws of nature, for example, are natural; they are es­
tablished by men to fulfill some purpose, and their details 
vary in different societies, and are often changed. From 
this it follows that there can be no natural motives to per­
form the actions corresponding to the artificial virtues in 
the sense that there are natural motives to perform the ac­
tions corresponding to the natural virtues.
nor is the interest, which gives rise to them,
(the rules of justice) of a kind that cou'd be 
pursu'd by the natural and inartificial passions 
of men. (T.497)
In the terms of Hume's description of benevolence, a natural 
virtue, there could be no inborn instincts or passions which 
correspond to the artificial virtues in the way that the 
desire that other people be happy could be an instinet cor­
responding to the virtue of benevolence. The important 
point is not one about the genesis or aetiology of the
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different sorts of virtue. A virtue, to be "natural" in 
Hume's sense, does not have to be instinctual; but it (log­
ically) could be, in the sense that its basic motive makes 
no necessary reference to convention. Similarly, it is not 
simply a natter of fact that there are no natural motives 
to perform acts of, for example, justice, but a matter of 
logic as well. Given that the artificial virtues rest upon 
conventions, the motives underlying these virtues must also 
rest on, and refer to, conventions.
In vain shou'd we expect to find, in uncultivated 
nature, a remedy to this inconvenience; or hope 
for any inartificial principle of the human mind, 
which might controul those partial affections, and 
make us overcome the temptations arising from our 
circumstances. The idea of justice can never serve 
to this purpose, or be taken for a natural prin­
ciple.... (T.488)
As I did with the natural virtues, I shall attempt 
to reconstruct the nature of the motives underlying the 
artificial virtues, concentrating on the virtue of justice. 
There is one condition which the motives underlying the 
artificial virtues must fulfill, as much as those underlying 
the natural virtues# the motives themselves cannot be, or 
contain, a reference to the moral worth of the action to be 
performed, or to the moral worth of acting from such a mo­
tive. Moreover the motives of the artificial virtues must 
be, in some sense, based upon or derived from "natural" mo­
tives, although, as I have noted above, they cannot be 
straightforwardly "natural", since they depend on conven­
tions for their existence. Both of these conditions follow 
from Hume's basic accounts of virtues and the objects of 
moral approval.
No actions can be virtuous, but so far as it pro­
ceeds from a virtuous motive. A virtuous motive.
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therefore, must precede the regard to the virtue; 
end *tis impossible, that the virtuous motive and 
the regard to the virtue can be the same. (T.430)
no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless 
there be in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct from the sense of its morality. (T.479)
There might be some question as to whether Hume actually in­
tended these two conditions to apply to artificial as well 
as to natural virtues. The use of the phrase "no action" in 
both passages creates, I think, a strong presumption that 
he did intend this. As we shall see, the first of these con­
ditions is more difficult to fulfill in regard to the motives 
underlying the artificial virtues than ' it was _ with ref­
erence to the natural virtues and their motives, while the 
sense in which the second is satisfied is not entirely clear, 
either. Like the motives underlying the natural virtues, 
the motives underlying the artificial virtues should prob­
ably be analysed in terms of purposes rather than actions.
This point is (as a matter of fact) rather more obvious in 
the case of the artificial virtues.
Before X begin to discuss the motives underlying the 
artificial virtues, I think it is important to make a dis­
tinction between three things# the account ; Hume gives of 
the origin of the artificial virtues, that is, the reasons 
why such virtues have been developed; the justification of 
the artificial virtues, that is, the reasons why Hume believes 
that these virtues play a valuable role in society and in 
morality; and the actual motives that the man having the 
artificial virtue of justice might be expected to act upon. 
These questions are all closely related, and it is necessary 
to discuss the first two, in order to get a clear picture 
of a typical artificial virtue and the expected underlying
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motives, but they are also distinct questions, and ought not
to be confused, as irume himself says. (T.464)
About the origin of justice. Hums argues;
that *tis only from the selfishness and confin'd 
generosity of men, along with the scanty provision 
nature has made for his wants, that justice derives 
its origin. (T.495)
*Tvas therefore a concern for our own, and the pub- 
lick interest, which made us establish the laws of 
justice. (T.496)
Were men, therefore, to take the liberty of acting,
with regard to the lavs of society, as they do in 
every other affair, they vou'd conduct themselves, 
on most occasions, by particular judgments, and 
uou'd take into consideration the characters and 
circumstances of the persons, as well as the gen­
eral nature of the question. But 'tie easy to ob­
serve, that this vou'd produce an infinite con­
fusion in human society, and that the avidity and 
partiality of men vou'd quickly bring disorder Into
the world, if not restrain'd by some general and
inflexible principles. 'Tvas therefore, with a 
view to this inconvenience, that men have estab­
lish'd those principles, and have agreed to restrain 
themselves by general rules, which are unchange­
able by spite and favour, and by particular views 
of private and public interest. (T.532)
and finally*
In man alone, this unnatural conjunction of infirmity, 
and of necessity, may be observ'd in its greatest 
perfection....'Tis by society alone that he is able 
to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an 
equality with his fellov-craatures, and even acquire 
a superiority above them. By society all his in­
firmities are compensated.... (T.4S4)
Hume's argument is basically that the origin of justice lies
in the selfishness of men. It is by instituting such con­
ventions that men can best fulfill their desires. Recognis­
ing that society is necessary to such fulfillment, men set 
up rules which will maintain that society in being, and thus 
allow them to fulfill their selfish desires in the most con­
venient way possible. Eume does not argue th*t men have no 
"fellow-feeling" whatsoever, but that it is in general 
limited to their friends and relations, and that they need
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more people than these in order to develop a working society. 
The justification for the institution of such rules 
or conventions is that they contribute to the general well­
being of all people in the society.
This system, therefore, comprehending the interest 
of each individual, is of course advantageous to 
the public; tho* it be not intended for that pur­
pose by the inventors, (T,529)
Since this is the case, individual cases of injustice are 
seen to cause pain, and by means of the operation of sym­
pathy (a topic which we shall consider in detail in the fol­
lowing chapter) this causes moral disapproval in the observer.
But tho* in our own actions we may frequently lose 
sight of that interest, which we have in maintaining 
order, and may follow a lesser and more present in­
terest, we never fail to observe the prejudice we 
receive, either mediately or immediately, from the 
injustice of others; as not being in that case either 
blinded by passion, or bypass'd by any contrary temp­
tation, Nay when the injustice it so distant from 
us, as no way to affect our interest, it still dis­
pleases us; because we consider it prejudicial to 
human society, and pernicious to every one that ap­
proaches the person guilty of it, ve partake of 
tteir uneasiness by symrathv; and as every thing, 
which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the 
general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever pro­
duces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denomi­
nate! Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of 
moral good and evil follows upon justice and injus­
tice,.., Thus yelf-lffterest is the original motive 
to the establishment of justice; but a sympathy 
with public interest Is the source of the roral 
approbation which attends that virtue. (T,499-500)
Thus the artificial virtues are justified in their existence; 
in the sense of being the object of moral approval, because 
they contribute to the general happiness of all of the mem­
bers of society, or, in other words, because they are useful.
Having reached this point, we can begin to consider 
the rather thorny problem of the motives one might expect 
the man possessed of an artificial virtue to have.
If one attempts an analysis parallel to the analysis
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given of the motives underlying benevolence, one would say 
that the virtue of justice consisted of a disposition to
have desires to do the sort of actions called just, but not
because there is some moral value in acting this way or from 
these &otives. In the case of benevolence, it was fairly
simple to describe the typical desires as desires to make
people happy, or to help people in difficulty, or any other
of the sorts of desires typical of the benevolent man, all
of these desires certainly being possible without there be­
ing any prior recognition that such desires would be typical 
of the virtue of benevolence, or that having such desires 
was morally praiseworthy. However, it is not so easy to 
come up with a parallel description of the typical desires 
underlying the virtue of justice. The first answer which 
would come to mind is the desire to do the just or right or 
correct thing in the situation. But this answer apparently 
would not do for Bume, since it fairly clearly seems to be
an appeal to the moral value of acting in such a fashion.
Presumably this could be avoided in some degree by analys­
ing "the desire to do the right or just action" as "the 
desire to act according to the rules of justice*. Providing 
this desire does not necessarily involve the thought that 
the rules of justice, or acting in conformity with the rules 
of justice, has moral value, then this could be submitted 
#s a typical desire underlying the virtue of justice, which 
desire is not a regard to the moral value of so acting.
There are, however, at least two problems concerned 
with this proposed desire. The first is that this descrip­
tion of the desire immediately leads one to ask# why follow 
the rules or conventions of justice? The desire to follow
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the rules of justice does not appear to be the same sort of 
desire as the desire, say, to help people in difficulty, in 
the sense that it could not be regarded as an end in itself, 
in the way that the latter desire could. There is something 
strange about the desire to follow the rules of justice, 
but not because doing so would be the right thing to do. I 
am not arguing that no one could have such a blind desire, 
and I shall later discuss the proposition that Bume might 
regard it as a good thing if such blind desires were developed 
in people, but rather that such a desire is unsuitable as 
the foundation of a virtue. At the very least, the desire 
would have to be one to follow the rules or conventions of 
justice blindly, since following the rules of soccer does 
not make one just. It is not entirely clear how these rules 
would be picked out and distinguished from other possible 
rules, if not on the basis of their "justice", which is very 
difficult to reduce to a non-moral concept.
If we leave aside for the moment the possibility 
that the underlying motives of the virtue of justice are 
desires to follow a certain set of rules or conventions, 
blindly, we might first of all consider what sort of reasons 
one might have for following these rules. It will remembered 
that Hume said that the motive for establishing the rules 
of justice was basically self-interest, whereas the moral 
value attributed to following these rules arose from the 
pain felt, either directly or sympathetically, when they 
were not followed. I do not think that one can derive 
directly from this that the motive for following the rules 
of justice in any particular case is self-interest, or for 
that matter, self-interest combined with limited benevolence.
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There is no theoretical reason for supposing that the motive 
for establishing something will be the same as the motive 
for acting in accordance with this establishment, even if 
one assumes that the same people are concerned with both 
aspects. In the case of the rules of justice, it might well 
be the case that although the motive for establishing these 
rules was self-interest, the reason for following them is 
the desire not to cause other men pain, which is not the 
same motive.
In any case, it is clear that in particular situa­
tions, neither self-interest nor benevolence, however wide 
or limited, would necessarily dictate the following of the 
rules.
If we examine all the questions, that come before any 
tribunal of justice, we shall find, that, considering 
each case apart, it wou'd as often be an instance of 
humanity to decide contrary to the public good; and 
'tie only the concurrence of mankind, in a general 
scheme or system of action, which is advantageous.
(T.579)
single acts of justice may be contrary, either to 
public or private interest.... (T.497)
Thus, for single acts of justice, the motive cannot consis­
tently be either self-interest, benevolence, or a combina­
tion of both, since there are frequently cases where any of 
these possible motives would dictate an action different 
from the one prescribed by the rules of justice. The same 
would be true of any other possible motive one might imagine 
as appropriate in particular cases# there would always be 
some case where the motive would dictate an action contrary 
to the rules or conventions of justice. The only remaining 
motive would then be the desire to conform to such rules or 
conventions.
Tho question them shifts to what motive there could
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be for following tho rule* of justice as a whole. Once again, 
it is not immediately obvious that because the motive for 
establishing the rules of justice is self-interest, it will 
be the case that the motive for adhering to them will also be 
self-interest. One can always point to Glaucon and Adeimantus 
in Book XX of Plato's Republic, whose position could be des­
cribed as advocating the establishment of such rules out of
self-interest, but who would argue that once the rules are 
established, self-interest dictates that one not obey them, 
so long as one can do so secretly. Thus, it is not clear 
that the motive for following the rules of justice in gen­
eral is self-interest.
Kume argues that#
sympathy with public interest is the source of 
the moral approbation which attends that virtue 
TTusticeJ, (T.500)
ve never fail to observe the prejudice we receive,
either mediately or immediately, from the injus­
tice of others. (T.499)
We disapprove of injustice as practiced by others, since we 
see that it causes pain, and this perception causes us pain, 
thereby arousing the feeling of moral disapproval. It may 
be that this process might be attributed to feelings of 
benevolence in the observer, or the desire to see other men 
happy. If this is the case, it then might be argued that 
benevolence is our motive for obeying the rules of justice 
in general. However, I do not find this analysis entirely 
convincing either. First of all, our reasons for approving 
an action by another person may well not be our reason for 
doing that sort of action ourselves. For example, we may 
approve of the virtue of frugality in another person be­
cause we see that it leads to his happiness and we desire
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his happiness, but yet our own motive for being frugal is 
not that doing so will make us happy, but simply because we 
have the natural desire to be frugal. Hence, that we ap­
prove of justice as practised by other people because of 
the virtue of benevolence, it does not follow that benevo­
lence is our own motive for following the rules of justice. 
In any case, to say that the reason we morally disapprove 
of actions which cause pain for other people is that we have 
the virtue of benevolence, is to reduce ell of morality to 
benevolence, since all judgments of moral approval or disap­
proval are based on pleasure and pain. It is not because 
we feel benevolence that we approve of certain actions or 
motives, and disapprove of others, it is because they cause 
us pleasure or pain, either directly, or by sympathy, and 
this immediately arouses the feelings of moral approval or 
disapproval. In the end I do not think that it can be es­
tablished in this way that benevolence is the underlying 
motive of the virtue of justice, in the sense that it is 
the motive for following the rules of justice in general.
The question then to be asked is, can it be estab­
lished by any other means that self-interest or benevolence 
or a combination of these two form the motive for following 
the rules of justice in general? I do not think so. For 
one thing, I do not think that self-interest is appropriate 
at all, since surely self-interest alone would dictate that 
one follow the rules of justice so long as they are to one's 
advantage, but otherwise, do one's best secretly to circum­
vent them; secretly, so as not to damage the fabric of 
society, upon which one's happiness depends. Benevolence, 
also, will not do, since the rules of justice contribute to
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the happiness of the whole society, not just to any partic­
ular group, and Ruiae is quite clear that we do not have a 
feeling of benevolence which extends to all of society, and, 
as a matter of fact, if we did, the rules of justice would 
be totally unnecessary.
experience sufficiently proves, that men, in the 
ordinary conduct of life, look not so far as the
public interest, when they pay their creditors,
perform their promises, and abstain from theft, 
and robbery, and injustice of every kind. That
is a motive too remote and too sublime to affect
the generality of mankind, and operate with any 
force in actions so contrary to private interest 
as are frequently those of justice and common 
honesty. (T.481)
Finally, given the lack of general benevolence, X do not 
think that any combination of the natural motives of self- 
interest and benevolence would serve as the motive for fol­
lowing the rules of justice in general. Her can I think of 
any other "natural" motive which might serve the purpose 
for us.
Probably the search for some "natural" motive to 
underlie the virtue of justice, in the sense either of par­
ticular desires to perform acts of justice in particular 
cases, or in the sense of a general desire to follow the 
rules of justice, is simply misguided, Eume docs after all 
say*
we have no real or universal motive for observing 
the laws of equity...the sense of justice and in­
justice is not deriv'd from nature but arises arti­
ficially, tho* necessarily from education, and human 
conventions. (T.483)
and#
(promises] are the conventions of men, which 
create a new'emotive, when experience has taught 
us, that human affairs wou'd be conducted much 
more for mutual advantage.... (T.522)
But to argue that the artificial virtues are not based on
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natural motives at all Is to run into immediate conflict with
one of Hume's own premises,
no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless 
there he in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct from the sense of its morality. (T.479)
(italics mine)
Alternatively, one might perhaps argue that the arti­
ficial virtues are in some sense extensions of the natural 
virtues, or a re-direction of the natural virtues. Such an 
interpretation might be supported by such statements by Bume 
as#
nature provides a remedy in the judgment and under­
standing, for what is irregular and incommodious in 
the affections. (T.489)
It is in reference to this passage that Ardal argues that
the judgment or understanding do not give rise to
any new motive, which opposes, and can be contrasted
with, the passions. The understanding changes only 
the direction of the passions.!
This would suggest that the artificial virtues are not really 
separate virtues from the natural ones, but the sane virtues 
redirected by reason. There are several reasons for reject­
ing such an account. For one thing, Hume does regard jus­
tice as a virtue —  a distinct virtue, and not just an ex­
ample of another virtue, such as benevolence. The largest 
part of the Third Book of the Treatise is concerned with the 
artificial virtues, and with justice in particular, which 
suggests that he does not regard the artificial virtues 
simply as examples of redirected natural virtues, but as 
virtues in their own right, so to speak. In the second 
place, there does, as a matter of fact, seem to be such a 
thing as a desire to be just, or to act justly, which is
^Ardal, ibid, p. 177.
63.
distinct from the desire to be benevolent or prudent, or to 
act benevolently, from self-interest, or from any other 
"natural" motive that one might think of* There are, as 
Hume suggests, many situations In which the just action 
would appear to be morally perverse if considered from any 
other point of view besides that of justice. Ve can use 
as examples such cases as people avoiding a conviction for 
breaking a law which they clearly did break, because of 
some technical error of the judge when giving his summary 
to the jury. Many other examples can clearly be thought of. 
Since Hume suggests thia point, I would present it as argu­
ment for the claim that he himself accepts the distinction 
I am making. There are a number of other reasons why I do 
not believe that the artificial virtues ought to be analysed 
simply as redirected natural virtues, having to do with the 
role rules play in the artificial virtues and their underlying 
motives, and with the difficulty of removing any reference 
to moral value from these motives. Since these points are 
yet to be discussed, I can at this point only suggest that 
the differences between the artificial and natural virtues 
are so great that it is implausible to regard the motives 
underlying the artificial virtues as being merely redirected 
natural motives. X will thus here only say that it is my 
belief that the motives underlying the artificial virtues 
are not redirected versions of benevolence or self-interest, 
or of any other motive typical of another virtue, and that 
it appears that Hume does not in the ease of the artificial 
virtues meet the criterion that these virtues must rest on 
motives which already exist in "human nature”.
We are still left with the problem of what the
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motive* typical of the virtue of justice might be. In partic­
ular cases, I do not think there can be any alternative to 
arguing that the underlying motive must be the desire to do 
the just act, not as a specific kind of action, but as an ac­
tion which is just. Since the rules of justice are "artifi­
cial conventions", and the actions which justice requires 
are very often not the actions which any other natural motive 
would lead one to desire to do, it is clear that there could 
be no consistent natural desire not referring to the rules 
of justice which would lead a person to do all those sort* of 
actions. In the particular case, then, the motive must be a 
desire to conform to a certain set of rules or convention*.
This point can also be made by pointing out that the
rules of justice, being in some sense arbitrary, could vary
from time to time and place to place. Hume does not believe
that they are completely arbitrary, and I am not suggesting
that they are.
Tho* the rules of justice be artificial, they are 
not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to 
call them Lava of lîgturei if by natural wo under­
stand what is common to any species, er even if ve
confine it to mean what is inseparable from the
species. (T.434)
He frequently refers to the rules of justice as being "Lav*
of Nature* (T.520, 523, 567), thus suggesting that although
they are artificial, they are also natural, in the sense
that all men are forced to establish them. Covever, it
still remains that the details, or the manner in which these
fundamental laws of nature and justice are put into practice,
will vary with time and place, and although all men may have
conventions about property, how property is transferred
from one person to another depends to a large degree on the
particular laws of the state. The man who has the virtue of
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justice will not desire to transfer his property by means of 
a particular set formula, but merely to transfer it in the 
legal of just way. Thus, in tho particular case, the motive 
must Involve a reference to the conventions of justice, in 
that the desire must be to act according to these conventions, 
and not merely to perform a particular action.
The question then arises, does such a motive involve 
a reference to the moral value of acting in such a fashion, 
or of acting from such a motive? It would appear that such 
a consideration would be difficult to remove from the partic­
ular case. The agent would appear to want to do something, 
and to want to do it in the just, or correct, or right, way# 
This surely is come reference, however, oblique, to the 
moral value of acting from such a motive, or in such a 
fashion. Hume himself says:
ve have no real or universal motive for observing 
the lavs of equity, but the very equity and merit 
of that observance; and as no action can be equit­
able or meritorious, where it cannot arise from 
some separate motive, there is here an evident 
sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless, 
therefore, wa will allow, that nature has estab­
lish'd a sophistry, and render'd it necessary and
unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of
justice and injustice is not deriv'd from nature, 
but arises artificially, tho* necessarily from 
education, and human conventions. (T.483)
there is naturally no inclination to observe 
promioes, distinct from a sense of their obli­
gation. (T.519)
Therefore I would argue that in the particular case, the
motive underlying the virtue of justice would be the desire
to do something in a just fashion, and that this desire
necessarily involves reference to the moral value of acting
in such a fashion. It also, of course, necessarily involves
reference to the conventions or rules of justice, and thus
the particular motive not only presupposes knowledge of the
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existence of ouch rules. It also involves explicit reference 
to the#. In the particular cage, then, it appears that the 
motives underlying the artificial virtues do not meet the 
criterion that
the virtuous motive mast be different from the
regard to the virtue of the action. (T.478)
We have still to consider the general ease, the mo­
tive that might underlie tho virtue of justice in the sense 
of the motive for following the rules of justice in general.
X am here suggesting that it is not impossible that the just 
man, besides in particular cases having the desire to ful­
fill hie purposes in a just fashion, might also have a gen­
eral desire to be just. This is the same distinction I 
suggested with regard to benevolence, where I suggested that 
the benevolent man might, as well as in particular cases 
having the desire to make people happy, have a general desire 
that people be happy. In the case of benevolence I argued 
that the distinction vas not really very important. In the 
case of justice, and all artificial virtues, I think more 
ought to be made of it. This is because, as I suggested 
earlier, there is something incomplete about the desire to 
follow the rules or conventions of justice in general, in 
the sense that it immediately arouses the question, "why?" 
Since the rules of justice are artificial, there can be no 
natural desire, prior to the establishment of such rules, 
to follow them. Given then that this is an artificial de­
sire, the demand for an explanation of this desire does not 
seom to me misplaced. By "explanation", I do not mean a 
genetic account of how men come to have this desire, but an 
explanation why any man might regard the development of such 
a desire as itself desirable. In other words, what is the
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motive for having much a general desire to be just?
I think that the explanation must be that these rules 
are useful; the same reason, in fact, why the rules were es­
tablished at all. The only other reasonable answer I can im­
agine would be because they are morally correct, and I think, 
because of the artificial nature of these conventions, that 
the former answer is actually more appropriate. Once again,
X think that this analysis involves a conflict with the cri­
terion, that the underlying motive must not be a regard to 
the moral value of the action. To say that something is use­
ful is not of course to say that it is morally valuable, and 
so to say that the underlying motive of the following of the 
rules of justice in general is the desire to follow them 
because they are useful is not the same as to say that it is 
the desire to follow them because they have moral value. 
However, the difference between a regard to the utility of 
an action and a regard to its moral worth seems to me to be 
insufficiently large to support the claim that the motive 
involves no regard to the worth of the action.* Xn any case, 
we still have Hume's statement that:
we have no real or universal motive for observing 
the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit 
of that observance. (T.483)
which seems to me to apply to the general case as well as
to the particular. At the least then, the underlying motive
in the general desire to act justly, or follow the rules of
2
Bernard wand. In "Hume's Account of Moral Obligation” The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 1956, argues that appealing to the 
utility of an action is sufficiently different from appeal- 
Ing to “ Ot.l tb«t Bum* , of tho charge that
he is contradicting himself at this point. I am more dubious 
about this point, and the strength of the distinction than 
Professor Wand.
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justice in general, is the desire to follow them because they 
are useful to achieving a wanted end; it is also possible, 
but not necessary, to claim that this involves a regard to 
the moral value of acting in such a way, just as the partic­
ular motives involve such a desire. And like the motive in 
the particular case, the general motive involves a necessary 
reference to the rules or conventions of justice.
I mentioned at an earlier point that it was possible 
that a man could have a "blind" desire to follow the rules 
of justice, both in general and in particular cases, without 
there being any underlying motive or justification for having 
such a desire. I do not think such blind desires are pos­
sible without at least some people having the sorts of mo­
tives I have been describing above, and I think that the lat­
ter are more properly regarded as the appropriate underlying 
motives of the artificial virtues. However, there are some 
passages in Hume which suggest that he would think that the 
more desirable state of affairs would be one in which every­
one, or most people at least, had such blind desires to fol­
low the rules of justice, so that such desires were more like 
those underlying the natural virtues than the ones I have 
been describing here. such desires or motives would still 
involve the necessary reference to rules, but the regard to 
the moral value or utility of the rules or of acting accord­
ing to the rules would fall away.
For as parents easily observe, that a man is the 
more useful, both to himself and others, the 
greater degree of probity and honour he is endow'd 
with; and that those principles have greater force, 
when custom and education assist interest and re­
flection: For these reasons they are induc'd to 
inculcate on their children, from their earliest 
infancy, the principles of probity, and teach them 
to regard the observance of those rules, by which
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society is maintain'd, as worthy and honourable, 
and their violation as base and infamous. By this 
means the sentiments of honour may take root in 
their tender minds, and acquire such firmness and 
solidity, that they may fall little short of those 
principles, which are the most essential to our 
natures, and the most deeply radicated in our inter­
nal constitution. (T.500-501)
I take this to mean that the artificial virtues can attain 
almost the same degree of "naturalness" as the natural, under 
suitable education, and that this is a desirable end. How­
ever, given that this is only possible with education, I 
would still argue that such unreflecting motives are secon­
dary to the original ones I have discussed above.
As a slight diversion, it might be noted that if Hume 
really did regard as desirable the inculcating of the arti­
ficial virtues in such a way as to eliminate the regard to 
the utility or moral value of acting in such a fashion from 
the motive underlying the virtue, then there is even less 
reason for considering him a Utilitarian than one might al­
ready have thought. The Utilitarian is, after all, normally 
supposed to act from the desire to produce the greatest 
amount of happiness (to put the point briefly and avoid all 
the obvious difficulties involved in formulating the Util­
itarian position), which would appear to involve always con­
sidering the utility or value of his actions before acting. 
Hume, it might be suggested, wants to eliminate as much of 
that sort of consideration as possible, and hence could not 
really be considered a Utilitarian at all.
I have thus concluded that tha motives underlying 
the artificial virtue of justice probably fail to meet both 
of the criteria Eume appeared to consider necessary for the 
motives underlying virtues# they do not appear to exist in 
human nature prior to their being considered of moral value.
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and they do Include a regard to the moral worth of the action 
following from them, or of acting from such a motive. Can 
Hume's position be rescued at all? Perhaps one could argue 
that this is what is meant by an artificial virtue: a virtue 
which is founded upon the moral value which will result from 
its existence, in contrast to a natural virtue, upon which is 
founded the moral value. The artificial virtue may consist 
in the habitual desire to perform acts in accordance with the 
rules of justice, without a necessary reference to their moral 
worth (not necessary because the desire has become habitual), 
this desire having been developed because of the recognized 
moral value of such a desire. However, even this involves 
at some stage a reference to moral value. If one argues this 
way, then the points which Hume makes about motives existing 
in human nature, and not involving reference to moral value, 
are only applicable to the natural virtues, and the artifi­
cial virtues are a different sort of virtue altogether.
If the artificial virtues are distinct from the 
natural virtues, then the motives underlying the artificial 
virtues are distinct from the motives underlying the natural 
virtues. I have already suggested this point, and I think 
that Hume's account of morality necessarily involves this 
distinction. In this analysis of what Hume's theory neces­
sarily involves, I differ from the analysis given by Ardal, 
who argues, in a passage which I quoted earlier, that
the judgment or understanding do not give rise 
to any new motive, which opposes, and can be 
contrasted with, the passions. The understand­
ing changes only the direction of the passions.
I take from this that Ardal's position is that when
nature provides a remedy in the judgment and 
understanding, for what is irregular and incom­
modious in the affections (T.489
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In the production of tho artificial virtues, no new motives 
are produced which underlie the artificial virtues, but 
rather, tho direction of the motives which underlie the 
natural virtues is simply changed. I do not think this is 
an accurate account of what Hume had in mind. In the first 
place, Hume himself argues, in his discussion of promise- 
keeping, which he classifies as an artificial virtue, that 
promises
are the conventions of men, which create a new 
motive, when experience has taught us, that hu­
man affairs wou'd be conducted much more for mu­
tual advantage.*.. (T.522)
(italics mine)
Secondly, there are a number of other arguments, not taken 
directly from Hume, but deducible from his general account, 
that suggest that the theory requires that the motives be 
different, or distinct from the motives underlying the 
natural virtues.
In the case of the natural virtues, there is not much 
difference between a general desire to, say, perform actions 
which will help people who are in difficulties, and a col­
lection of specific desires to help people in difficulty in 
specific situations. I argued earlier that either would do 
as an account of having a disposition to have benevolent 
motives, since the former is really just a generalisation 
of the latter. However, if I am right in arguing that the 
motive for following the rules of justice in general is a 
desire to do something which is useful, whereas the desire 
to be just in a particular situation is to be analyzed as 
a desire to follow the rules of justice, it cannot be said 
that the former is merely a generalisation of the latter.•• 
the situation is at least slightly different. There is
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thus that difference between motives underlying natural and 
artificial virtues, that in the former case, the content of 
general and specific desires appropriate to them is similar, 
while in tho latter case this is not entirely true.
There is secondly the point that the desire to help 
someone in difficulty is a radically different sort of de­
sire from the desire to follow a set of rules. The first de­
sire can be regarded as a desire to do something as an end 
in itself, whereas the second cannot be so regarded, or at 
the least, cannot be so regarded with any degree of comfort# 
—  the question "why?" seems highly applicable in the second 
case, and somewhat inappropriate in the first. Furthermore, 
the desire to follow a set of rules presupposes the existence 
of a set of rules, whereas the desire to help someone does 
not, even though it may be true in some situations that the 
latter desire cannot be put into action without knowledge of 
some rules (the desire, for example, to help a man who has 
gone bankrupt). In the case of the artificial virtues, 
moreover, the desire cannot exist without prior recognition 
of the existence of the convention or rules. For example, 
one cannot desire to be just without recognizing that there 
is such a thing as justice, which in Humean terms is the 
set of rules or conventions in the society. One cannot de­
sire to be chaste, without recognising the existence of 
chastity, again to be accounted for in terms of conventions 
in a society. One can, however, desire to help someone 
without having an analogous sort of knowledge of conventions 
or rules. Thus, although in many cases rules or conventions 
may be relevant to carrying out the desires typical of the 
natural virtues, in the case of the artificial virtues.
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knowledge of at least the existence of such rules is neces­
sary not only for carrying out the desires, but also for 
having the desires.
All of these points suggest that the motives under­
lying the virtue of justice are not redirected versions of 
the motives underlying the virtue of benevolence and pru­
dence, but are distinctly different sorts of motives, and 
thus different motives. The desire to follow a set of rules 
is not just a redirection of the desire to help people, —  
in many cases it may simply conflict with the desire to help 
people, not only on a short-range, but also on a long-range 
basis.
Thus, on the basis of my analysis of Hume's theory 
to this point, I would claim that the motives underlying the 
artificial virtues are distinct and different from the mo­
tives underlying the natural virtues. The question of how 
closely my analysis conforms to what Hume himself says on 
the matter is difficult to answer, since much of what he 
says conflicts with other things that he says, and on the 
basis of just vhat he says, both my interpretation and 
Ardal'8 are plausible. However, in the long run I think 
the theory requires my interpretation. However, I do not 
think, as has been suggested by at least one commentator, 
that the difference between the natural and the artificial 
virtues is on the banis of the "objects" of the virtues.
John B. Stewart suggests that the natural virtues are con­
cerned with personal relationships, whereas the artificial 
vittues are concerned with social relationships.^ It is
*Stewart, J.B. The Moral end Political Philosophy of David 
Bume, New York and London, Columbia U. Press, 1963, p. 105.
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possible to see how Btewart arrived at this idea, since it 
would seem, on first consideration, that relationships be­
tween individual people would bo less likely to be governed 
by rules or conventions than would relationships between 
people in so far as they are members of a society* However, 
even though it is not entirely clear what tho difference is 
between social and personal relations, it would seem to me 
that chastity, an artificial virtue according to Hume, surely 
has #ore to do with personal than social relationships* 
Charity, on the other hand, a natural virtue, might well be 
regarded as having more to do with social than personal re­
lationships*
Stewart also, incidentally, suggests that the dis­
tinction is that the natural virtues are manifestations of 
feelings for other persons, whereas the artificial virtue 
are manifestations of feelings for economic goods,* But 
surely chastity, again, and good manners, two of the artifi­
cial virtues, are only in the most unlikely sense manifes­
tations of feelings for economic goods, whereas frugality, 
a natural virtue, probably is* It is less clear how this 
idea may have arisen. In any case, I am sure that this is 
the wrong way to approach tha problem. Tha artificial vir­
tues, and the motives underlying them, are not, I think, to 
be distinguished by the "objects" of the virtues, but by 
the ways the rules or conventions are logically related to 
the motives.
To summarize to thia point* I have attempted to 
make a distinction between the natural and the artificial
*Ibid., p. 102.
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virtues, ou the basis of the t otives underlying the** • I have 
argued that there are the following differences between the 
two sorts of motives* that the motives underlying the arti­
ficial virtues presuppose a recognition of the existence of 
rules or conventions in a society, and also a recognition 
that these rules are useful, and possibly that they Ihnve 
moral value, whereas the motives underlying the natural vir­
tues presuppose none of these things* that there is no worth- 
whilw distinction to be made, in the case of the natural vir­
tues, between the general desire to do a particular kind of 
action, and the disposition to have particular desires to do 
actions of that kind, whereas, in the case of the artificial 
virtues, there is such a distinction* and finally, that the 
motives underlying the artificial virtues involve a necessary 
reference to a set of rules, whereas the natural virtues do 
not. I have also argued that the motives underlying the ar­
tificial virtues are not merely a redirection of the motives 
typical of the natural motives, but are actually new and 
distinct motives. All of these points lead me to conclude 
that the motives underlying the artificial virtues, since 
they could not exist prior to the establishment of conven­
tions, could not exist* In human nature..«distinct from 
the sense of [their] morality. "
A final problem 1 would like to mention with regard 
to the natural and artificial virtues is that of accounting 
for the value placed upon these virtues. Hume says that
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous 
or vicious* why? because its view causes a pleas­
ure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving 
a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, 
we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. (T.471)
and;
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everything, which gives uneasiness in human actions,.*, 
is call'd Vies, and whatever produces satisfaction,
in the same manner, is denominated Virtue.... (T.499)
The problem then is to discover why it in tlit certain qual­
ities arouse in the observer the appropriate feelings of 
pleasure or satisfaction, pain or uneasiness. The answer to 
this question is given at the end of the Treatise, as one 
of the conclusions;
Virtue is consider'd as means to an end* Means to 
an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. 
...the sentiment of approbation, which arises from 
the survey of all those virtues, that are useful to 
society, or to the person possess'd of them. These 
form the most considerable part of morality. (T.619)
We are also told:
This pleasure [virtue] and this pain [vice] may 
arise from four different sources. For we reap 
a pleasure from the view of a character, which 
is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or
to the person himself, or which is agreeable to
others, or to the person himself. (T.591)
The reason, then, that a character is valued morally is that 
it is useful or agreeable. The agreeability criterion does 
not present much difficulty in itself, except for the fact 
that it might seem to allow too much into morality. How­
ever, sayint that something is useful immediately suggests 
the question "Useful for what?" This is a question that 
Hume does not appear to have ever considered. However, I 
suppose we might say, useful for getting what people want, 
or fulfilling people's desires. This of course presupposes 
that people have various wants or desires, but X think this
can be taken as given, both by us, and by Hume, one would
assume. A character is thus morally valued If it is useful 
for, or leads to, the fulfillment of certain desires that 
people have. Is this account compatible with Hume's claim 
that*
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no action can be virtuous, or norally good, unless 
there be in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct from the sense of its morality, (T.479)
The virtues, I have claimed, are analysable in terms of mo­
tives, or dispositions to have motives of a certain kind. 
Motives lead to actions^ and it would seem reasonable to say 
that it is actions which fulfill people's desires, and not 
the motives per se, So it would seem that certain char­
acters are useful because they lead to actions which ful­
fill people's desires, and further, that this is why they 
are regarded with moral approval, and said to have moral 
value. It might make more sense to describe the situation 
by saying that it is certain states of affaire which are 
initially valuables that is, those states of affairs in 
which desires are fulfilled, and the value of certain mo­
tives derives from the fact that they lead to the produc­
tion of these states of affairs. The difference between 
the natural and artificial virtues woùld then be that the 
motives underlying the natural virtues were those tliat were 
motives to do some action which would immediately fill some 
human desire, whereas the motives underlying the artificial 
virtues were motives to do some action which would only 
indirectly, by means of the general result of some conven­
tion being followed in society, fulfill desires. This 
account does not appear to be inconsistent with any account 
of the natural and artificial virtues given so far. What 
it might appear to be inconsistent with is îîume's insis­
tence that it is motives, and not actions, which are the 
subject of moral value, and that actions only derive their 
value from the motives. My account night be read to suggest 
that the motives derive their value from the actions, or
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at least from the results of the action, rather than the 
other way around.
Pcrhang what la misleading In the suggested account, 
however, is tho emphasis on actions, As I have argued ear­
lier, the motives underlying the virtues are beat described 
as motives to achieve a certain pirpoee, and not to do a 
specific action. For example, the motives underlying the 
virtue of benevolence are desires to help a person, more or 
less, and not the dosire to throw him a rope, although in 
certain situations throwing him a rope nay «11 be the best 
way to help him. The sane, I believe, is true of the arti­
ficial virtues. Thus one might eliminate the action from 
tho notlve-action-stato of affairs account of the derivation 
of value, and argue that the motive derives its value from 
being productive of a desirable state of affairs. This 
account allows one to agree with Hume that an action derives 
its moral value from tho motive behind it, After all, an 
action which may have moral value in one situation would 
not in another, since it depends on the situation in which
the action is performed. To loan a man a jersey ray well
be the act of a benevolent person, when the ran in question 
is chilly, but it will hardly do when what he actually needs 
is a fan. The motive can be the same in two different si­
tuations, for example, to ease a man's discomfort, and the 
state of affairs trought about by the actions resulting 
from tho motive the same, for example, the man's discomfort 
eased, but the actions entirely different, for example, 
loaning bin a jersey or a fan.
It is thus possible to meet this requirement of
Hume's —  a requirement I regard as perfectly reasonable#
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and still claim that tha motive dsrivss its valus from the 
stats of affairs of which it is productive. As well, this 
account does allow one to make sense of the criterion that 
a character is morally valuable if it is useful, since it 
answers the question, "Useful for what?* The meaning of 
"derives* is, however, somewhat different here than when it 
is used in "an action derives its moral value from the mo­
tive". In the latter case, we are saying that an action is 
morally valuable because it results from a morally valuable 
motive; in the former, that a motive is morally valuable 
because it leads to a desirable, but not necessarily morally 
valuable, state of affairs. This I think is the sense of 
Hume's account, if not the actual word. The motive thus 
is the point at which moral value, so to speak, begins. A 
motive or character is regarded with that appropriate feel­
ing of moral approval when it is seen to lead to a state of 
affairs which is desirable.
The difference between the natural and artificial 
virtues could, under this account be described as the dif­
ference between having the motives directly productive of 
a desirable state of affairs, and the motives only indirectly 
so productive. The virtue of benevolence, for emample, 
is the disposition to have motives which lead directly to 
a desirable state of affairs, such as making someonv happy.
On the other hand, the artificial virtue of justice is the 
disposition to have the motive to follow the rules or con­
ventions of justice, which would not in itself lead to a 
desirable state of affairs unless, first of all, there 
were such rules, (a presupposition of there being any such 
desires, of course) and these rules were generally followed.
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Again, this makas it clear that the motive* underlying the 
artificial virtue* are distinct from those underlying the 
natural virtues. Moreover, if we consider the problem from 
the point of view of the pleasure aroused in the observer, 
it would appear to be the case that the reason an artificial 
virtue would be approved would be because it would be recog­
nised to lead to a desirable state of affairs, albeit in­
directly. This indirect aspect again at least suggests that 
part of the motive for acting in conformity with the rules 
of, say, justice, is the recognition that doing so is useful, 
although it certainly does not establish the case. However, 
if the motive for acting is to produce some state of affairs 
which is regarded as desirable, then this very indirectness 
about the artificial virtues suggests some degree of recog­
nition that a desirable end will be reached in such an in­
direct fashion. At the least, this recognition makes the 
motives underlying the artificjWl virtues more complicated 
than the motives underlying the natural virtues, as well as 
suggesting that they may well violate Hume's criterion that 
they must not include a reference to the moral value of the 
actions to follow.
In the end, then, I would argue that the motives 
underlying the artificial virtues are distinct from, and 
have a different logical structure than, the motives under­
lying the natural virtues, and are not simply redirected 
versions of the latter.
As I have suggested earlier in this chapter, the 
distinction between the artificial and natural virtues can 
perhaps be considered from another point of view besides 
that of the nature of the motives underlying them. This
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Is the point of view of the observer, that is the nan who
morally approves or disapproves of certain characteristics.
Characteristics are approved, Hume says, if they are useful
or agreeable to the person himself, or to those who have any
connexion with him. (T.591) He further argues that
Virtue is consider'd as means to an end. Means to 
an end are valued so far as the end is valued. (T.519)
and that
the reflecting on the tendency of characters and 
mental qualities, is sufficient to give us the 
sentiments of approbation and blame. Now as the 
means to an end can only be agreeable, where the 
end is agreeable.... (T.577)
He would thus appear to be arguing that the reason why any 
particular characteristic is regarded as a virtue, or with 
moral approval, is because it leads to an end which is de­
sirable. I do not think that he is arguing that a conscious 
connection is made, in the manner of simple utilitarianism, 
such that an agent must first decide whether or not a char­
acteristic is useful, or leads to an agreeable end, before 
he can decide that such a characteristic is morally valu­
able. Rather, X would claim that he is arguing that this 
is a fact of human nature, that people do naturally feel 
moral approval towards those characteristics which lead to 
desirable ends. He appears to regard it as a causal connec­
tion, rather than a rational inference#
it being an inviolable maxim of philosophy, that 
where any particular cause is sufficient for an 
effect, we ought to rest satisfied with it, and 
not to multiply causes without necessity, we 
have happily attain'd experiments in the artifi­
cial virtues, where the tendency of qualities to 
the good of society, is the sole cause of our 
approbation.... (T.578)
(italics mine)
Although it is not a logical inference from the fact that 
a characteristic leads to a desirable end, to the fact that
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It is morally valuable, it would still sees to be the ease 
that the observer must be able to recognise that the char­
acteristic leads to a desirable end, since surely it is the 
observer's recognition of the fact that it leads to a de­
sirable end, and not just the fact that it does so lead, that 
causes him to morally approve the characteristic. The latter 
case just does not make sense.
This analysis would seem to conflict with a number
of things which Hume says about the immediacy of moral
feelings. For example, he argues that#
some qualities acquire their merit from their being ; 
Immediately agreeable to others, without any tendency 
to the public interest; so some are denominated vir­
tuous from their being Immediately agreeable to the 
person himself, who possesses them. (T.590)
However, these qualities which are immediately agreeable seem 
to be regarded by Hume as being in the minority; —  or at 
least, those qualities whose moral virtue depends upon their 
being immediately agreeable are fewer in number than those 
whose moral virtue lies in their being useful to the attain­
ing of some desirable end.
I am also of the opinion, that reflexions on the 
tendencies of actions have by far the greatest 
influence, and determine all the great lines of 
duty. (T.590)
In any case, it is only some natural virtues which are imme­
diately agreeable, and derive their value from this, since 
the artificial virtues all derive their value from their 
utility. It would seem then that there are two different 
kinds of moral virtues, as seen from the point of view of 
the observer. There are first of all those qualities of 
mind which arouse immediate pleasure in the observer, with­
out considering the ends to which they lead. These qualities 
appear to be a small class of the natural virtues. Secondly
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there ere those qualities, the reflecting upon the ends to 
which they contribute, cause them to be regarded with moral 
approval. These qualities include all of the artificial 
virtues, and the remainder of the natural virtues. A dis­
tinction between the artificial and natural virtues can thus 
not be made on the grounds of whether or not the quality of 
mind called a virtue is immediately agreeable, since some 
natural virtues it would seem are not.
However, it is clear that except in the case of those
natural virtues whose moral value lies in their immediate
agreeability, the cause of the moral value attributed to the
virtues is the recognition of the desirable ends to which
they lead. In this regard, Hume says that;
The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and 
justice lies in this, that the good, which results 
from the former, arises from every single act, and is 
the object of some natural passion; whereas a single 
act of justice, consider'd in itself, may often be 
contrary to the public good; and 'tie only the con­
currence of mankind, in a general scheme or system 
of action, which is advantageous. (T.579)
The point about the good being a result of some natural pas­
sion is, I believe, a reference to the fact that the motives 
underlying the natural virtues exist "normally" in humans, 
whereas those underlying the artificial virtues do not, and 
are developed, as well as being distinct from the former 
motives. This is, of course, the point I was discussing in 
the previous section of this chapter. "Good", of course, 
cannot be taken as meaning "morally good", since Eume is 
quite clear that moral worth resides in motives, not in 
actions. The point he is surely making is that the desir­
able state of affairs which results from the former is one 
which is immediately obtainable by means of that action, 
while the desirable state of affairs which results from the
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latter la only obtainable if everyone adopts a certain pat­
tern of action. If this pattern of action is not fairly 
universally adopted, then the state of affairs resulting from 
the action might quite easily be undesirable rather than de­
sirable. Another way of putting it is that one can consider 
a single action resulting from a natural virtue, by itself, 
and on the basis of this, presumably, judge that the motive 
which produced the action was morally valuable, whereas this 
cannot be done in the case of the artificial virtues. In 
the latter case the action must be considered as related to 
a number of other relating actions, and the whole pattern 
seen as desirable, before one would regard the motive produc­
ing it as being morally valuable. I am not trying to argue 
here that the motive derives its moral value from the ac­
tion, -- this of course would conflict with one of Rime's 
basic principles. Rather, I am arguing that if one considers, 
as Hume does appear to, that motives are judged to be morally 
valuable when they lead to a desired state of affairs, than 
the state of affairs which is desired is more complex in the 
case of the artificial virtues than in the case of the natural 
virtues. It would then follow that if, as I have argued 
above, the observer must be able to recognise that a quality 
of character leads to a desired end before he can regard it 
with moral approval in the case of all but a email class of 
natural virtues, then he must, in the case of the artificial 
virtues recognise that a certain pattern of conduct of which 
the particular action is only am example, will lead to the 
desired end, and not just that one particular action will do 
so. The observer is thus more or less in the same position 
as the agent in reference to the artificial virtues# both must
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recognise the existence of a certain set of rules, the gen­
eral following of which will lead to a desired state of af­
fairs. This is a requirement which of course does not exist 
in the case of the natural virtues.
The moral value, then, that is given to the artificial 
virtues, is dependent on the existence and recognition of 
the value or usefulness of following a set of rules or con­
ventions in reaching a desired state of affairs, whereas the 
moral value which is given to the natural virtues is dependent 
only on the recognition that the practice resulting from the 
virtue leads directly to a desired state of affairs. This is 
a parallel distinction to that made in reference to the mo­
tives underlying the natural and artificial virtues.
An interesting point which arises is the possibility 
of a conflict between the natural and the artificial virtues. 
Such a possibility is hinted at by Kune when he points out 
that
a single act of justice, consider'd in itself, may 
often be contrary to the public good....if we exam­
ine all the questions that corns before any tribunal 
of justice, we shall find, that, considering each
case apart, it wou'd as often be an instance of hu­
manity to decide contrary to the laws of justice as 
conformable to them. (T.579)
It would seem that if one were gifted with the virtues both
of benevolence or humanity and of justice, there would be
cases where the actions dictated by these virtues would be
inconsistent. Part of the solution to this difficulty lies
in the notion of taking a general point of view, a topic
with which I will deal in chapter 6. However, the taking
of a general point of view does not completely dissolve the
conflict between acting benevolently and acting justly.
Nor can one simply say, in reference to any and all particular
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oases, that a person will in the end be better off, presum­
ably the object of benevolence, if he is treated in a manner 
conforming to the rules of justice. As Hume points out in 
the quotation above, very often it would be to the individual's 
advantage to be treated in a manner contrary to the laws of 
justice, although presumably the society as a whol^ would not 
be better off If these rules were disregarded in a large num­
ber of cases. In a way, the conflict seen here is very much 
like the conflict between act and rule utilitarianism, al­
though again I am not suggesting that Hume is a utilitarian.
As It has often been pointed out. It is very easy to construct 
a case in which the breaking of a rule which is justified 
in general on utilitarian grounds, can be itself justified 
on utilitarian grounds. If no one sees me stealing the pen 
from a large department store, to use an example of Slans- 
hard's,^ and the company never misses it, no one will be 
harmed, the general practice of honesty will not be harmed 
by my example, and I will be on the whole better off than 
I warn before. I have never been convinced by arguments which 
attempt to show that in the long run, some harm will result 
from such isolated actions. It is, of course, at this point 
that considerations of justice, or points about the univer- 
salizability of moral judgments, are introduced into simple 
utilitarianism.
The similarity of this case with the problem I see 
in Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues 
is that just as rule and act utilitarianism may dictate
^Blanshard, B., in De George, A.T. Ethics and Society, London, 
Macmillan, 196$, p 11.
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different course of action, so might justice and benevolence, 
the former in both cases based on a general view of the ad­
vantages of following certain rules, the latter on a consid­
eration of a particular case by itself. Just as a simple 
solution is not available in the utilitarianism case, I do 
not believe it is available in the Humean case although the 
notion of a general point of view discussed in chapter 6 does 
give some assistance. There simply is a conflict between 
what justice and what benevolence dictates that one d o , the 
conflict depending to a large degree on whether one considers 
a particular ease on its own, or regards it as an example of 
a kind of situation, and makes the judgment on that basis.
The possible conflict between justice and humanity 
is the only one which Hume mentions, but one can easily con­
struct other possible cases. Charm, for example, which Hume 
regards as a natural virtue, could easily come into conflict 
with the dictates of modesty or chastity, which Hume regards 
as artificial virtues. Promise-keeping, another artificial 
virtue, could very easily, as we all know, come into conflict 
with benevolence or frugality, and so forth.
It might be argued that these examples show no more 
than that people frequently have conflicting desires or mo­
tives for acting, and that some virtues come into conflict 
with others. The examples do of course show at least this 
much, and Rune's theory, as a purported account of normal 
moral life, would be seriously at fault if it did not allow 
for, or made light of, the moral conflicts which people con­
stantly encounter. And it is of course true that natural 
virtues can come into conflict with one another; —  gener­
osity and frugality, for example, or temperance and
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magnanimity, and also artificial virtues with one another; 
such as promise-keeping and justice, or promise-keeping and 
"allegiance to nations*. However, X think that conflicts 
between natural virtues and artificial ones show a different 
structure than conflicts between logically similar virtues. 
This difference is concerned with the way the possible courses 
of action following from the motives are evaluated. In the 
case of a conflict between natural virtues, I think it can 
be argued that the conflict can be expressed by saying that 
the agent wants to do two different things; for example, 
help a neighbour and save his own money. In tho end, the 
decision is made on the basis of which he wants to do most.
In the case of a conflict between two artificial virtues, 
the agent presumably has the desires to follow two different 
sets of conventions. As I have argued earlier, the justifi­
cation for desiting to follow either set of conventions Is 
the belief that the universal adherence to these conventions 
will lead to a desired state of affairs. This, in a case 
of conflict, it wouH seem that tha decision could be made 
on two different bases; cither, which setcf conventions 
does he in the end want to follow the most (for example, 
the keeping of promises may be so strongly instilled that 
in cases of conflict the decision is always made in that 
direction), or, which set of rules will lead to a more de­
sired state of affairs* an almost purely utilitarian con­
sideration. 3 do not think the latter sort of considera­
tion is really open in the case of the natural virtues, 
if one is to remain consistent to the Humean scheme. How­
ever, in the case of a conflict between a natural and an 
artificial virtue the situation becomes rather more
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complicated, Hera wa have & conflict between two different 
sorts of desires, that to do a certain kind of action, and 
that to follow a set of rules because doing so will lead to 
a desired state of affairs in the long run, although perhaps 
not immediately. The conflict in this case becomes in a 
sense one between short-term and long-term interests, both 
the agent's and other persons', as well as between conflict­
ing desires, and it cannot really be resolved by just con­
sidering one level or aspect. That is, it is not just a case 
of a conflict of desires, nor is it just a case of choosing 
between two possible desired states of affairs. It is rather 
more a case of choosing between following a desire or choosing 
to do something which in the long run contributes to a desired 
state of affairs.
From the point of view of the observer too, the same 
sort of distinction holds. In the case of the natural vir­
tues, he views the virtue as leading to certain actions which 
immediately produce desired states of affairs, a happy man, 
having been given a gift, for example. In the case of tha 
artificial virtues ha has to recognise that these virtues 
lead to actions which will on the whole, but not necessarily 
in every particular case, lead to a desired state of affairs, 
particularly if these virtues are held by most of the popula­
tion. And to, in evaluating an agent's choice between acting 
benevolently and justly, he too would have to balance out 
the immediate from the long-run picture, and the particular 
from the general cases.
In the end, what I think the possibility of this 
kind of conflict between the natural and artificial virtues 
shows, besides the existence of the standard moral dilemma.
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le that the artificial virtues are a logically different 
kind of virtue from the natural virtues, and cannot simply 
be regarded as re-directed natural virtues. From whatever 
point of view one considers the situation, the considera­
tions which serve to distinguish the two sorts of virtues 
make it clear that they are quite different and distinct 
ways of making moral decisions. In the end, I think the 
artificial virtues present a somewhat utilitarian view of 
morality, whereas the natural virtues remind the reader of 
a moral sense theory. Hume has of course had both positions 
attributed to him, with some justification, but not entirely 
accurately. This is a question I shall mention briefly in 
chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5 
Sympathy
An important aapaot of Hum#*# moral theory le hie
doctrine of eympathy#
Thue it appeare, that eympathy in a very powerful 
principle in human nature, that it hae a great in­
fluence on our taete of beauty, and that it prod­
ucer our eentlment of morale in all the artificial 
virtuee. (T.577-8)
Ae a matter of fact, Ardal elaime that#
the approval of all virtuee depends upon our taking 
up an objective standpoint, that the imagination 
is involved, and thus eympathy with the effect 
the quality of mind in question would tend to have.
It is obviously Important to get a clear picture of this
doctrine, and the role that the principle of eympathy plays
in the forming of moral evaluations.
Sympathy, according to Eume, is a principle of human 
nature, and not a passion. That he does not mean by "sym­
pathy" something analogous to pity, or the expression of 
sympathy, as with others in time of trouble, is a point ade­
quately made by Ardal,^ and I will not repeat Ardal*s work 
on this subject. Sympathy, in the Humean sense is not to 
be regarded as an emotion. It is a principle which accounts 
for the communication of ideas, opinions and emotions from 
one person or group of people to another person or group, 
in much the same ways as the principles of resemblance, con­
tiguity and cause and effect account for the relations of 
ideas in Hume's epistemology. Sympathy is thus a process.
^Ardal, op.cit., p. 151. 
'ibid., p. 48 ff.
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rather than an emotion. The details of the operation of this 
process have been well discussed by Ardal, above, and Korman 
Kemp Smith, in The Philosophy of David Eume, and since I have 
nothing important to add to their accounts, what follows will 
merely be a summary, necessary for the rest of this chapter.
Presupposed in the doctrine of sympathy is Eume's 
analysis of ideas and impressions. In particular, we have 
the fact that the distinction between ideas and impressions 
is made In terms of vivacity of force, impressions being more 
vivacious or forceful than ideas. Impressions are taken to 
include not only the sensations of external sense perception, 
but also internal sensations of emotions, passions, etc.
There are of course serious problems with the manner in which 
Eume makes this distinction, (in the end, I think it is actu­
ally incoherent,) but this is the distinction presupposed in 
this section. All ideas are derived from impressions; no 
person can have ideas without having had the appropriate im­
pressions from which these ideas are derived. In certain 
cases, that is, of simple ideas, this derivation is a copy­
ing, Eume claiming that no one can have a simple idea without 
having previously had a phenomenologically similar impression. 
This is a point of some importance in moral evaluation.
Another aspect of Hume's epistemology which plays a 
significant role in his account of sympathy is the similarity 
of reaction among most humans# As I mentioned earlier, when 
discussing Hume's account of free will and determinism, he 
argues that most humans, when placed in similar situations, 
display similar behaviour, feel similarly,^ and so forth.
This similarity acts as the foundation for our beliefs about 
other people's beliefs, feelings, etc.* since all that one
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person can be directly aware of about another person is his 
perceptible behaviour, and not his motives or passions,
Hume argues tbat the only way we can reach any conclusions 
about another person's feelings is by analogy with our own, 
on the supposition that similar feelings accompany similar 
behaviour.
Now 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great 
resemblance among all human creatures, and that we 
never remark any passion or principle in others, of 
which, in some degree or ether, we may not find a 
parallel in ourselves. (T.318)
From the observation of behaviour, then, the observer is led 
to think of himself exhibiting similar behaviour, and then 
to think of the passions, emotions or motives which usually, 
in himself, accompany this behaviour. From this, he reaches 
the conclusion that the agent is experiencing similar pas­
sions, emotions, or motives.
'Tis indeed evident, that when we sympathize with the 
passions and sentiments of others, these movements ap­
pear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are con­
ceiv'd to belong to another person, as we conceive any
other matter of fact. 'Tis also evident, that the
ideas of the affections of others are converted into 
the very impressions they represent, and that the pas­
sions arise in conformity to the images we form of 
them. (T.319)
The process of sympathy is thus the enlivening of certain
ideas of passions, as seen in another person.,to the actual
passions themselves, in the observer. It is of course true,
that since all ideas are derived from impressions, this
process cannot occur without the observer having himself
previously having experienced these passions, emotions or
motives. If he had not, he could never reach the idea of
their existence in another person. Thus, it is impossible
to sympathize, in the Humean sense, with passions one has
never had oneself.
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The means by which these ideas of passions are en­
livened into passions themselves leads to a problem of con­
sistency in Eume. He argues that
'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather Impressions of 
ourselves is always intimately present with us,....
(T.317)
It is the liveliness of the impression of self that is con­
veyed to the idea of the passions, and since the only distinc­
tion between ideas and impressions is that the latter are 
more lively than the former, once the idea is sufficiently 
enlivened, it becomes itself an impression. Thus the ob­
server in a sense "shares" thepassions of the agent, in the 
sense that they have similar passions. This is the operation 
of sympathy, the sharing of passions by agent and obsever.
The problem which arises is of course that Hume says 
earlier in the Treatise that we have no such thing as an 
idea of impression of self.
nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it 
is here explain'd. For from what impression could 
this idea be deriv'd?...It must be some one impres­
sion, that gives rise to every real idea. But self 
or person is not any one impression...and conse­
quently there is no such idea. (T.251-2)
The only impressions we have, when we introspect, are partic­
ular impressions
of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, 
pain or pleasure. (T.252)
The notion of personal identity, he claims,
proceed(s) entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted 
process of the thought along a train of connected ideas, 
according to the principles above explained (resem­
blance, contiguity and causation]. (T.260)
These passages do appear to conflict with several things he
says in the section on sympathy#
that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is 
always intimately present with us. (T.317)
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Ardal attempts a resolution of this problem, claiming that
Eume's earlier arguments, in Book 2, are to the effect that
there is no one continuing particular impression that can be
identified as an impression of self. However,
we can, at any time, identify a complex set of im­
pressions which constitutes what we call our self 
at that particular time,*
These impressions are those of desires and passions, rather 
than those of external sense, which are regarded as repre­
sentative of the external world, I think Ardal's interpreta­
tion is basically correct, Hume of course gives an answer 
of sorts himself, later in the section (I, IV, VI) when he 
discusses the source of our notion of personal identity,
'Tie evident, that the Identity, which we attribute 
to the human mind, however peffect we may imagine 
it to be, is not able to run the several different 
perceptions into one...notwithstanding this distinc­
tion and separability, we suppose the whole train of 
perceptions to be united in identity...whether it be 
something that really binds our several perceptions 
together or only associates their ideas in our imagi­
nation. (T.259)
It seems to me that what Hume is arguing in this section is 
not that we do not have a sense of personal identity, or that 
we are not conscious of ourselves, but that this sense of 
identity is not based upon a perception of identity, or of 
unity, that is, a single, unchanging perception of the self. 
Much as he argues that our notions of causation are not based 
upon a perception of causation, but are rather a confused 
mixture of, and inference based upon, a number of other per­
ceptions, at the same time as admitting that we do after all 
operate almost all our lives on the notion of cause and 
effect, ;so, I think, he is arguing that the basis of our
*ibid., p. 44,
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notion of personal identity is not a single perception, even 
though we do have such a notion. I do not really see that 
there is a problem of reconciling what Hurae says about per­
sonal identity with what he aaye about sympathy. Doubtless 
he ought not to have used the phrase "impression of self", 
which is certainly misleading, but I do not think in the end 
the two sections are really inconsistent. In reference to 
the operation of sympathy, what enlivens the idea of certain 
passions, emotions or motives into their corresponding impres­
sions is not so Much a single impression of the self, but the 
impressions of passions, etc., which are always present in 
the mind, and are identified as being part of the self. It 
is name's contention that the operation of sympathy is a 
necessary constituent of moral approval or disapproval, with­
out sympathy, although pleasure or pain is felt on the obser­
vation of certain characteristics of mind, this pleasure or 
pain is not truly to be identified with moral approval or 
disapproval.
The first thing to do is to examine the role that
sympathy plays in moral approval or disapproval. It is clear
that the operation of sympathy alone is not sufficient to 
ensure that moral approval or disapproval Is taking place.
It is also the source of pity, a cause of love of relations 
and acquaintances, and a source of our sense of beauty. It 
can cause us to "share" the pain of a person suffering, or
to "share" the pleasure of a person in possession of a work
of art. None of these is an example of moral evaluation, 
even in Fume's wide-reaching view of morality. Thus the 
operation of sympathy is only one aspect of the production 
of those feelings identified with moral approval or disapproval.
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It should also bo pointed out again, here, that what 
are morally approved of are not actions, but motives, or 
rather virtues, which are analyzed in terms of motives. In 
discussing this aspect of îîume's theory, Ardal expresses 
some uneasiness at the identification of moods and motives 
which he attributes to Ilurae,^  Hume clearly regards certain 
passions such as anger as being a suitable subject for baoral 
disapproval, and Ardal argues that anger is not really a mo­
tive, in the way that, for example, desire to help someone 
la, I think part of the difficulty here is that Hume's po­
sition is not 8 0 much that motives are the subject of moral 
evaluation, as that qualities of mind or character are. 
Particular motives are considered to be representative of 
dispositions to have certain sorts of motives, and it is 
these dispositions which are virtues or vices, I have al­
ready argued (Chapter 2, and see the passages T477, and 
7,575, quoted there) that what Hume means to be the subject 
of moral evaluation, is not a specific motive behind a spe­
cific action, but rather the general quality of character 
which leads to certain types of action. Thus anger would 
count in the Humean scheme as subject to moral evaluation, 
since a general tendency to anger would certainly lead to 
the performance of certain sorts of actions, which in this 
case would in general cause pain to the agent himself or to 
others. Hence anger wnüld be a vice, I would thus agree 
with Ardal, when he says that
One must of course, be aware that the term 'motive* 
is being used in a somewhat extended sense when it 
is made to cover moods, such as anger. But those who
pp. 152-153.
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think that Hume considers that we always evaluate 
motives must be using the term in this extended 
sense,*
I do not think, however, as Ardal gives the impressions of 
doing, that a propensity to certain passions is unusual in 
the Humean scheme of virtues and vioes. Benevolence, the 
chief example of a natural virtue, is of course a passion, 
albeit a calm one, unlike anger, <T,417) If the subjects 
of moral evaluation are qualities of mind which lead to the 
fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of desires, then it would 
seem to me that the propensity to a given passion is just 
as likely a Subject as any other human propensity which 
leads to action.
Given then that the operation of sympathy is a nec­
essary condition of feeling moral approval or dloapproval, 
and that qualities or characteristics of mind are the sub­
ject of moral approval or disapproval, we have still to see 
the role of the operation of sympathy in eliciting moral 
approval or disapproval.
There are two basic reasons why the operation of
sympathy is necessary in Hume's theory. The first is that
it is possible to, and people clearly do, morally approve
or disapprove, of qualities of mind of people with whom they
have never, and could never, come into contact:
we give the same approbation to the same moral 
qualities in China as in England (T.581)
Since we are not directly affected by these qualities, there 
must be some mechanism by which we come to feel the appropri­
ate pleasure or pain on viewing them. The second is that Eume
‘ibid., p. 152.
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must account for our roral approbation of the artificial vir­
tues, which do not lead directly to the state of affairs re­
garded as most desirable, and thus would not seem to arouse 
the appropriate feelings of pleasure. There is a third 
reason, which has to do vlth tho necessity cf taking a gen­
eral point of view, which topic 1 shall discuss later. The 
role of sympathy la thus basically to allow the observer to 
feel the appropriate pleasure or pain as a result of the 
effects of a quality of mind, although he himself may not be 
directly affected by it.
i»ith what elements of the moral situation do we then 
sympathize? Hume says that
reflecting on the tendency of characters end men­
tal qualitiea, is sufficient to give us the senti­
ments of approbation and blame. (T.577)
when speaking of those virtues whoso value lies in the bene­
fit they bring to society, —  that is, those virtues which 
are useful to those who have a connection with the agent, 
in Iiurae's four-fold distinction. This would suggest that 
the observer sympathizes with the feelings of pleasure or 
pain resulting froa the effects of those characters and men­
tal qualities, rather then with the characters or mental 
qualities themselves. This pleasure or pain is not itself 
moral approval or disapproval, but gives rise to farther 
feelings of pleasure and pain which are approval or disap­
proval. This sort of explanation wu&ld also presumably be 
relevant to those virtues whose value lies in the fact that 
they are immediately agreeable to other people, such as wit 
and charm.
Me also, Hume claims, sympathize with the feelings 
or passions of the agent, in reference to those virtues or
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vices which are eelf-reyardiny, (useful or agreeable to the 
person himself,) rather than other*-regarding. The parallel 
construction would bo that the observer sympathizes with 
the feelings that the agent has as a reenlt of having a Cer­
tain character or quality of laind, and not with the actual 
feelings which constitute the virtue or vice.
The need for the operation of sjSipathy for the pro­
duction of moral feelings is obvious in these two cases, so 
long as the observer ia detached from the situation, and not 
involved in it. Obviously, if he is to feel the requisite 
pleasure or ^ain, there must be some basis for the arousal 
of those feelings, and the basis lies in the "shared* pleas­
ure or pain. However, it has been argued that If the observer 
is involved, in certain cases, the operation of eyrapathy 
would bo superfluous. In particular, this charge has baen 
made by Ingsnar Hendonius,^ In general, I think Hendenlus* 
charge might be broadened, to cover all of the other-regarding 
virtues, although in the end the doctrine of the general point 
of view, discussed in chapter 6, will lead me to reject his 
argument. I shall leave the discussion of this point tntil 
later in this chapter and until chapter C.
Ardal, gives a good account of the operation of sym­
pathy in each of the four cases; those qualities useful to 
the agent, those qualities agreeable to the agent, those 
qualities useful to people other than the agent, and those 
qualities agreeable to people other than the agent,^ from 
which X will borrow a few points. In the case of qualities
^nendenius, Ingemar, Studies In nune*g Ethics, Uppsala, 
repr, from Adolf Phelen in fervor jam, 1937, p# 398,
Top,cit., pp. 152-154,
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useful to the agent, nu;ae says that;
It seams evilont that where a quality or habit is 
subjected to our examination, if it appears in any 
respect prejudicial to the person possessed of it, 
or such as incapacitates him for business and ac­
tion, it is instantly blamed and ranked among his 
faults and imperfections. (2.2)3)
and t
If we examine the panegyrics that are commonly made
of groat man, we sliall find, that most of the qual­
ities, which are attributed to then, may be divided 
into two kindn.via, such as make them perform their 
part in society; and such as render them service­
able to thamgelves, and enable them to promote their 
own interest. Their prudence, temperance, frugality. 
Industry, assllulty, enner laa, lexterlty, are cel­
ebrated as well as their generosity and humanity.
(f.537)
It would appear to bo the case that one of the results of 
having any of these self-rogarding virtues is tk.o arousal 
of feelings of pleasure in the possessor at the results of 
these virtues. Because he has tliese qualities, he is able 
to "promote hla own interest", and this will naturally give 
him pleasure. It ia with these resultant feelings of pleas­
ure that the observer oympathlros, and which are the basis 
for his feelings of moral approval. And similarly, in the 
case of ouah self-regarding vices as indolence, or
a blundering understanding, and a wrong judgment 
of everything in life.... (T.537)
the results of the exercise of these vices is to make the 
agent unhappy, and it is with his feelings of pain that the 
observer sympathises, giving rise to feelings of moral dis­
approval.
The other class of self-regarding virtues and vices 
are those qualities immediately agreeable or disagreeable 
to the agent. Hume says that;
As some qualities acquire their merit from their
being immediately agreeable to others, without
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any tendency to public interest; so eoma are de­
nominated virtuous from their being immediately
anrrmabio to the person himself, who possesses 
them. (T.590)
By "being immediately agreeable to the person himself" I 
would presume that Hume means that the existence or opera­
tion of these qualities causes immediate pleasure to the 
possessor. It is this resultant feeling of pleasure with 
which the observer sympathizes, which gives rise to his 
moral approval. It is not entirely clear, however, just 
what sort of virtues and vices Hume has in mind at this 
point, since he gives no specific examples. He does say 
that#
Each of the passions and operations of the mind has
a particular feeling, which must be either agree­
able or disagreeable. The first is virtuous, the 
second vicious. This particular feeling constitutes 
the very nature of the passion; and therefore needs
not be accounted for, (T,590)
From this it could be argued that all passions are either 
virtues or vices, from the point of view of whether they 
are agreeable or disagreeable to the agent, and that this 
criterion does rot pick out any particular set of virtues 
and vices. On the other hand, the previous quotation does 
s§ty "ffone are denominated virtuous", which does suggest that 
a particular class is being discussed here, Ardal gives as 
examples of this class of vices the passions of fear, anger, 
dejection, grief, melancholy, and anxiety, arguing that it 
is the propensity to have these passions which is the vice, 
and not singular occurrences, which may sometimes be appro­
priate,® That the vice or virtue should be a propensity to 
have certain kinds of passions fits in with the general
®ibld., p. 152.
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account of vices and virtu##, a# being tendencies to have 
certain kinds of motives or desires, rather than merely only 
occasionally having such desires or motives. The propensity 
to have desires, motives or passions which are pleasant in 
feeling would then be a virtue, while to have desires, mo­
tives or passions which are painful in feeling would then be 
a vice. If we are to take it that all desires, motives and 
passions have a "particular feeling, which must be either 
agreeable or disagreeable", then it would seem to follow 
that the propensity to have any particular sort of desires, 
motives or passions would be either a virtue or a vice. This 
of course broadens the area of virtues and vices rather more 
than most modern writers would countenance, although the em­
phasis on the propensity to have these passions makes the 
account rather more acceptable. A man does not have a vice 
if he is occasionally angry, but if he is constantly iras­
cible, then he might reasonably be said to have a vice, and 
it is true that we morally disapprove to some degree of the 
irascible man. And likewise, a man is not virtuous because 
he is occasionally benevolent, but if he is constantly bene­
volent it seems reasonable to say that he has the virtue of 
benevolence, and to approve morally of him on this ground.
If any propensity to have certain motives, desires 
or passions counts as either a vice or virtue by this cri­
terion, it would follow that the different criteria for moral 
value may overlap and that, as a matter of fact, a virtue 
or vice under any other criterion is also necessarily a 
virtue or vice under this criterion. Moreover, there seems 
to be no a priori reason why a character which is a virtue 
under one criterion could not be a vice under this other.
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In other words, there seems no compelling reason to believe 
that a tendency of character which might be a virtue under 
the criterion of being useful to the possessor might not be 
one whose "particular feeling" is one of pain, or a quality 
which is a vice, under the criterion that it is detrimental 
to those who come into contact with the agent, might not be 
a quality whose particular feeling is one of pleasure. Hume 
would presumably argue that this is never the case, citing 
introspective data as his evidence, but I don't think that 
this will quite answer the objection. There is first of all 
the very serious problem about proving any facts based on 
introspective data, a question I have touched on before.
More importantly, however, it would seem to conflict with 
the facts.
If we take, for example, the vice of miserliness, 
we can see the conflict. Miserliness could, and would, I 
think by Hume, be regarded as a vice, on the grounds that 
it was a quality detrimental to the possessor. It could 
reasonably be said to be a quality which is detrimental to 
those who have contact with him as well. However, it is 
quite clear that this quality gives its possessor pleasure#
A miser receives delight from his money.... (T.314)
I think it must be agreed that the tendency to accumulate 
money clearly gives the miser pleasure, and on these grounds, 
it would seem that it should be counted as a virtue. On 
other grounds, however, it as clearly counts as a vice* The 
same must surely be true of any other vice which a man en­
joys, and it is certainly the case that there are qualities, 
which under the Humean criteria would be called vices, which 
are enjoyed. For example, am indolent man may not feel the
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least pain as a result of his indolence. The men in Stein­
beck's Cannery Row, who only work when they run out of money 
and credit, certainly do not feel any pain as a result of 
their way of life. If this is the case, then either the ob­
server does not feel moral disapproval in this case, or he 
must sympathise with some other sentiment of the agent, or, 
thirdly, some other process must be in operation here. The 
first possibility is unlikely, since people do, as a matter 
of fact feel moral disapproval of idle men, and as a matter 
of fact, feel it rather more strongly in reference to the 
men who do not feel pain as a result of their own indolence 
than to the men who do. Appealing to the feelings of other 
observers, such as those who have any relationship to the 
agent, will not solve this problem either, since their pain 
or moral disapproval must rise from some source as well, 
and the source is equally absent in the case in question.
The second possibility is that the observer is sym­
pathising with some other feelings of the agent. However, 
there seems, in the Humean system, no likely candidate for 
this other feeling. The third possibility is that there is 
some other process in operation, and this seems the most 
plausible solution to the problem* At one point in his dis­
cussion of sympathy, Hume says;
There remains only to take notice of a pretty re­
markable phaenomonon% of this passion; which is, 
that the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes 
acquires strength from the weakness of the original, 
and even arises by a transition from affections, which 
have no exieteno*. (T.370,
italics mine)
This, he claims, occurs because:
the imagination is affected by the general rule, 
and makes us conceive a lively idea of the pas­
sion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the
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the same manner, as if the person were really ac­
tuated by It. (T.371)
If we ignore the problems of the "transition from affections, 
which have no existence", this alternative process can be 
applied to the case of the idle man. If it is true that in 
general, the indolent man feels pain as the result of his 
indolence, then in the exceptional case of the man who feels 
no pain, the general rule comes into play, and we feel pain, 
even though it is not justified on the basis of sympathy in 
this case. This theory of course rests on the assumption 
that generally, a man who has a self-regarding vice feels 
pain as the result of it. This seems a not unreasonable 
assumption, since if it were a quality of mind or character 
which in general did not cause any pain to the possessor, and 
was not detrimental to society (and since we are discussing 
a self-regarding vice, this is an extraneous consideration), 
then it would surely not be a vice, and not be morally dis­
approved. However, albeit not unreasonable, I am not en­
tirely happy about the assumption, since it seems to me that 
a very large number of infrugal people, for example, are not 
unhappy about their extravagance or made unhappy as a result 
of their extravagance.
Hume does, however, explain why the observer might 
disapprove more of the man with a vice who does not feel un­
happy as a result of it, than of the man who feels pain as 
a result of it. His explanation calls into play the prin­
ciple of comparison, which is more or less the mirror image 
of sympathy, in that the effect of comparison is for one 
sentiment in the agent to bring into existence in the ob­
server the opposing sentiment# a sense of security causes 
fear, as in the example of the Infant prince (T.371) or
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pleasure causefl pain. The principle of comparison comee into 
play when the general rule is not followed in a specific in­
stance, as for exemple in my case of the Infrugal nan who 
does not feel pain as a result of his extravagance. The 
general rule leads one to expect that he will feel pain as 
a result of it, the observer feels pain as a result of sym­
pathy with the non-existent but expected sentiment, and the 
lack of pain felt by the egent, by the principle of compar­
ison augments the feeling of p^lnin the observer. Hence 
the observer disapproves more strongly (on the assumption 
that the greater phe pain he feels, the more he will disap­
prove as a result of it) of the infrugal man who is not un­
happy than of the infrugal man who is. The solution is very 
neat; distressingly neat in fact, since the combination of 
the two opposing principles would seem to allow for anything 
at all happening, so that this aspect of Hume's theory is 
irrefutable; there could be no possible conflicting evidence. 
Any curious result whatsoever could be accounted for by some 
combination of the operation of the principles of sympathy 
and comparison.
Presumably the sane sort of answer,involving the 
dual operations of the principles of sympathy and compari­
son, could be given to the problem X suggested earlier, 
about possibilities of conflicts between the different cri­
teria. It could be claimed that those cases, in which I 
have argued a vice by any other criterion is a virtue by 
the one in question, are the exceptions to the general rule, 
and that the general rule is to be followed. However, X 
do not see any obvious support for the general rule in these 
cases, the general rule being that a vice by other criteria
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will be # vice by the criterion of being disagreeable to the 
possessor. The general rule is after all exactly what is in 
question.
Perhaps the correct answer is simply that there are 
sometimes conflicts, such that one would be in doubt whether 
to call a particular characteristic a virtue or a vice, and 
that such Conflicts are necessarily engendered by the exis­
tence of more than one criterion for moral value. I would 
myself tend to take this point of view, since surely one of 
the facts of normal "moral life" is that not all cases are 
clear-cut, and th t conflicts do arise, depending on what 
criteria, are used for moral worth. This is of course to 
argue that there is more than one criterion, a position X 
would certainly hold. (I an not, incidentally, holding that 
the criteria I would choose are necessarily those which Eune 
uses.) Sometimes this conflict is expressed in a manner 
which is particularly relevant to the examples I have been 
using: "yell, it makes him happy, so there must be something 
to be said for it”. I would thus argue that although the 
problem discussed here does lead one to the conclusion that 
there is an inconsistency or a conflict between the various 
criteria Hume gives for moral value, this conflict is justi­
fied if Hume's theory is considered to be descriptive of 
normal moral life, where inconsistencies and conflicts do 
exist. It is my belief, however, that Hume himself would 
not be happy with this argument, since my reading of Bume 
suggests to me that he is trying for consistency, not merely 
in the sense of consistently describing people's inconsistent 
beliefs, but in the sense of presenting consistent criteria, 
and that he believes his account achieves it.
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There le another possible problem with regard to the 
self-regarding virtues and vices, which can be brought out 
by considering the role of sympathy. In the case of quali­
ties useful or agreeable to the agent himself, the role of 
sympathy would appear to be fairly obvious. Since men do 
not have unlimited benevolence#
In general, it may be affirm'd, that there is no 
such oassion in human minds, as the love of man­
kind, merely as such, independent of personal 
qualities, of services, or of relation to ourselves.
(T.481)
the pain or pleasure of individuals unrelated to us would not 
be a matter ol concern unless there were some means of making 
this pain or plea ure relevant to us. This is the role of 
sympathy; to "transfer* to the observer the feelings of pain 
or pleasure felt by the agent as the result of possessing 
some quality or character, these "transferred" feelings serv­
ing as the basis for the arousal of feelings of moral ap­
proval or disapproval. This suggestion, however, that ve 
need the operation of sympathy in certain cases because we 
do not feel unlimited benevolence towards all mankind leads 
one to the conclusion that sympathy might not be needed for 
the arousal of moral approval or disapproval in the cases of 
qualities or characters possessed by people towards whom we 
do feel benevolence, unless, of course, sympathy plays a 
necessary role in benevolence itself. Benevolence is basi­
cally the desire that another person be happy, or be relieved 
from pain, and to have these sorts of desires would not seem 
to require the operation of sympathy, mless it were the case 
that we could not know that another person was happy or un­
happy without the operation of sympathy. But this does not 
seem a plausible view, since the operation of sympathy surely
1X0.
itself presupposes the recognition of the feelings present 
in the agent. That is, before we can acquire feelings of 
pain or pleasure by means of tha operation of sympathy, we 
must in some sense recognise that the agent has such feelings 
of pain or pleasure himself.
If benevolence does not require the operation of 
sympathy in order to exist, it would then seem to follow 
that 5n thise oasea where the observer feels benevolence 
toward the agent, he can feel moral approval or disapproval 
of qualities possessed by the agent without the operation 
of sympathy. However, I actually think this whole direc­
tion is misleadin, and results from a misunderstanding of 
benevolence. The virtue of bonsrvolenca consists as I have 
argued earlier, of the tendency to have desires or motives 
of the sorts "lie is in trouble, I want to help him" or "I 
want him to be happy". As a result of having these desires 
or motives, it la likely that the benevolent man will feel 
pleasure if the p9Xaon who is the object of his benevolence 
ia happy, and feel pain if that person is unhappy. However, 
these latter feelings of pleasure and pain are distinct from 
the desires typlcll of the virtue of benevolence. I would 
argue that these latter feelings of pleasure or pain could 
quite easily be attributed to the operation of sympathy, 
and if o, it would then follow that if it is these latter 
feelings which are bhe basis of moral approval or disapproval, 
rather than the feelings or desires typical of benevolence, 
then the observer would require the operation of sympathy 
to feel moral approval or disapproval even in the cases of 
those people towards whom he feels benevolence.
There are two points which I must establish here:
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that the feeling# of pleasure and pain felt by the observer, 
if the person toward# whom he feel# benevolence i# happy or 
unhappy, are the result of the operation of sympathy; and 
that it is these feelings which are the basis of the feelings 
of moral approval or disapproval. To deal with the first 
point: sympathy is the operation, (more or less,) of acquiring 
the same feelings as the agent, by observing him and having 
one's ideas of his feelings enlivened to actual feelings in 
enself. In all of Bume's account# of this operation, there 
is a definite suggestion of a causal relationship here: in 
some sense, "observing" the feelings of the agent causes the 
the observer to have similar feelings. However, it will be 
recalled that Hume's own account of causation reduces this 
relationship basically to a matter of constant conjunction 
and contiguity in time and space. Thus, to say that the 
pleasure of the agent cause# the corresponding pleasure in 
the observer by a rather indirect process is only to say 
that it universally occurs (other things being equal) that 
if the agent has a feeling of pleasure or pain, the observer 
does as well. And this description surely fits the case of 
the benevolent man feeling pleasure or pain as well as it 
fits the description of the operation of sympathy. In both 
eases, the feeling of pleasure or pain felt by the agent 
frequently or usually is followed by the corresponding feel­
ing in the observer. The detailed description that Bums 
gives of the operation of sympathy does not appear to detract 
from the argument that the two processes are, as a matter 
of fact, the same.
Support can he lent to this argument by considering 
the example of the vice of malice, which Hume describes as
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the opposing passion to benevolence. Malice, he explains, 
operates by means of the principle of comparison, which, as 
we have already seem, is the mirror image, more or less, of
the principle of sympathy;
ve must at least allow of the principle, from whence 
the discovery arose, that objects appear greater or 
lesser by a comparison with others,.and 'tie from 
this principle I derive the passions of malice and 
envy. (T.375)
By means of the operation of the principle of comparison, the 
observer acquires the opposite passion to that which the agent 
hast pain instead of pleasure, happiness instf^d of unhappi­
ness, This comes about when the observer compares the agent's 
happiness with his own misery, thus increasing his own misery, 
rather than acquiring the agent's happiness. If the principle 
of comparison plays such a large role in malice, it would 
not seem unlikely that the principle of sympathy would play 
a similar role in benevolence, resulting in the pleasure the 
observer feels at the recognition of the agent's pleasure. 
Although Fume, by saying that sy^^athy was needed in the pro­
duction of feelings of moral approval or disapproval because 
men do not feel a general benevolence towards all mankind, 
would seem to be suggesting that where benevolence exists, 
sympathy is not necessary./ I do not think this suggestion 
is to be followed. As a matter of fact, it wculd appear that
the operation of sympathy has a role to play in benevolence,
at least in that characteristic of the benevolent man, that
he feels pleasure if his friend is happy, pain if he is nàt.
The second point which I said had to be established, 
is that the feelings of pleasure and pain felt by the observer, 
if the person towards whom he feels benevolence is happy or 
unhappy, are the feelings upon which are based the feelings
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of moral approval or disapproval. This point X do not believe 
to be contentious. I have earlier argued that the feelings 
of the agent with which the observer sympathises are the feel­
ing* of pleasure or pain the agent has as a result of having 
some virtue or vice. Surely these are just the sorts of feel­
ings which are under discussion here. In the end, then, X 
do not think that this possible criticism of Bume's theory is 
justified, and the theory is not inconsistent at least oa 
these grounds.
The question with which this discussion originally 
began was the details of the operation of sympathy with ref­
erence to those virtues and vices whose moral value lies in 
their being immediately agreeable or disagreeable to the 
agent. since Hume argues that every passion or operation of 
the mind has a particular feeling which must be either agree­
able or disagreeable, it would seem to be these particular 
feelings which are the obvious candidates for the operation 
of sympathy. I have said earlier that the observer sympa­
thises with the feelings of pleasure or pain the agent has 
as a result of having certain passions, and although "result" 
might be slightly misleading in this context, I think that 
original account is more or less correct. The observer sym­
pathises not with the actual passion, desire, and ro forth, 
but with the "feelings" which these operations of the mind 
have. These feelings are, I think, to be regarded as logi­
cally distinct from the actual passions, desires, and so 
forth, although they may universally accompany then. The 
desire to help another person is not itself pleasure, al­
though this desire may be pleasant, and anger is not itself 
pain, although to be angry may be painful. Thus the observer
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sympathizes with the feelings of pleasure or pain which are 
the "result* of having a certain passion, desire or motive.
The process of sympathy here is very similar to the process 
with regard to the other self-regarding virtues and vices.
The other main class of virtues and vices, under the 
four-fold distinction, is that of the other-regarding virtues 
and vices. These are the virtues and vices whos^ moral value 
lies in their being useful or agreeable, detrimental or dis­
agreeable, to those who have any contact with the agent. The 
person, or people, on whom the principle of sympathy will 
operate will thus not be the agent, but rather those whom he 
affects. This, not surprisingly, makes the situation rather 
more complex.
I will begin with the simpler case, those virtues and 
vices whose value lies in their being immediately agreeable 
or disagreeable to those people in contact with the agent.
Where sympathy is to operate in reference to this class of 
virtues and vices, it must clearly be upon the feelings of 
pleasure and pain that those people ha^e as the result of 
the agent's having a particular virtue or vice. This pleas­
ure is caused by the virtue or vice being immediately agree­
able or disagreeable to these people. However, in the case 
of the other-regarding virtues and vices, it rust -turely be 
the case that it is not so much the quality of mind or char­
acter which causes the pleasure or pain, but the actions of 
the agent resulting from these qualities of mind or characters. 
Hume does make a distinction between the motives or desires 
for acting, and the subsequent actions, the motives or desires 
being particular mental events. This can be seen both from 
his insistence that it is the motives, and not the actions.
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that are the subject of moral evaluation, and that motives 
and other operations of the mind have particular phenomenol­
ogical characters#
Kaeh of the passions and operationsof the mind has 
a particular feeling. (T.590)
however, it is surely the actions which are immediately agree­
able to others, and not the motives, since the motives are 
private. The examples which hume gives cf this class of mo­
tives suggests this as well#
There are, however, instances, in cases of less 
moment, wherein this immediate taste or senti­
ment produces our approbation. Wit, and a certain 
easy and disengag'd behaviour, are qualities 
immediately agreeable to others, and command their 
love and esteem. (T.590)
The examples are obviously of behaviour, and although one 
night find it difficult to locate or describe the appropriate 
underlying motives for these particular kinds of behaviour, I 
think it is obvious that Hume thP^ght there must be such. It 
is however, the behaviour which causes the feelings of pleas­
ure or pain with which the observer sympathizes in the process 
of moral evaluation.
The other class of other-regarding virtues and vices 
are those whonei moral worth lies in their being useful or 
detrimental to those who have any contact with the agent.
There are two different sorts of virtues and vices under 
this criterion, the natural and the artificial, and it is 
at this point that the distinction between artificial and 
natural virtues becomes important in a dimousaion of sym­
pathy. I will once again begin with the simpler case, the 
natural virtues. The distinction Is particularly important 
at this point because I believe that all the artificial 
virtues fall into the class of qualities useful to other people
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than the agent. Hume, for example says#
Kov justice is a moral virtue, merely because it 
has the tendency to the good of mankind, and, in­
deed, is nothing but an artificial invention to 
that purpose. The same may be said of allegiance, 
of the laws c5 nations, of modesty, and of good 
manners. (T.577)
Since this list given by Bume includes all the virtues which 
he difcusses in Part XI, which is the section on the artifi­
cial virtues, except property and promise-keeping, whose 
worth also clearly lies in their public utility, I believe 
this classification of the artificial virtues is justified.
The natural virtues which would fall into the class 
of qualities useful to other people would be such virtues as 
benevolence, meekness, char ity, generosity, clemency, modera­
tion and equity (T.578) and the source of our esteeea for 
these virtues. Bums says, is their public utility;
we have happily attain'd experiments in the arti­
ficial virtues, where the tendency of qualities to 
the good of society, is the sole cause of our ap­
probation....And where that principle may take place, 
and the quality approv'd of is really beneficial to 
society, a true philosopher will never require any 
other principle to account for the strongest approba­
tion and esteem.
That many of the natural virtues have this ten­
dency to the good of society, no one can doubt of.
(T.578)
It would seem obvious, then, that these qualities, being
useful to society, would cause pleasure in their operation,
and it fouXd bo this pleasure with which the observer would
sympathize in the process of moral evaluation.^. Since the
natural virtues are immediately useful, in the sense that
they produce actions which themselves immediately are of
use; there is no difficulty in locating the pleasure or pain
with which the observer must sympathize.
The only difference betwixt the natural vir­
tues and justice lies in this, that the good.
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which results from the former, arises from every 
single act. (T.579)
The agent with the virtue of, S’ay, benevolence, has the de­
sire or motive to help other people, this desire or motive 
results In an action which is helpful or useful to some per­
son or people other than himself, the helpful nature of the 
action, or the action itself, causes pleasure in the other 
person or people, and the observer sympathizes with this 
pleasure, and feels moral approval. In some cases the ob­
server will sympathize with one person. In other eases, with 
many. Hume's operation allows for both situations with no 
difficulty. Thus, once again, the operation of sympathy is 
fairly obvious and straightforward in this class.
There Is, however, one possible problem connected 
with the operation of sympathy in the other regarding vir­
tues, which I earlier suggested would arise. It has been 
argued that if the observer is Involved, in certain cases 
the oneratlon of sympathy would be superfluous. Tngemar 
Hendenius makes the charge with reference to those quali­
ties immediately agreeable to others, but I think the charge 
could be extended to all of the other-regarding virtues, 
or at least to the natural virtues which fall within that 
class.
A quality of mind which is useful to others could 
be, it would seem, the subject of moral approval just on 
the basis of its being helpful to the observer. It would 
cause pleasure on that basis, and this pleasure, it would 
seem, could arouse the feeling of moral approval as easily 
as could the feeling of pleasure acquired by means of the 
operation of sympathy. Ardal maintains that there is not 
a problem here, Qsing as part of his evidence a quotation
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from the Enquiry#
We approve of another, because of his vit, polie- 
ness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality 
which he possesses#...The idea, which we form of 
their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable 
influence on our imagination, and gives us the sen­
timent of approbation. This principle enters into 
all the judgments which we form concerning manners 
and characters. (£.267)
Be maintains that the principle referred to is clearly the 
principle of sympathy, and therefore that Hume did not in­
tend that there be any exceptions to the necessity of the 
operation of sympathy in the formation of moral evaluations. 
In the first place, I do not think that what Bume intended 
is entirely the question here, or the question which Een- 
denitts was raising. Surely the question is whether or not 
Hume's account of the role of sympathy in moral evaluation 
is consistent, and the charge is that there seems no need 
for the operation of sympathy in certain, at least, of the 
other-regarding virtues.
In the second place, I do not regard it as being 
quite so obvious as Ardal does that the principle being 
referred to is that of sympathy. The quotation comes from 
the section# "Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others", 
and I would think that a possible reading of the quotation 
would suggest that the principle referred to is that quali­
ties immediately agreeable, in such matters as wit, charm, 
and politeness, are approved of because they are immediately 
agreeable# and that the tacit reference to the operation of 
sympathy in the previous sentence is neither the main point 
of the paragraph nor the reference for "this principle".
In any case, the passage is sufficiently ambiguous that I 
would hesitate to pronounce one way or the other.
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Ardal*8 aeoond reason for rejecting Hendenius'
Q
charge has, to my mind, rather more foundation. Be argues 
that Hume's other necessary condition for moral evaluation 
is the taking of a general point of view, and that aince 
taking a general point of view necessarily involves ab­
stracting oneself from the situation and considering the 
question from some "middle distance", this process itself 
involves sympathy, and thus sympathy cannot be eliminated,
I shall deal with this later, when 1 discuss the notion of 
the general point of view. In the meantime, if one ignores 
that aspect, it does appear to me that the operation of 
sympathy might well be regarded as redundant in the case of 
evaluating other-regarding virtues, particularly those whose 
value lies in their being immediately agreeable to people 
other than the agent.
It may be that this appearance of redundancy results 
from my own analysis of the reasons why sympathy is a nec­
essary constituent of some moral judgments; that there must 
be some way CCf the observer to acquire, or have,the feel­
ings of pleasure that arouse the feelings of moral approval.
It could be argued, and I believe that this is behind Ardal's 
arguments which I criticised above, that Bume believed that 
sympathy just was a necessary condition for the arousal of 
feelings of moral approval. The problem with this view, 
however, is that it is somewhat arbitrary. Also, it is not 
clear to me that Bume actually held it. For example, he 
says:
But the happiness of strangers affects us by
'ibid., p. 151.
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sympathy alone. To that principle, therefore, we 
ere to ascribe the sentiment of approbation, which 
arises from the survey of all those virtues, that 
are useful to society, or to the person possess'd 
of them. These fora the most considerable part of 
morality. (T.619
italics mine)
and
Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful 
principle in human nature, that it has a great in­
fluence on our taste of beauty, and that it produces 
our sentiments of morals in all the artificial vir­
tues. (T.577-8)
Both of these quotations suggest to me that Bume thought 
that sympathy was necessary for the production of the feel­
ings of moral approval in the oases of a large number of 
the virtues, but not in all, the obvious exceptions being 
the natural virtues which are immediately agreeable. I 
still do not see the need for sympathy in the case of those 
natural virtues which are useful to persons other than the 
agent, if the observer is immediately involved, but at the 
very least, X believe Eendenius' position is justified by 
the text, as well as by independent considerations of the 
theory. X do rot, however, regard this as as serious a flaw 
in the theory as Hendenius and Ardal (if he were to admit 
it existed) would appear to. Since there are two distinctly 
different criteria for moral value in the Humean scheme# 
qualities agreeable tO qualities useful, and two different 
kinds of virtues# natural and artificial, as well as a 
basic division of virtues into celf- and other-regarding, 
it should not be very surprising that the feelings of moral 
approval may be aroused in different cases by slightly dif­
ferent processes. On the contrary, it would be rather sur­
prising if there were not that sort of difference*
In the case of the artificial virtues, however, it
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It clear that sympathy is absolutely necessary for the arousal
of feelings of moral approval and disapproval. Unlike the
natural virtues, the artificial virtues would not appear to
produce pleasure in such a direct fashion, and the operation
of sympathy becomes correspondingly more complex.
Whereas a single act of justice, consider'd in it­
self, may often be contrary to the public good; and 
'tie only the concurrence of mankind, in a general 
scheme or system of action, which is advantageous..
The whole scheme, however, of law and justice is 
advantageous to the society....After it is once es­
tablished by these conventions, it is naturally at­
tended with a strong sentiment of morals; which can 
proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the in­
terests of society. (T.579-80)
It is thus obvious that a single act of justice does not
necessarily result in feelings of pleasure for those who
have contact with the agent, nor it it expected to, and thus
one cannot appeal to any general rule in establishing the
existence of the feelings with which the observer is to
sympathize. In most cases the feelings which would be
appropriate to eliciting moral approval or disapproval
simply are not there. However, it is clear that sympathy
does operate in this case. fiaae argues that#
Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where 
the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, 
where our own interest is not concern'd, or that 
of our friends, pleases only by sympathy# It fol­
lows, that sympathy is the source of the esteem, 
which we pay to all the artificial virtues. (T.577)
The pleas'^re with which the observer must sympathise is the 
pleasure of the whole of society, which results from the 
general establishment and following of certain conventions.
If this is the case, then the process of sympathy in the 
case of the artificial virtues becomes rather complicated.
The observer obviously must first recognise that a partic­
ular action, or set of actions, falls within the dictates
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of an established convention, and that this established con­
vention contributes to the good of society, in the sense 
that it contributes to the pleasure or happiness of society. 
It is then this postulated happiness or pleasure with which 
the observer sympathises, and not any immediate pleasure or 
pain resulting from the actions conforming to the convention. 
The process of sympathy in this case is thus, at the very 
least, more than just a mechanical transfer of feelings from 
one individual or group of individuals to another person or 
group.
To complicate the issue further, there ia the point
which Hume makes, that;
Whereas a single act of justice, consider'd in it­
self, may often be contrary to the public good...
(T.579)
Not only must the observer consider a given action as one of 
a class of actions, and consider the general effect of this 
class of actions, and not of any individual action within the 
class, but he must also, it would appear, reject what must 
be his immediate feelings, which might give rise to an op­
posing moral judgment. In such cases as Hume cites# taking 
from the poor man to give to the rich, bestowing on the dis­
solute the labour of the industrious, and so forth, it would 
seem that the observer should sympathize with the pain 
caused by the agent, and morally disapprove of him on the 
grounds that he has a character which is disadvantageous 
to those who come into contact with him, or, in other words 
because he has a vice under the very criterion under dis­
cussion here. Surely the tendency to desire to do such 
things as to take from the poor to give to the rich would 
count as a vice. The basis for this moral evaluation would
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be the simpler operation of sympathy, for which the observer 
need only sympathise with the feelings which result from the 
operation of this motive by itself, and not as a member of a 
class of motives based on an artificial convention.
Since the subject of moral evaluation is the motive 
underlying the action, and not the aotion itself, the choice 
between the two conflicting moral evaluations appears to lie 
in a decision about the nature of the motive of the agent.
In other word*, the basic difference is whether or not the 
action resulted from a desire to give to the rich by taking 
from the poor, or a desire to act in conformity with the 
rules cf justice. If this is the case, the moral evaluation 
is not so much based on a sympathetic transfer of feelings, 
although this id of course a necessary condition, as upon 
the observer's belief about the agent's motive. This would 
fit in with my earlier account of the motives underlying the 
artificial virtues. I argued there (Chapter 4) that the mo­
tive must be a desire to follow a set of rules or conventions 
because they contributed to a desirable end, and that a man 
did not have an artificial virtue if he performed the sorts 
of actions demanded by the rules or conventions from some 
other motive, so that the fact that they did conform to the 
rules was purely adventitious. It would seem not unlikely 
that similar conditions are necessary for a proper moral 
evaluation in the case of these virtues and vices. If this 
is the case, however, arousal of the feelings of moral ap­
proval and disapproval depends on more than just sympathising 
with the feelings of pleasure and pain caused by the actions 
of the agent on those who have contact with him. It surely 
involves a recognition by the observer similar to that of the
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agent, that the rules or conventions in question lead to a 
desirable end, as veil as the recognition, by the observer, 
that this ia the underlying notive of the agent's actions.
Furtherraore, the sympathy involved is not so much with the 
pain or pleasure felt by those directly affected by the 
agent's actions, as with the feelings of pain or pleasure 
experienced by society as a whole as a result of the general 
adherence to certain conventions. This latter point is prob­
ably connected to the observer's required recognition that 
these rules or conventions are established for the general 
good of society, since the general good, in Hume's system, 
surely consists in no more than that more desirable ends 
are reached by following the conventions, desirable ends be­
in'; those which give most pleasure, (or, at least, lead to 
the fulfillment of people's desires, which Ardal argues is 
not to be identified with tha seeking of pleasure^^}. Hume 
has this in mind when he says*
After it is once establish'd by these conventions, 
it is naturally attended with a strong sentiment of 
morals; y. icn can proceed from nothing but our sym­
pathy with the interests of society. (T.579-80)
^"Naturally” here of course means "spontaneously"; it does
not import a contrast to the artificiality of the virtues
in question.)
The most difficult aspect of this problem is the 
possible conflict between the natural and artificial vir­
tues, from the point of view of the observer, who makes 
the moral evaluation. I have discussed this point in the 
previous chapter, and need add little more to my discussion 
there. It appears to be largely a case of choosing between
lOibid., pp. 69-70.
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the Interests of one man, and of the community as a whole, 
or choosing between short-range and long-range advantages. 
The observer in a sense has to choose between these alter­
natives in the operation of sympathy, and it seems to me en­
tirely possible that if he is confronted with the individual 
man harmed by an act of, for example, justice, he may feel 
moral disapproval, whereas if he considers the case from a 
more general point of view, and sympathises with the feel­
ings of society as a whole, he may feel moral approval.
This is not an unusual moral dilemma, and onoe again, if 
Hume's account la considered as descriptive of normal moral 
life, it is not surprising that such a conflict should be 
contained within it, Ha gives the reader no clues as to 
what to do in the case of such a moral conflict, nor, for 
that matter, any account of what happens when the observer 
finds himself in a _situation whore there are conflicting 
feelings with which it is possible for him to sympathisa. 
However, the general impression one gets fro a the Treatise 
is that the artificial virtues are more important, in the 
sense that in the case of a conflict, the agent ought to 
follow the conventions rather than his "natural" instincts, 
and the observer ought to sympathise with the feelings of 
society in general rather than with those of particular in­
dividuals, The artificial virtues are after all established 
to bring about more desirable states of affairs, or, as Hume 
puts itt
our natural uncultivated ideas of morality, instead 
of providing a remedy for the partiality of our af­
fections, do rather conform themselves to that par­
tiality, and give it additional force and influence.
The remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, 
but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature
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provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, 
for what is irregular and incommodious in the affec­
tions. (T.489)
Since the artificial virtues are providing a "remedy", it
would appear that in oases o£ conflict, either as agent or
observer, their dictates are to be followed, rather than
those of the natural virtues.
The point made by Hume about the remedy being pro­
vided in the judgment ano understanding, also accounts for 
the rather more complex nature of the process of sympathy 
in the observer in the case of the artificial virtues. I 
have argued that moral evaluation in this class of virtues 
depends not only upon sympathising with the feelings of 
society, but also recognising that any particular action 
corresponding to an artificial virtue is one of a class of 
actions, and that the feelings with which to sympathise are 
those which result from the practice as a whole, and not 
those Which result from an individual action of the class. 
There is thus obviously rather more "judgment and under­
standing" involved in evaluating the artificial virtues than 
the natural virtues, where only the feelings resulting from 
the individual action need be considered. In the latter 
case moral evaluation can be seen as an almost purely me­
chanical process, whereas In the former case the process is 
much more than that.
Another curious aspect of the theory, which is brought 
out by the consideration of the role of sympathy in evaluat­
ing the artificial virtues, is that whereas the sympathy 
on which the moral evaluation is based is with the feelings 
caused as a result of certain actions, the moral approval 
or disapproval is actually of the agent's motives. It will
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be remembered that this is one of Rume'e earliest, and most 
firmly made points with regard to moral evaluation# that 
what are regarded with moral approval or disapproval are 
the motives, and that the actions only have moral value as 
derived from the moral value of the motives causing them.
I haV^argued earlier that the motives derive their moral 
value from being conducive of some desirable state of af­
fairs, but this does not detract from the claim that moral 
value resides in motives, not actions. However, the aspect 
of syiixpathy in moral approval or disapproval does appear, 
most obviously in the oase of the other regarding virtues, 
to focus attention on the actions rather than the motives.
In the case of those qualities useful to the agent, I argued 
that the pleasure to ba sympathised with was that caused by 
the results of the motives being put into action, and not 
just the motives. In the case of those qualities agreeable 
to those other than the agent I argued that it was clearly 
the actions which resulted from the motives that caused the 
pleasure, since the motive was private. The same is surely 
true of tho3^ qualities useful to people other than the 
agent# the motive is not of use unless it is put into action, 
and it is clearly the action which causes the pleasure.
Only in the case of those qualities immediately agreeable 
to the agent does it make any sense to talk of the motive 
itself actually causing pleasure. What then is the connec­
tion between the sympathy with the pleasure or pain caused 
by actions, and the point that moral evaluation is of mo­
tives, n6t actions? The connection must surely lie in the 
belief of the observer that the action is a result of a 
particular Motive, and that such a motive, or that motives
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of such a type, tend to result in actions which cause pleas­
ure, either by their immediate agreeability or by their 
utility. Since the motive is ea&entially private, this sug­
gests that the observer not only sympathize* with the feel­
ings he judges the affected person to have, on the basis of 
hi* behaviour, but that he also judge* on the basis of the 
agent's behaviour what motive must underly hi* action. The 
moral evaluation is not solely based, then, upon the feel­
ing* of pleasure aroused by sympathy, but also depends on a 
judgment about the nature of the motive underlying the ac­
tion. This would seem to be the oase even with those qual­
ities which are immediately agreeable to the agent, since 
in the case of a vice enjoyed by the agent, moral approval 
is not appropriately elicited by sympathy with his feelings 
of pleasure. This is an aspect of Hume's account of moral 
evaluation which is not discussed by Hume himself in any 
detail* it is also an aspect, the general effect of which 
is to increase the role of reason in moral evaluation.
It also allows for mistaken moral evaluations, in
the sense that the observer might well uake a mistake about
the motive underlying an action, so that he morally approve*
of the agent in a situation where he ought not, and where he
presumably would not ware he correct in his assessment of
the agent's actual motive. This doe* not, I think, conflict
with Hume's general edict, that;
Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring 
of reason. Reason is wholly Inactive, and can never 
be the source of so active a principle as conscience, 
or a sense of morals. (r.453)
The approval or disapproval is still aroused by the feeling
of pleasure or pain acquired by sympathy, since the feeling
of pleasure or pain Is the necessary condition of feeling
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moral approval or disapproval# but reason Informs the observer 
of the likely motive behind the action and thus, in gome 
cases, can indicate that although pleasure has been caused 
in this case, the usual effect of such a motive is pain.
Since motives are valued insofar as they lead to desirable 
states of affairs, and since there is some consistency be­
tween motives and actions, it would seam that there is a 
general rule to be appealed to here as in other parts of 
the theory. In general, actions causing pleasure will re­
sult from motives which are morally approved of, and tuose 
causing pain will result from motives which are morally dis­
approved of. The general assumption, then, on recognizing 
the existence of pleasure or pain in the agent or those af­
fected by him, is that the pleasure or pain has been caused 
as a result of a morally valuable or reprehensible motive.
The observer will thus not be forced to consider the actual 
nature of the agent's motive in each case, since he can 
appeal to the general rule. Thus error is possible, in that 
a morally reprehensible motive may result in pleasure for 
the agent or. those affected by him, and the observer, unaware 
of the actual motive, may follow the general rule and feel 
moral approval, although it is unmerited, likewise, an ob­
server aware of the motive prompting an action, may feel 
moral disapproval in situations where the expected pain does 
not ensue. The principles in operation here will be the 
same as those in any other case where the expected and 
usual pleasure or pi#in does nùt occur. The general possi­
bility of error here is not inconsistent with normal moral 
experience; the sort of error I have described the observer 
as making is surely the sort of error we have all frequently
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made *
what this operation does suggest, however, is that 
even in the case of the natural virtues, moral evaluations 
arc naio more on the basis of general considerations about 
the nature of a motive and Its results, than on the basis 
of particular actions* That is, it ia suggested that just 
as In tho artificial virtues, moral approval is aroused on 
the basis of the belief that the action which caused tho 
pleasure is the sort of action likely to follow frctu a= par­
ticular motive, which is the sort of motive which is typical 
of a particular virtue, is morally valuable, or is likely 
to result in actions such ae this one, and thus lead to a 
desirable state of affairs. This point I think ties in 
both with the notion of a cnneral point of view, the sub­
ject of tho following chanter, and the account cf the vlr— 
tueiî given, earlier, as tendencies to have certain ncrts of 
motives. Motives are regarded with moral approval ojly if 
they can bo caid to embody a certain kind of general de­
sire or purpose. I have discussed this point in come de­
tail eurlitr (chapter 3). This being the case, moral ap­
proval of a I otivü identified as a particular agent's on a 
particular occasion would be based cn the belief that it 
was a member cf a certain class of valuable motives. This 
is the sort of general consideration I think the account 
of moral evaluation calls for. Thus in this respect moral 
evaluation of natural and artificial virtues does not differ* 
The difference still remains, however, in the consideration t 
Af individual or general results of actions or motives, and 
of rhort-tcrn and long-term advantages.
There la another question about moral evaluation
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which might be brought up et this point, in relation to the 
operation of sympathy. This is whether there is any explana­
tion, under Hume's theory, for the failure to make the appro­
priate moral judgment. By this I mean something more than 
I meant in the case I mentioned above, where the observer is 
mistaken about the nature of the agent's motive, and so makes 
a mistaken judgment, in that if he had known the truth, he 
would have made another evaluation. The sorts of cases I am 
thinking about are those where there is a genuine disagree­
ment about the moral worth of a certain kind of motive, as 
for example it might be said there is today in reference to 
the virtue of chastity, or where one individual with a par­
ticular vice does not disapprove of another with the same 
vice, as one indolent man might not disapprove of another.
This is a problem which is, in reference to a dis­
cussion of Hume, somewhat anachronistic. The variation of 
moral opinions is more a matter of concern for the Twentieth 
century than for the Eighteenth. Hume, as a matter of 
fact, did not appear to think that there was that much 
variety in moral opinions.
This proposition must hold strictly true, with re­
gard to every quality, that is determin'd merely 
by sentiment. In what sense we can talk either of 
a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or 
beauty, shall be consider'd a f t e r w a r d s . I n  the 
mean time, it may be observ'd, that there is such 
an uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind, 
as to render such questions of but small importante.
(T.547n.)
The general opinion of mankind has some authority 
in all eesesi but in this or morals *tis perfectly 
infallible. (T.552)
^^a promise which, so far as I can see, is not carried out.
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The only exception he appears to allow to this general
ability of all men to recognise the morally good, and in
the same way, is with reference to pride . or conceit, where
he comments*
Nothing is more disagreeable than a man's over-
weaning conceit of himself: Everyone almost has
a strong propensity to this vice* No one can
well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and
the virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his
own merit is well-founded. (T.597-598)
However, except for this one exception, there is no account 
given of the causes, or explanations, of mistaken or differ­
ing moral evaluations. The question then arises, (if there 
is not such universal agreement, as it would appear to the 
modern man that there is not,) whether an account of these 
differences consistent with Hume's scheme can be given.
It is, X think, first of all clear that an answer 
cannot be given in purely rational terms, since although con­
siderations of reason do enter into moral evaluations, the 
basis of moral approval or disapproval is still the feelings 
of pleasure or pain aroused in the observer by viewing the 
results of actions, and this basis is non-rational. The 
simplest answer would obviously be to say that in some 
cases sympathy fails to operate, and thus no moral evalua­
tion is made, or alternatively, that sympathy does operate, 
on the basis of the wrong feelings. However, there does 
not seem to be any ready explanation for why this might 
occur. It also seems to me that moral disagreements are 
rather more substantial than can be accounted for purely 
on the grounds of a failure of such a mental operation.
On the other hand, it cannot be just a matter of a disagree­
ment about whether or not a quality or character leads to 
a desirable state of affairs, because in the end this
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appears to be a matter of whether it bauses pleasure or 
happiness for the agent and those who have contact with him, 
and this is itself a matter of sympatti%ing yith the feel­
ings of the agent or those who have contact with him. In 
the case of one indolent man failing to disapprove of an­
other, the appropriate feelings are presumably available 
with which he can sympathise. Perhaps there is no one an­
swer, in the sense that there are a large number of different 
cases. In some cases, most probably the artificial virtues, 
it may be a case of rational disagreement with the belief 
that adopting a certain convention will lead to a more de­
sirable state of affairs, and Hume's own recognition of a 
wide variety of practice between societies with regard to 
the artificial virtues (T.523, 563) may well cover some of 
what would naturally be called "moral disagreement", while 
at the same time this variety would be subsumed by him under 
the "uniformity of the general sentiments of mankind". The 
problem here is that, while a general view of the functions 
of some alien institution may suffice to make it humanly 
comprehensible, it may not suffice to make it acceptable.
In uther cases it may be a willful refusal to sym­
pathise with certain feelings, surely a possibility under 
the Humean scheme, since he never argues that the operation 
of sympathy is totally involuntary. This might fit the 
case of one indolent man failing to disapprove of another.
In other eases, it might just be a failure to recognise 
the feelings with which it would be appropriate to sym­
pathize. Since it is the case that moral disagreements are of 
different sorts, it is perhaps not surprising that one is 
not able to give a single account of them. All of the
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suggestions I have made I believe to be consistent with 
Hume's theory, and could easily account for at least some 
examples of disagreements. In the end, however, though 
much can be accommodated within Hume's machinery, it may 
be that the psychological foundations of his system are at 
once too strictly laid down and too uniformly benevolent 
in spirit to accommodate everything we should recognize as 
a comprehensible morality. That the management of aggres­
sion is an important demand on any moral economy, for ex­
ample, is an idea more familiar to our theories and our 
life than it was to Hume's.
To summarise* I have argued that sympathy is a ne­
cessary constituent of the arousal of moral approval in the 
case of all the virtues except those which are immediately 
agreeable to persons other than the agent, at which point I 
have agreed with Rendenius that there is no good reason why 
feelings of moral approval could not be aroused in these 
cases without this operation. An examination of the opera­
tion of sympathy has lead me to the conclusion that moral 
evaluation of all the virtues and vices, and not just the 
artificial virtues and vices, depends not only on sympathy 
but also on a belief about the nature of the agent's motive. 
This belief is, basically, that the motive of the agent was 
typical of a class of motives whose practice leads to a 
more desirable state of affairs. In the case of the natural 
virtues, which fall under all four of the criteria Hume 
gives for moral value, the feelings sympathised with are 
those immediately experienced by the agent, or those who 
have any contact with him, this sympathy being to some 
degree directed by general rules or beliefs about the nature
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of the agent's motive. In the case of the artificial vir­
tues and vices, which all fall under the criterion of be­
ing useful or detrimental to those whc have contact with 
the agent, the feelings with which the observer sympathises 
are not the immediate feelings experienced by those who 
have any contact with the agent, but are rather the feel­
ings of society as a whole, as caused by the general ad­
herence of the whole of society to a certain set of rules 
or conventions. Thus moral evaluation of the artificial 
virtues and vices depends to a large degree on a belief 
about the results of generally following a set of rules or 
conventions. I have argued that it is obvious that con­
flicting moral evaluations can arise, based on the diff­
erence between the artificial and the natural virtues, and 
that in the case of such conflicts, it is clear that Hume 
intended that one ought to approve of the artificial vir­
tue, despite the fact that it appeared to be a natural vice, 
and disapprove of the artificial vice, even though it might 
appear to be a natural virtue. The observer, as well as 
the agent, thus follows the artificial when it comes into 
conflict with the natural. These considerations lead me 
to the conclusion that although Hume's basic point about 
moral approval and disapproval depending cn sentiment and 
not reaeon still stands, reason has a rather larger role 
to play in moral approval and disapproval than might at 
first appear. I base this on the assumption that choosing 
between specific and general interests, and between short 
and long-term advantages, which is what is involved in 
placing the artificial virtues before the natural ones, 
is a matter of reason and not solely a matter of sentiment.
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This conclusion also follows from the earlier point, that 
moral approval and disapproval rests on a belief about the 
nature of the agent's motive, which b<rli- f i b a s e d  on 
rather more than sentiment. Reason can inform us of the 
tendency of actions or motives, Hume claims, and this is 
what the belief about the agent's motive is based upon. 
These general considerations, which along with sympathy, 
are the basis of moral evaluation, lead us to the notion 
of taking a general point of view, which I shall deal with 
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 
The General Point of View
Betides the operation of sympathy in moral evaluation, 
there is another operation which plays a large, and it ap­
pears, necessary role, in the arousal of moral feelings. This 
operation is the taking of a general point of view. The first 
mention of this operation occurs when Hume says that:
AS everything, which gives uneasiness in human ac­
tion, upon the general survey is call'd Vice, and 
whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, 
is denominated Virtue;... (T.499,
italics mine)
To take a general point of view appears to be, on Hume's ac­
count, to take the point of view of the agent or those who 
have any connexion with him.
Now, in judging of characters, the only interest 
or pleasure, which appears the same to every spec­
tator, is that of the person himself, whose char­
acter is examin'd; or that of persons, who have a 
connexion with him. And tho' such interests and 
pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet 
being more constant and universal, they oounter- 
ballance the latter even in practice, and alone
are admitted in speculation as the standard of
virtue and morality (T.591,
italics mine)
The relation of this operation to that of sympathy is thus 
clear, since the operation of sympathy enables the observer 
to consider, or rather share, the feelings of the agent, or 
those who have a connexion> with him. To take the general 
point of view thus seems to be little more than to sympathise 
with the agent or those affected by the agent, which opera­
tion has already been granted to be a necessary aspect of
moral evaluation in most, if not all, of the virtues and 
vices. However, the problem with this interpretation of 
Hume's account of taking a general point of view, is that it
138.
Is rather more a particular point of view. In the ease of 
the self-regarding virtuesor vices, for example, we have 
seen that the role of the operation of sympathy is to trans­
fer the feelings of the agent to the observer. This is to 
take the point of view of the agent, which is of course dif­
ferent from that of the observer, but is hardly a "general" 
point of view. The same might well be said, although less 
strongly, about the operation of sympathy with reference to 
the other-regarding virtues and vices. However, other things 
that Hume says about the general point of view suggest that 
he does have something rather more "general" in mind. For 
example, he argues that#
Besides, every particular man has a peculiar posi­
tion with regard to others; and "tis impossible we 
cou'd ever converse on any reasonable terms, were 
each of us to consider characters and persons, only 
as they appear from his peculiar point of view.
In order, therefore, to prevent those continual con­
tradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of 
things, we fix on some steady and general points of 
view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in 
them, whatever may be our present situation. (T.581-82)
These "steady and general points of view" Eume compares to
the taking of a certain position in perceiving objects.
Such corrections are common with regard to all the 
senses; and indeed "twere impossible we cou'd ever 
make use of language, or communicate our sentiments 
to one another, did we not correct the momentary 
appearances of things, and overlook our present si­
tuations. (T.582)
He further argues, in reference to sense perception, that#
'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances 
of the senses, and makes us imagine, that an object 
at twenty foot distance seems even to the eye as 
large as one of the same dimensions at ten. (T.632)
The general point of view thus would seem to be some partic­
ular, and "correct" point of view for regarding the situa­
tion, and not just the point of view of the agent or those
who have any connexion with him, since these would surely
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be examples of peculiar points of view, which Hume says are
to be disregarded or discounted in judgment. Finally, we
find, to support this interpretation, that Hume says#
The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in so­
ciety and conversation, makes us form some general 
inalterable standard, by which we may approve or 
disapprove of characters and manners. (T.603
italics minob
The formation of this general inalterable standard, which
surely must be meant to be more than just the point of view
of particular people in particular situations, is designed 
to counteract the vagaries of sympathy (T.603), and thus we 
are led to the conclusion that the general point of view is 
more than just the feelings acquired by sympathy from the 
agent or those others involved in the situation although it 
may presuppose the operation of sympathy. If it is an in­
alterable standard, is not just the point of view of a par­
ticular man, since any man's point of view is alterable.
Nor can it be the standard of any particular group of men, 
since each man is affected differently by different situa­
tions, and thus what is reached is several standards, and 
not one inalterable one.
It is at this point in Hume's theory that he is cited 
as an ancestor of what has been called the "Ideal Observer 
Theory" in ethics. Since this theory presents a possible 
interpretation of the taking of a general point of view, al­
though one that I think is mistaken, I think it deserves 
some discussion at this point. One of the best known pro­
ponents of this theory is the American philosopher R.B. Brandt. 
The theory is basically an account of the meaning of moral 
terms. An example of a typical definition under this theory 
is given by Brandt as#
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is better than means "If anyone were, in res- 
peot of and fully informed and vividly imagina­
tive, impartial, in a cala frame of mind and other­
wise normal, he would prefer x^  to %#"##.In other 
words, the theory supposes that ethical statements 
assert about their subject-term that any person who 
fulfilled certain qualifications at the time would ex­
perience a certain reaction toward the subject-term.^
The claim sometimes made in reference to Hume is that what
he meant by taking a general point of view was to take the
position of the "ideal observer", as outlined in this theory.
The general point of view woùld thus be the point of view
which would be taken by a normal disinterested observer who
was acquainted with all the relevant facts, presumably not
only those "facts” acquired by sympathy, but also the facts
about the true nature of the agent's motive and so forth,
and the correct moral evaluation would be that which would
be aroused in this observer as a result of his observations*
The general point of view thus becomes something like the
omniscient point of view. The thing to be noted, of course,
is that this omniscient observer has still to have all the
emotions and feelings of the normal observer, since it is
the emotions or feelings, and not reason, which are the source
of moral evaluation. This is also implied in the quotation
from Brandt given above. Thus although he is disinterested,
he is only so in the sense that he is not one of the people
involved in the situation, but mot in the sense that a non-
human might be said to be disinterested with regard to the
situation. Be must not, for instance, be uninterested in it.
It must still arouse in him normal human emotions.
This éa certainly a possible interpretation of what
^Brandt, R, Ethical Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Frentice- 
Hall Inc., 1959, p. 173.
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Hume means by taking a general point of view, but my own 
opinion is that it goes rather beyond what Hume actually had 
in mind# The problem is with the "ideal" aspect of the Ideal 
Observer. It is, I think, certainly the case that part of 
taking a general point of view is to take the point of view 
of an observer rather than a participant in the action, or 
rather, to remove oneself from one's own particular point of 
view. However, there is nowhere in Hume this suggestion of 
omniscience that the "ideal observer" would appear to have in 
the modern theory. To take the general point of view is to 
take the point of view of the agent or those who have any 
connexion with him, and this does not appear to be the posi­
tion of the omniscient olserver. The omniscient observer, 
among other things, knows the long-range results of a course 
of action, this is not suggested in the Humean account. Nor 
is there ary reason to believe that the attitude of the ideal 
observer in any particular case would correspond to the atti­
tudes of the agent or those affected by him. And finally, 
there is the radical difference, tb&t Hume is giving an ac­
count of the mechanics of arousing moral sentiments, and the 
modern theorists an account of the meaning of moral terms, 
so that in the end the two theories do not really coincide.
It may be the case that the mechanics of arousing moral
feelings in Hume's theory involves taking the point of view 
of an observer, rather than of a participant in the action, 
although even this is slightly misleading, but this in no 
way suggests that this is what Hume thought the meaning of 
moral terms to be. And likewise, even if one holds that the
meaning of a moral term depends on, or expresses, the atti­
tude of an ideal observer, this does not entail that the
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arousal of moral feelings Involves taking such a point of 
view. There are two disparate theories here, and the claim 
that Hume is an obvious ancestor of the modern Ideal Observ­
er Theory seems to me far-fetched#
I have said that the claim that taking a general 
point of view is to take the role of the observer is slightly 
misleading. The reason it is so is that Hume says that the 
observer is to take the point of view of the agent or those 
who have any connection with him, (T.591) rather than his 
own, which means he is to abstract himself from the situa­
tion, and discount his own feelings of pleasure and pain, 
but at the same time he is to consider, or actually experience, 
by way of sympathy, the feelings of those people other than 
himself who are involved in the situation# Thus, in a sense, 
the observer becomes less of an observer, and more of a par­
ticipant, ’.’hen he takes the general point of view, and only 
acts as an observer in the sense that ht discounts his own 
feelings in the process.
The reference to the process of taking a general 
point of view as being the sort of thing which happens with 
regard to all the senses (T.582) might give some sort of 
clue as to what Hume had in mind at this point. The correct 
point of view is like the correct point of perception: the 
point at which the object is most clear or most readily seen, 
a point neither too close, so that the object is obscured 
by the details, nor too far, eo that the details cannot be 
seen at all. This places the observer, in moral questions, 
at the mlddle-distance, neither so close that the matter is 
obscured by his own sentiments, nor so distant that he is 
not at all involved. He must be involved to some degree.
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since moral evaluation is a matter of sentiment, not reason, 
and GO there mast be at loist enough involvement to arouse 
the appropriate sentiments. This middle distance, Hume ap­
pears to argue, is the point of view of those others involved 
in the situation. The problem with this, is that it does not 
seem so much the middle distance, aa a close view, but the 
close view of persons other than the person doing the evaluat­
ing. However, I suspect that the point which is being made 
here is that although the observer may acquire by sympathy 
the feelings of those others, he will not feel so strongly as 
they do about the matter. That is, his feelings, as acquired 
by sympathy, will be somewhat subdued versions of the originals, 
and thus he will not be "carried away" so to speuk, by the 
strength of his feelings and will make a r.ore balanced eval­
uation. This account —  merely in terras of taking up the 
position of the other -- perhaps may seem too rationalist to 
be consistent with Hume's general tendencies, but I do not 
think that it actually is. In the first place, as I have 
argued earlier, reason does have sone role to play in moral 
evaluation, in the sense of supplying facts on which the emo­
tions are to seme extent dependent. Secondly, it is clear 
that it is possible for the observer to receive conflicting 
feelings by means of sympathy in any one situation, a point 
which I shall discuss later in more detail, and there must 
be some moans by which he "balances" these out, relying no 
doubt partly on some generalr uLes, which will indicate the 
normal pattern of events. Finally, it is consistent with 
normal human behaviour that the discounting of one's own 
interests, at least to the degree that one's own interests 
are no mere relevant than any other single person's, will
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inevitably lead to a lee# biased decision about the moral 
value o£ a certain course of character or action, and this 
is surely the end that has in mind here.
The point about discounting one's own feelings must 
be modified to some degree, however, since moral evaluation 
is also possible in situations in which the observer plays 
no part whatsoever. Thus Hume gives examples of moral eval­
uations about events distant in time and place.
we give the same approbation to the same moral qual­
ities in China as in England....nor can I feel the 
same lively pleasure from tne virtues of a person, 
who liv'd in Greece two thousand years ago, that Z 
feel from the virtues of a familiar friend and acquain­
tance. Yet I do not say, that I esteem the one more 
than the other. (T.581)
In these sorts of evaluations, it is quite clear that the ob­
server is not discounting his own feelings, in the sense of 
abstracting himself from the situation, since he is not 
really in it, and the act of moral evaluation involves put­
ting himself into it, to some degree. Yet surely this is 
just the other side of the coin. In tau&e situations in 
which the observer is involved, he must remove himself to 
some degree, and thus discount his feelings of interest when 
he morally evaluates, whereas in those situations in which 
he plays no part whatsoever, he aust "enter* into it to some 
degree, and, so to speak, discount his uninterested feelings.
Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite 
stronger sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus 
Brutus, as represented in history; but we say not 
upon that account, that the former character is more 
laudable than the latter. We know, that were we to 
approach equally near to that reuown'd patriot, he 
would command a much higuer degree of affection and 
admiration. (T.582)
Thus, in both examples, the observer removes himself from
his own situation, and discounts his own feelings, whether
of great interest or total lack of interest, and takes up
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A more central position.
The conclusion to which one ia thus led is that what 
HuBie ueana Ly a general point of view is a point cf view 
which embraces the feelings of all those involved in the rel­
evant situation, rather than the point of view of some "out­
side observer", end that "general" is to be taken in the sense 
of "wide-ranging" rather than in the sense of "uninvolved". 
This rather makes the analogy with tho correct point of view 
in visual perception less compelling, however, since that 
point of view is somewhere between wide and narrow. I would 
think, however, that the analogy could be maintained by sug­
gesting that Hume does not mean the general point of view to 
include the attitudes of everyone who :uight possibly ba af­
fected by the course of action or character, as the Ideal Ob­
server Theory would appear to hold, but o ily the attitudes of 
those people whom the average observer could see as being more 
or less imMediately involved. The general point of view could 
thus be considered halfway between the all-encompassing view 
of an ideal observer and the narrow view of the nan who con­
siders only his own interests. It nay seem paradoxical to 
sustain the sense-peroeption analogy by reference to a point 
of view midway between that of an ideal observer and that of 
someone else, for what point of view could possibly be more 
ideal than that of an ideal observer? Bat that paradox is 
only apparent, for the "ideal observer" is, as has been 
said, an omniscient observer, and is therefore not analogous 
to a perceiver by the senses et all; he does not, in fact, 
observe anything from a point of view at all. The analogy 
of sense-perception, therefore, does not involve (as the 
paradox suggested) staying with the ideal observer, but
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precisely involves moving sway from him.
Eovever, although we have narrowed the field some­
what in our search for the notion of the general point of 
view, in that it is not the views of either the all-knowing 
ideal observer, or the narrow-minded man who considers only 
his own interests, we still have not got an account of what 
point of view it actually is. We have still the problem 
that the description given Ly Hume#
that of the person himself, whose character is 
examin'd# or that of persons, who have a con­
nexion with him. (T.SSl)
does not really sound like a "general" point of view nor,
for that matter, like
seme general inalterable standard. (T.603)
It sounds rather more like a collection of particular points
of view. Part of the answer to this problem may lie in the
consistency of human reactions to particular situations. In
a footnote, Hume cc mcnts, as we noticed in the last chapter.
In what sense we can talk either of a right or
a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty,
shall be consider'd afterwards. In the mean­
time, it may be observ'd, that there is such a 
uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind, 
as to render such questions of but small import­
ance. (T.547 n.)
Many times in his discussion of morality and moral evaluation,
Hume refers to general rules, which people tend to follow,
and which can be relied upon as guides, even%4ien the unex­
pected occurs. Thus, even when a man docs not feel pain 
where most men do, the observer sympathises with the non­
existent pain, relying on the general rule. These general 
rules thus express the normal course of action, and are to 
be relied upon, since they are based on the clearly true 
premise, that human behaviour is sufficiently consistent
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that one knows what to expect. Thus, although there is al­
ways the possibility of conflict in the feelings of the agent 
and of those affected by him, in general, most people react 
in more or less the same way in similar situations. The ob­
server thus has a rough guide to the normal feelings result­
ing from particular situations* For example, the virtue of 
benevolence results usually in feelings of pleasure for all 
concerned, and thus the general point of view in this oase 
might consist of feelings of pleasure in viewing a situation 
in which this virtue has been put into practice* Although 
there may be occasional variations from this# (my heir, for 
example, may net regard all my acts of generosity with com­
plete pleasure,) the usual or normal result is fairly clear* 
If the observer's own feelings conflict with the feelings 
required by the taking of a general point of view, then they 
are to be discounted, as not being part of the normal scheme 
of things# if they o not, then they only add to the general 
picture* Following this approach, then, we take the "general 
point of view" to mean the "normal" or "usual" point of view* 
There are some problems with this interpretation, 
however. It appears to be Inconsistent with Hume's account 
of the reason why such a general point of view is necessary 
in moral evaluation.
Our situation, with regard both to persons and 
to things, is in continual fluctuation# and a 
man, that lie » at distance from us ray, in a 
little time, become a familiar acquaintance.
Besides, every partciular man has a peculiar 
position with regard to others# and 'tis impos­
sible we cou'd ever converse together on any 
reasonable terme, were each of us to consider 
characters and persons, only as they appear 
from his peculiar point of view. In order, 
therefore, to prevent those continual contra­
dictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment 
of things, we fix on some steady and general
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points of view# and always, in our thoughts, place 
ourselves in them, whatever may be our present sit­
uation....In general, all sentiments of praise or 
blame are variable, according to our situation of 
nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person 
praised or blamed, and according to the present dis­
position of our mind. But these variations we regard 
not in our general decisions... (T.561-582)
Bums appears to be arguing that the reason why the taking of
a general point of view ia necessary is that there are no
normal or usual sentiments that can be relied upon. There
are a wide variety of differing sentiments, and the taking
of a general point of view is required in order to establish
a common sentiment, and thus cannot be based on such a common
sentiment.
however, although this analysis of what hume meant 
by the "general point of view" clearly is not satisfactory, 
there is some degree cf truth in it. A characteristic or 
quality of mina is deemed a virtue if it is useful or agree­
able to the agent or to those % ho have contact with hin, and 
this utility or agrceableness results in pleasure for the 
agciit, for those who have contact with him, and for the ob­
server by means of the operation of sympathy. It is on 
these feelings of pleasure that the moral evaluation is 
based. hence, a character which is judged to be morally val­
uable on the whole must produce more pleasure than pain, 
since it is this pleasure which "causes* the appropriate 
moral evaluation. The sentiment of the observer must there­
fore be similar to the most common sentiment produced in 
people by the character, in order to account for his moral 
evaluation. The variety will presumably be largely in the 
degree of pleasure or pain felt by the various people in­
volved in the situation, along with an occasional dissent­
ing sentiment ia people who are unusually affected by the
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character In question.
It may be that the correct approach is to consider 
not the content of the sentiment, in the attempt to describe 
the general point of view, but rather the manner in which 
the sentiment is entertained. In other words, the general 
point of view might be regarded, not as a particular senti­
ment chosen frcm among many possible in a given situation, 
but rather as a sentiment which results from considering the 
situation in a "general" fashion. The sort of thing I have 
in mind here is that the observer would not only abstract 
himself from the particular situation, tut would take a dis­
interested point of view of the particular situation itself. 
The judgment would then be made not so much on the basis of 
considering the pleasure or pain produced by the particular 
situation, but rather the pleasure or pain generally produced 
by situations or characters of this sort. The particular 
case would be evaluated with reference to some sort of general 
criteria.
That this particular analysis might be applicable to 
Hume's notion of the general point of view is, I think, sup­
ported by Kune's account of our reasons for approving of 
characters of mind which are normally useful or agreeable, 
but which in particular cases might be prevented from operat­
ing.
Where a character is, in every respect, fitted to 
be beneficial to society, the imagination passes 
easily from the cause to the effect, without con­
sidering that there are still some circumstances 
wanting to render the cause a coopleat one. General 
rules create a species of probability, which some- 
iimes Influences the judgment, and always the imagina­
tion.
'Tis true, when the cause is compleat, and a 
good disposition is attended with good fortune, which 
renders it really beneficial to society, it gives a
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stronger pleasure to the spectator, and is attended 
with a more lively sympathy. We are more affected 
by it| and yet we do not say that it is more virtuous, 
or that we esteem it more. (T.585)
That is, we do not consider just the particular case, but the 
particular case as a member of a class, and our judgment is 
based on the class, or normal result, rather than just on the 
particular case. This analysis also easily accounts for the 
possibility of moral «valuations of characters in history, or 
in distant countries. We do not have to consider the partic­
ular effects of the character on those surrounding the agent, 
(which it may be impossible for the observer to know,) we 
only have to consider the usual results of the operation of 
such a character, in any time or place.
The imagination adheres to the general view of 
things, and distinguishes the feelings they pro­
duce, from those which arise from our particular 
and momentary situation. (T.537)
In most particular cases it will of course be true, that the 
sentiment the observer has will be indicative of, or similar 
to, the feelings of most people involved in the situation. 
This follows from the claim that general rules can be estab­
lished on the basis of a generalisation from particular 
cases. However, this is not a necessary correspondence, and 
will allow for the moral approval of a character even when 
the results of the operation of that character of mind have 
"misfired", resulting in pain in the particular case, rather 
than the expected pleasure.
The only real problem that such an. analysis presents 
is that it appears to be inconsistent with Burners initial 
"definition" of the general point of view, as being the point 
of view
of the person himself, whose character is examin’d, 
or that of persons, who have a connexion with him.
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And ’tho such interests end pleasures touch us more 
faintly than our own, yet being more constant and 
universal, they counter-ballance the latter even in 
practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as 
the standard of virtue and morality. They alone 
produce that particular feeling or sentiment, on 
which moral distinctions depend. (T.591)
This passage does appear to refer to the particular case, and 
to suggest that the points of view t6 be taken into account 
are those felt by the agent and those affected by him in the 
particular situation. It is not suggested that they should 
be regarded as indicative of some sort of normal reaction.
Yet I think it could be argued that the claim that these 
sentiments are "more constant and universal" is an implicit 
reference to the general or usual results of the operation of 
such a character, than to the results in any particular case. 
If not, the claim that they are "more constant and universal" 
does not appear to be justifiable. Thus I do not think my 
analysis conflicts with Hume’s own account of the general 
point of view, and although it might present some problems of 
interpretation, it does, on the other hand, make more reason­
able some other points which Hume makes about moral evalua­
tion.
In the end, then, I think the general point of view 
which the observer takes in moral evaluation not only requires 
him to discount his only feelings in a particular situation 
(a position I'do not think my analysis rules out) but also 
requires him to consider not the particular situation itself, 
but rather the particular situation as representative of a 
class of similar situations. The sentiments of pleasure and 
pain to be considered are not just those felt by the people 
involved in the situation, but also the sentiments which 
would be expected, under the general rule, to result from the
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operation of the character of mind being examined. The im­
portance of taking a general point of view is, of course, 
that Hume claims that only the sentiments of approval or dis­
approval resulting from the taking of this point of view are 
properly moral approval or disapproval.
They alone produce that particular feeling or senti­
ment, on which moral distinctions depend. (T.591)
"Tis only when a character is consider'd in general, 
without reference to our particular interest, that 
it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates 
it morally good or evil. (T.472)
An interesting aspect of this notion is the implied conserv- 
ativism in morality which can be seen in it. That which is 
properly regarded with moral approval, in Eune's system, is 
basically that which is normally so regarded, by the majority 
of people. The moral reformer ought therefore to be disap­
proved of, basically because he is a reformer, and thus is 
necessarily not advocating the usual. As a matter of fact, 
from a theoretical point of view, the moral views of the 
reformer become themselves highly suspect. Either he is not 
taking a general point of view, in which case his views may 
be interesting, but non-moral, or else he has made a terrible 
mistake in the process of acquiring these views (I shall 
discuss the problem of moral error at a later stage in this 
chapter) and they are moral, but mistaken. It will do no 
good to appeal to some sort of utilitarian principle, that 
actually following a certain plan of action, or encouraging 
the development of certain characters will in the long run 
lead to the happiness of most people, since although Hume 
argues that men do, as a matter of fact, approve of what is 
useful or agreeable, they do not do so on the rational basis 
that they ought to do so because it is useful or agreeable.
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What the moral reformer must do i.% actually to make people 
feel pleasure as the result of the development of a certain 
character, in whioh case they will come to approve of it, 
and the moral reformer will finally come to have correct 
moral sentiments. Be would be in more or less the same posi­
tion as those mythical people who instituted the rules or 
conventions underlying the artificial virtues,  ^Be cannot 
establish them on moral grounds, but must rather appeal to 
self-interest or some other non-moral sentiment in order to 
establish his point. This is a somewhat unhappy result of 
the theory, but it is consistent with the general tone of 
Hume*s»work,
To take the general point of view, as I have argued 
earlier in this chapter, has an obvious connection with the 
operation of sympathy, in that to take the general point of 
view Involves taking the point of view of persons other than 
the observer, and this would seem to presuppose the opera­
tion of sympathy. However, given the account of what the 
general point of view involves, as I have outlined it above, 
the operation of sympathy is somewhat less than straight­
forward. It will be recalled that the operation involves 
the "transfer" of feelings to the observer from those whom 
he is observing. Thus, observing a man clearly feeling 
pleasure, th«^  observer, by means of the arousal of the feel­
ing of pleasure from the idea of pleasure, himself feels 
pleasure. The development in the observer of the correspond­
ing feelings is called the operation of the principle of 
sympathy. Sympathy also works by what Hume refers to as the 
general rule. That is, in cases where the agent does not 
have the expected feeling of pleasure or pain, the observer
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may none the less develop such feelings, merely on the grounds 
that they normally are there, or should be there, or were ex­
pected to be there. Thus, although the operation of sympathy 
appears to be an example of a causal connection, it does not 
quite fit Hume's own account of causal relations.
According to Eume, we say t- at one thing is the cause 
of a second if there is a universal correspondence between 
the two events, such that the first is always followed by the 
second, other things being equal, and likewise, the second is 
preceded by the first, other things again being equal. The 
operation of sympathy appears not to fit into this account of 
causalIcn because of the possibility of the arousal of feel­
ings of pleasure or pain in the observer when they are not 
present in the agent. This difficulty can probably be got 
round by saying that the feelings of pleasure or pain are ac­
tually aroused, or caused by, the corresponding idea, and 
that this idea can be aroused either by seeing the correspond­
ing feeling affecting another person, or by merely just seeing 
another person in a situation in which custom leads the ob­
server to have the appropriate idea. This allows one to say 
that the operation of sympathy is causal, but the direct 
cause of the feelings in the observer is his own ideas, and 
not the feelings the agent is believed to have. This is im­
portant, since it makes possible the operation of sympathy 
in those cases where there actually is no agent or other 
person present with whose feelings the observer is to sympa- 
tliJzei for example characters in ancient Rome or in China.
If taking a general point of view does presuppose the opera­
tion of sympathy, then such a process must be possible. 
Moreover, if the taking of a general point of view does involve
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considering the particular cage n:ly as representative of a 
class of cases, as I have suggested above, then the observer 
has the monumental task of sympathizing with the feelings 
that generally result from the sort of character being eval­
uated, even if there are no examples of such feelings avail­
able in the particular case. This t.tsk may be subsumable 
under an extended view of what the operation of sympathy in­
volves, but it is a long way from the simple arousal of the 
corresponding feelings when the observer considers the feel­
ings of another person, Rather than being what one might 
refer to as a "transfer" of feelings from one person to an­
other, it is a case of arriving, by means of some sort of 
general rule, at an idea al>out what feelings night be expected 
to be aroused in general by this sort of character, this 
idea then forming the basis of the arousal of that feeling 
in the observer. On a theoretical level I am rather rubious 
about classing this sort of operation as an example of the 
operation of the principle of sympathy, because of the way 
this operation seems to have been extended. However, it is 
clear to na that Hume meant it to bo regarded as such al­
though the evidence from the text may seem conflicting on 
this point.
To support the argument that sympathy is a necessary
condition of taking a general point of view, we may cite the
following passage.
How we have no such extensive concern for society 
but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that prin­
ciple, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as 
to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the 
characters of others, as if they had a tendency to 
our own advantage or loss. (T.579)
On the other hand, Hume frequently makes the point that the
sympathy varies with distance in time and place, whereas the
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moral evaluation does not.
%hen any quality, or character, has a tendency to 
the good of mankind, we are pleas'd with it, and 
approve of it| because it presents the lively idea 
of pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and 
is itself a kind of pleasure. But as this sympathy 
is very variable, it may be thought, that our senti­
ments of morals must admit of all the same variations.
...But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, 
we give the same approbation tc tho came moral quali­
ties in China as in England....The sympathy varies 
without a variation in our esteem, (T,580-581)
This might be taken to suggest that we ignore the feelings 
acquired by sympathy, sincu they vary, and in taking the 
general point of view we do not need tho operation of sympathy; 
rather, it has to be discounted. However, I do not think this 
is a 4 liusible conclusion. There is at least one rxre sec­
tion where Hume brings the two principles together. He says;
May when the injustice is so distant from us, as 
no way to affect our interest, it still displeases 
us; because we consider it as prejudicial to human 
society, and pernicious to everyone that approaches 
the person guilty of it. Ke partake of their un­
easiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which 
gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general 
survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces satis­
faction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue...
(T.499)
Thus X think Bums means the taking of a general point of view 
to involve the operation of sympathy, since he regards this 
latter operation as being the only.means by which the observer 
can acquire any feelings except the ones with which he is im­
mediately and peculiarly affected by the actions of the agent. 
If the observer is to discount or ignore his own sentiments, 
and yet has to have some sentiments on which to base the 
moral evaluation, then it is clear, to Hume, that these 
other feelings must be acquired by the operation of sympathy. 
And if moral approval or disapproval necessarily presupposes 
the taking of a general point of view, then it follows that 
moral approval or disapproval necessarily involves the
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operation of the principle of sy ] athy.
Another question which arises, once it is established 
that the taking of a general point of view involves the oper­
ation of the principle of sympathy, is, with how wide a range 
aast the observer sympathize in order to have truly taken a 
general point of view? Humo says tl at we sympathize with 
the interests of society, but how large is society? It is 
clearly intended to bo raoro than one's immediate family and 
friondj, towards whom one naturally feels benevolence, and 
whose advantage, along with one's own, would be the object of 
one'a actions, ware one not compelled, by virtue of the 
abiliiY to sympathize with a wider group, to take into ac­
count the interests of the rest of society, Hov'ever, it is 
not cloar whether this widor society is meant to include man­
kind as a whole, or only the other members of one's social 
group, or oao's nation* Home does believe it is possible to 
sympathize with mankind as a wholet
'fis true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible, 
creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some 
measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and rep­
resented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely 
from sympathy, and is no proof of such a universal 
affection to mankind, since this concern^extends it­
self beyond our own species, (T,431)
However, we surely are not to conclude from this that the 
taking of a general point of view involves in each case sym­
pathizing with all sensible creatures.
Perhaps one could argue that since, in all his dis­
cussions of society, the social virtues, and the artificial 
virtues whioh are established for the interest of all society, 
Hume appears to be considering, more or less, a nation as 
constituting a society, that he intends the general point 
of view to extend to a nation or a society, and not
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necosgtrlly beyond It. On the ot’*ar hand, ho doog regard 
it as pognlbla to make moral evaluations of characters in 
different times and places, and in these circumstances it 
would bo very strange to limit one's sympathy only to the 
reactions of the members of one's own nation. Since there 
la no clear indication in name's woj as to how far he 
meant the general point of view to extend, I do not think 
that any real answer can be given to this question. I 
rather think that actually, no clear answer la nscesaary.
Hen in different times and places do not vary, on Hume's 
view, that widely In their reactions to similar characters 
of ml 1, and in their views of such characters, so that ex- 
tonding the general point of view to all mankind will not 
really achieve much more than extending it to the citizens 
of one's own nation, n-mipathy mubt obviously extend beyond 
the Intorofets of the observer and his relations and friends, 
but onca it is extended beyond particular interests, the 
particular situation Is considered as a member of a class 
of similar situations, and sympathy ranges over the genjral 
class, a general point of view will have been taken, making 
questions of whether thin includes only one nation or all 
of mankind largely irrelevant, ’Te are, after all, supposed 
to be able to appreciate our eneiay's virtues, (which might 
present problems for the artificial vir tui of allegiance to 
nations in tiras of war),
I have several times commented that taking a gen­
eral point of view is a necessary condition of moral eval­
uation, and sympathy is a necessary condition of taking a 
general point of view, then the operation of sympathy is a 
necessary condition of moral evaluation. This position was
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of courge discussed in the previous chapter, where I argued 
that there !5,d not appear to be any good reason why the oper­
ation of sympathy vaa necessary in the arousal of feelings 
of moral approval or disapproval in certain of the other- 
regarding natural virtues. It will be remembered that I 
argued then that if the observer wau one of the people af­
fected by the agent, then there seemed to be no reason why 
the appropriate feelings of pleasure or pain could not be 
directly aroused, without the observer's having to sympathize 
with either the agent or any other parsons who were affected 
by him. However, as was there pointed out (Chapter 5) if it 
is tr ■ r' that the appropriate feelings of moral approval or 
disapproval aannot be aroused without the taking of a gen­
eral riolnt of view, and hence without the operation of sym­
pathy, the argument of the previous chapter will have to be
rejectai. Vo thus come to the question of whether the tak­
ing of a general point of view Is a necessary condition of 
moral evaluation, and if, so, in what sense.
It is, first of all, clear that Hume regarded the 
taking of a general point of view as a necessary condition 
of moral evaluation:
•Tia only when a character is considered in gen­
eral, without reference to our particular interest, 
that it causes such a fooling or sentiment, as de­
nominate# it morally good or evil. (T.472)
as everything, which gives uneasiness in human ac­
tion, upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and
whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner,
is denominated Virtue... (T.499)
How, in judging of characters, tho only Interest or 
pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, 
is that of tha person himself, whose character" is 
examin'd; or that of persons, who have a connexion 
with him. And tho' such interests and pleasures 
touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more 
constant and universal, they counter-ballanco tho
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latter aven in practice, a n ’ alone are admitted in 
speculation as the standard of virtu# and morality.
(T.5 91)
I think the position is quite clear, and thus we are left
with the v.rohlevA of why the taking of a general point of
view 19 neoeesary.
The first possibility is that it is some sert of
"physical* necessity which Eume has in mind here. This
night he deduced from his claim that*
•Tig only when a character is considered in gen­
eral...that it causes such a feeling or sentiment,
as denominates it morally good or evil. (T.472)
The argument wouZl then Le, that as a natter of "physical" 
fact, t:e feelings appropriate to noral approval or disap­
proval could liGt be aroused without the prior taking of a ^ 
general j^oint of view. On Kuîse's analysis of causation, 
what tills then means is that the feelings of moral approval 
trd disapproval do not ever occur unless precea « d Ly tlie 
taking of a general point of view. This loint could pre- 
BUr.aMy only he estahlif}*ed by introspection, since there 
seens to he no theoretical rear on why this must be so. As 
on all questions to he settled by introspection, I have no 
argument, being unable to locate all these different and 
distinct feelings myself.
that this position docs imply, however, is that the 
fcclinrc of toral approval and disapproval are phenomeno- 
loglcally distinct from other feelings of pleasure and pain, 
and can be distinguished on this basis.
•tic true, those rsntirtnts, from interest and 
morale, are apt to be confounded, and naturally 
run into one another. It seldom happens, that 
ve do not think an enemy vicious, and can dis­
tinguish betwixt hie opposition to our interest 
and real villainy or baseness. But this hinders 
not, but that the sentiments are, in themselves.
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distinct; and a man of temper and judgment may pre­
serve himself from these illusions. (T.472)
*tis evident, that under the term pleasure, we com­
prehend sensations, which are very different from 
each other, and which have only such a distinct re­
semblance, as is requisite to make them be express'd 
by the same abstract term...an inanimate object, and 
the character and sentiments of any person may, both 
of them, give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction 
is different, this keeps our sentiments concerning 
them from being confounded, and makes us ascribe vir­
tue to the one, and not to the other. Nor is every 
sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from 
characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which 
makes us praise or condemn.' (T.472)
X have discussed earlier (Chapter 2) the question of identi­
fying feelings of moral approval and disapproval phenomeno- 
logieally, and pointed out that it is not entirely clear that 
Hume consistently holds this position, since many of the 
other statements he makes about moral evaluation are very 
difficult to maintain along with this position. Z concluded 
then that there seems little point in insisting upon the 
theory that feelings of moral approval or disapproval are 
identifiable phenomenologically, since there are other cri­
teria for identifying them which are more consistent with 
the rest of Hume's theory. However, the passages I have 
quoted above do seem to suggest that Hume is at this point 
relying on the phenomenological point.
In contrast to this point, I should like to note
some other things that Hume says about the general point of
view. For example#
tho' sympathy be much fainter than our concern for 
ourselves, and a sympathy with persons remote from 
us much fainter than that with persons near and 
contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in 
our calm judgments concerning the characters of men. 
Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation 
in this particular, we every day meet with persons, 
who are in a different situation from ourselves, and 
who cott'd never converse with us on any reasonable 
terms, were we to remain constantly in that situation
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and point of view, whioh is peculiar to us. The 
intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society 
and conversation, makes us form some general in­
alterable standard, by which we may approve or 
disapprove of characters and manners. And tho* 
the heart does not always take part with those 
general notions, or regulate its love or hatred 
by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, 
and serve all our purposes in company, in the 
pulpit, in the theatre, and in the schools. (T.603)
We partake of their [those affected by injustice] 
uneasiness by sympathy, and as every thing, which 
gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the gen­
eral survey, is call'd Vice.... (T.499)
The latter quotation does not make it explicit that only a 
particular kind of uneasiness is appropriately a basis for 
moral evaluation, but rather suggests that any uneasiness, 
upon the general survey, is sufficient. The former quota­
tion is however, more interesting, since it might be inter­
preted as suggesting that the general point of view, is, 
like the artificial virtues, a convention established in 
order to get around some difficulty in the "natural" way 
of doing things. Without taking a general survey, men would 
still feel pleasure or pain as the result of the action 
prompted by characters of mind, but they would not be able 
to make any common judgments on the basis of such reactions, 
since the reactions would vary so much between different 
people, and with the same person at different times. In 
order, then, to be able to carry on a conversation about 
these matters, man must learn to view characters from a 
certain point of view, the general point of view, and the 
pleasure or pain felt, as the result of such a point of 
view, will be the same for different people, or for the 
same people at different times. Thus common standards of 
evaluation will be established. If that is a reasonable 
account of the origin of the general point of view, then
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either the establishment of this convention results in the 
creation of a new feeling, or the feeling is more or less 
that same as any feeling of approval or disapproval, a kind 
of pleasure or pain, but we only count it as moral when it 
results from a general survey. I am in favour of accepting 
the latter alternative, since it is more consistent with the 
rest of Hume's moral theory than is the former, which presents 
a number of difficult problems. I have particularly dis­
cussed these problems in chapter 2, and mentioned them in 
passing at other points.
Does this analysis have any validity? I think it 
does. The passage X quoted above is not the only one in 
which Hume refers: to the need to establish a general stand­
ard, so as to allow for agreements in morality.
Besides, every particular man has a peculiar posi­
tion with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we 
oou'd every converse on any reasonable terms, were 
each of us to consider characters and persons, only 
as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In 
order, therefore, to prevent those continual contra­
dictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of 
things, we fix on some steady and general points of 
view.... (T.581-582)
By this reflexion we correct those sentiments of
blame, which so naturally arise upon any opposi­
tion. (T.S83)
When we form any judgments of persons, merely from 
the tendency of their characters to our own benefit, 
or to that of our friends, we find so many contra­
dictions to our sentiments in society and conversa­
tion, and such an uncertainty from the incessant 
changes of our situation, that we seek some other 
standard of merit and demerit, which may not admit 
of so great variation. (T.583)
All of these passages suggest that the general point of view
is another device by which "men correct, by their reason,
what is irregular or incommodious in their affections".
On this basis, I think one can conclude that the taking of
a general point of view does not arouse distinct and different
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feelings identifiable as moral approval or disapproval, but 
rather that the feelings of pleasure or pain are only counted 
as feelings of moral approval or disapproval if they follow 
the taking of a general point of view. Otherwise they are 
feelings of pleasure and pain relatedt:> interest rather than 
morality. We thus have to reject some things that Hume says 
about these feelings, but in the end, I do not believe he is 
consistent on the matter, and I think my analysis conforms 
better with the rest of the theory.
It is of course, not just an arbitrary point that 
the feelings of pleasure or pain are not counted as moral 
approval or disapproval unless preceded by the taking of a 
general point of view. It is, I think, a point about what 
morality is actually about. Morality is not only a matter 
of considering the interests of oneself and one's relations 
and friends, it is also a matter of considering the effects 
of a character on a wider or more general range. In a way, 
the significance of taking a general point of view is much 
like the significance of the artificial virtues; to extend 
concerns beyond one's immediate interests and look at mat­
ters from a more long-range and wide-extending view, and 
these sorts of considerations are what distinguish morality 
from questions of taste. However, I should like to leave 
a discussion of the general significance of these and other 
points in Humeic theory of morals until a later point.
The establishment of the doottine of the general 
point of view allows for a simple distinction to be made 
between moral and non-moral evaluation, I have of course 
commented several times earlier that in general Huae is 
reluctant to make such a distinction. However, when I
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considered the question in chapter 2, I did so in terms of 
the objects of evaluation, rather than in terms of the pro­
cess, I argued then, for example, that natural abilities 
ought not to be tho subject of moral evaluation, since they 
were to a high degree involuntary, and 1 did not regard in­
voluntary qualities as a suitable subject for moral approval 
or disapproval. The distinction bètween moral and non-moral 
evaluation that results fron the theory that the taking of 
a general point of view is a necessary condition of moral 
evaluation is, however, an entirely different one, and has 
no relevance that I can see to any distinction on the basis 
of voluntary and involuntary qualities. This new distinc­
tion is simply that unless a general point of view is taken 
in regard to any character or quality of mind, the feelings 
of approval or disapproval whioh result are non-moral rather 
than moral. It is presumably irrelevant what sorts of qual­
ities are considered, although it Is of course true that 
Hume's theory requires that they be qualities of mind, or 
dispositions to have certain sorts of motives, whether the 
approval is moral or non-moral; the distinction is based 
solely on the manner in which the observer goes about getting 
the feelings of pleasure or pain. If he has not taken a 
general point of view, the evaluation is simply non-moral.
If he has taken such a point of view, then of course, it 
does not neces&^rily follow that the evaluation is moral, 
since there is always the possibility that some sort of 
error has occurred in the process which might not permit the 
evaluation to be properly termed moral; for example, as I 
mentioned above, the subject might not be a quality of mind. 
This brings us directly th the question of the
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possibility of error in moral evaluation. One of the most 
intriguing implications of the principle of a general point 
of view is that it appears to allow the observer to be mis­
taken about whether or not he has actually made a moral eval­
uation, in contrast to a non-moral or interested evaluation.
•Tis only when a character is considered in general, 
without reference to our particular interest, that 
it causes such a feeling or sentiment as denominates 
it morally good or evil. •Tie true, those sentiments, 
from interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, 
and naturally run into one another. It seldom happens, 
that we do not think an enemy vicious, and can dis­
tinguish betwixt his opposition to our interest and 
real villainly or baseness. But this hinders not, 
but that the sentiments are, in themselves, distinct; 
and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself 
from these illusions. (T.472)
If we were to accept the theory that feelings of moral ap­
proval or disapproval, qua feelings, could only be aroused 
by the taking of a general point of view (which theory I 
have rejected) one possible error would be a simple one of 
phenomenologically mis-identifying the feelings which one 
had, in the sense of "I thought it was a feeling of moral 
approval, but actually I made a mistake, and it was the 
feeling of interested approval that I was experiencing".
This appears to be the sort of error which Eume is referring 
to in this passage. If one does not accept that theory, it 
would still be possible to argue, along much the same line, 
that although one had thought that the feelings of pleasure 
one had were feelings of moral approval, actually they were 
of interested approval, either since one had failed to take 
a general point of view, or because the feelings of interest 
simply overwhelmed any feelings that might have resulted 6n 
the basis of taking a general point of view* On this point, 
Hume eayst
But however the general principle of our blame
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or praise nay he corrected by thoee other prin­
ciples, *tis certain, that they are not alto­
gether efficacious, nor do our passions often 
correspond entirely to the present theory...
Here wa are contented with saying, that reason 
requires such an impartial conduct, but that *tls 
seldom wa can bring ourselves to it, and that our 
passions do not readily follow the determination 
of our judgment. (T.533)
The demands of immediate interest nay simply overtake what­
ever feelings of moral approval or disapproval one might 
have had, and yet one might still think that the feelings 
one had were of moral approval or disapproval, since one 
had taken a general survey of the character.
If one holds the theory that it is whether or not 
the feelings of pleasure or pain are aroused as a result cf 
having taken a garerai point of view, that distinguishes 
moral from non-moral approval or disapproval, then another 
kind of error is possible. One might have the appropriate 
feelings of approval or disapproval, and yet, since one had 
failed to take a general point of view, these feelings could 
not be correctly counted as moral. I think there are two 
distinct cases here, that in which the observer had not 
even attempted to take a general point of view, end that 
in which he attempted, but in some way failed. In the fiést 
C&&&, the situation is quite simple. The observer, having 
feelings of pleasure or pain, could mistakenly regard then 
as feelings of moral approval or disapproval, believing that 
he had, or forgetting that he had not, considered the char­
acter or quality being evaluated from a general point of 
view. In such a case, although he might think bis evalua­
tion was moral, it clearly would not be.
The second case is more complex. This is the case 
where the observer sight genuinely attempt to consider the
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character fron a general point of view, but in vaoae way fall* 
He may, for oxanple, ha^*dl@counted his own feelings as di­
rectly affectai by the character, and yat have only considered 
tho character from the point of view of his relations or 
friends. This would not count as taking a general point of 
view. On the other hand, he may have discounted the feelings 
of himself and his relations and friends, and yet have con­
sidered the situation purely in the particular case, and not, 
as I have earlier argued is necessary, as an example of a 
class of situations. This again would presumably not count 
as a general point of view, and the resulting feelings could 
not properly count as moral. Finally, there is of course the 
possibility that the point of view was just not sufficiently 
"general", to make the resulting feelings count as moral.
This hind of error ia orly possible if there is some definite 
range of sympathy underlying a general point of view which 
must be net before tho view truly counts as "general". I 
have argued at an earlier point that it is not clear whether 
Fume thinks there is such a definable range, and so I am not 
entirely sura that this is a possible source of error for 
' lîume.
A last possible source of error is based on the claim 
that there is some sort of causal relationship between the 
taking of a general point of view and the production of feel­
ings of moral fvproval or disapproval. If it is argued that 
the feelings of pleasure or pain are only truly counted as 
moral if they are caused by the taking of a general point of 
view, then it is always possible, for one to be mistaken 
about causal connections. Ko propositions concerning matters 
of fact are necessarily true. All these possible sources of
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error do not result in mistaken moral judgments, of the sort 
that I have earlier argued are possible If the observer does 
not recognise a sufficient number of the facts about a situa­
tion. They result rather in a mistake about whether a moral 
evaluation has actually occurred. The principle of the gen­
eral point of view as a necessary condition of moral evalua­
tion allows for a mistaken belief about the nature of one's 
feelings of approval or disapproval. Allowing for such mis­
taken brings Hume's theory a bit further away from the simple 
subjectivism that it might at first have appeared to be. To 
know whether one morally approves or disapproves of some 
character Involves, it now appears,knowing more than just 
whether one feels pleasure or pain when contemplating it; 
it also involves knowing whether one has contemplated it from 
the correct point of view.
There is one final point whioh might be made about 
the taking of a general point of view, bexore leaving the 
subject. In chapter 4 I referred to the possibility of a 
conflict between the sorts of actions dictated by the nat­
ural and the sorts of actions dictated by the artificial 
virtues. I then commented that this sort of conflict was 
representative of a very common kind of moral dilemma, sad 
might be regarded as a conflict between taking a particular 
or a general point of view. Am example of such a dilemma 
would be where benevolence might lead us to feel approval 
of an act of injustice which is beneficial to a particular 
man, whereas justice would lead us to feel disapprovâl to­
wards it. At that point I said that the general tone of 
Hume's work suggested that the dictates of the artificial 
virtue were to be followed rather than those of the natural
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virtue. I think that the notion of taking a general point 
of view provide* us with a reason for this. It appears to
Bie that in the ease of at least some of the conflicts which
might arise between natural and artificial virtues, the arti­
ficial virtue represents the feeling arrived at after having 
taken a general point of view, and thua represents the truly 
moral decision. Although our natural feelings of benevolence 
may lead in the opposite direction, a decision or evaluation 
of the character, based on these feelings would not be, in 
such a situation, a truly moral decision or evaluation. This 
does not mean that moral evaluations of natural virtues are 
made without taking a general point of view. Obviously a 
general point of view must be taken in evaluating the natural 
virtues at well as in evaluating the artificial virtues, or 
else the evaluation will not count as moral. What it means 
is that in at least soi.6 oases of conflict, the general point
of view leads to the approving of the artificial virtue rather
than the natural virtue. This point of course also ties in 
with the claim that the general point of view is, like the 
artificial virtues, to some degree a convention placed upon 
the natural operations of our feelings and motives. This does 
not make the process "unnatural", as the analogy with seaae 
perception shows.
Such coxrections are common with regard to all the 
senses# and indeed #twere impossible we cou'd ever 
make use of language, or communicate our sentiments 
to one another, did we not correct the momentary ap­
pearance vi things, and overlook our present situa­
tion. (T.582)
Although the observer in sense perception may change his
position to take the point of view leading to the clearest
view of the object, this is not unnatural, it is merely a
matter of not taking all views as representing or being
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tha oorroat oao. Tho oamo I0 trua of notai "perception", 
which is no less natural.
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CHAPTER 7 
The Moral Agent# and Conclusion
Up until this point, with reference to both sympathy 
and the taking of a general point of view, X have been talk­
ing solely in terms of the observer, the man who has the feel« 
ings of moral approval and disapproval as the result of con­
templating the character or actions of another man. Both of 
these aspects of moral evaluation could be extended so as to 
have relevance for the motives of the agent himself. As a 
matter of fact, it may be possible to distinguish between 
the artificial and natural virtues to some extent on the 
basis of the different roles these two operations play in 
guiding the actions of the agent. The significant difference 
has to do with the taking of a general point of view. Al­
though it is not clear that the agent must take, or presup­
pose, a general point of view when acting under ai natural 
virtue, it is certainly clear that he must when acting under 
an artificial virtue.
The natural virtues may be divided into two classes, 
those! have called the self-regarding virtues, such as 
prudence or frugality, and those I have termed other-regard­
ing virtues, such as benevolence. The motives underlying 
the self-regarding natural virtues would it appears to me, 
involve neither the taking of a general point of view, nor 
the operation of sympathy. It makes no sense to speak of 
the agent's discounting his own# interests in acting under a 
self-regarding virtue, since it is surely his own interests 
which such a virtue serves. He might, I suppose, consider 
any particular action he intended to do under some sort of
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general aspect, that Is, as a member of a class of similar
actions, but merely to do this, and not to discount his own
interests, is not to take a general point of view. In any
case, such a long-range consideration seems out of place
with the natural virtues on the whole, since it would not
be in the spirit of such passages as#
no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless 
there be in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct from the sense of its morality. (T.479)
As I argued in chapter 3, a man with a natural vittue such 
as frugality would probably be characterised as having not 
only the general desire to be frugal. Lut as having also a 
disposition to have the desire to be frugal in specific sit­
uations. Such particular desires do not seem entirely suited 
to contaii: such long-range or general considerations as tak­
ing a general point of view would appear to require. As for 
sympathy, sympathy is surely only necessary in a motive when 
other people are involved, if them, and this is not immedi­
ately the case with the self-regarding virtues. Sympathy 
might be necessary were an agent to stop and consider his 
own motives morally, but this would be separate from the ac­
tual motives.
Those natural virtues which are other-regarding 
present a somewhat different p idiure. A man acting from a 
motive typical of such other-regarding natural virtues as 
benevolence would be, in the very act of having such a 
motive as a desire to help someone else, discounting his 
own interests. However, such a motive is normally directed 
towards one person, or towards a small group of people, but 
not towards all of society, or whatever range is required 
for a general point of view.
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In general, it may be affirm'd, that there is no 
such passion in human minds, as the love of man­
kind, merely as such, independent of personal 
qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself.
(T.481)
The general point of view involves discounting not only one's 
own feelings, but also the feelings of those people directly 
connected with one, and I would think that this latter class 
of people is exactly the class towards whom most benevolent 
motives would be directed. As well, the comment about the 
inappropriateness of the consideration of this particular in­
stance as one of a class of such instances seems as applic­
able to the other-regarding natural virtues as to the self- 
regarding natural virtues.
with reference to the relation of sympathy to the 
other-regarding natural virtues, it might be argued that 
one could not have an other-regarding motive without the 
operation of sympathy. However, I do not think that this 
is true. It may be true that the feeling of pleasure a 
benevolent man has as a result of seeing another person happy 
is an example of the operation of sympathy, ^nd with this I 
would agree. However, this pleasure in distinct from such 
desires as the desire to make another person happy. One can 
have this desire, it seems to me, without the other person's 
being unhappy, or without knowing whether he is happy or un­
happy. In any case, recognition of another person's feelings 
is not the same as sympathising with them. The latter pre­
supposes the former, but is not identical with it# it goes 
beyond it and is a separate operation. I am not, however, 
entirely sure that Hume would have agreed with this analysis. 
In discussing the artificial virtues he implies that sympathy
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is the source of our Interest in the good of society, and 
henoe if our desire to perform acts of jurtice stems from 
this interest, sympathy will be a necessary condition of 
our feeling the appropriate motives* I have of course dis­
cussed this in C.^iptcr S* One might extrapolate from this 
that any concern for or interest in the good of another in­
volves sympathy, and henoe our interest in the good of our 
friends or relations will likewise depend on the operation 
of sympathy# In other words, one might take from home's 
comments about the role of sympathy with regard to the ar­
tificial virtues, that any interest in another person depends 
on the operation of sympathy* I have already explained why 
I do not think this is necessary in Bums's system, and there 
are some statements made by Hume which night indicate that 
he also did not think it necessary*
as the good of society, where our own interest is 
not concern'd, or that of our friends, pleases 
only by sympathy.*#. (T.577,
italics mine)
Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have
no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy* (T.576)
Both of these passages suggest that sympathy is needed only 
when the person in question is not a friend, which of course 
implies that if the person in question is a friend, the 
operation of sympathy is unnecessary* What this shows about 
Hume's view of the other-regarding natural virtues, it seems 
to me, is that if they are directed towards friends, the 
operation of sympathy is not needed, whereas, if they are 
directed towards strangers, it may be required* This sug­
gests to me that he believed that one would not naturally 
feel benevolence towards strangers, but only towards friends* 
There is no good reason to believe this to be true in all
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oases. I see no reason why feelings of benevolence could 
not be Immediately felt towards strangers. In the end, I 
think that all that can be clearly said about this point is 
that I do not see any theoretical reason why one could not 
have the motives typical of the natural virtues without the 
operation of sympathy, but that it is not at all clear that 
Hume would agree with me, or what his own position would ac­
tually be. The other-regaa^ding natural virtues, or the mo­
tives underlying them, do not then involve the taking of a 
general point of view, and might not Involve the operation 
of sympathy. This of course is not to :?ay that evaluating 
these virtues does not involve either principle! obviously 
both are necessary for evaluation, but evaluation of such 
motives ia distinct from having them.
Tha artificial virtues, both self-regarding and 
other-regarding, present a different picture with regard to 
those two operations* In my discussion of the motives under­
lying the artificial virtues in chapter 4, I pointed out 
that the existence of such virtues and such motives presup­
posed tha recognition that some set of rules or conventions 
was to the advantage of society in general. I further pointed 
out in that chapter that the motive to act in accordance with 
an artificial virtue must include within it soma recognition 
of the point of following such conventions, or else it re­
duces simply to a blind desire to follow rules. Although 
such a blind desire is possible, and might even have been 
regarded by Hume as being desirable, I argued that it could 
only be a secondary sort of motive, and itself presupposed 
the existence of a motive involving a recognition of the 
value of the conventions or rules. This desire must then
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presuppose the operation of sympathy, sincet
the good of society, where our ova interest Is 
not concern'd, or that of our friends, pleases 
only by sympathy. (T.577)
and I
we have no such extensive concern for society
but from sympathy. (T.S79)
Moreover, Hume argues that#
Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very power­
ful principle in human nature, that it has a 
great influence on our taste of beauty, and that 
it produces our sentiment of morals in all the 
artificial %±rtues. From thence we may presume, 
that it also gives rise to of the other vir­
tues.... (T.577-578)
In other words, he appears to be arguing that sympathy is in 
some sense the source of the artificial virtues, by which I 
would take him to mean that these virtues and thsir typical 
motives could not exist without the operation of sympathy.
It is thus quite clear that sympathy is involved in the ac­
tual virtues as well as in evaluating the virtues, in the 
case of the artificial virtues.
The taking of a general point of view seems likewise 
to be a necessary part of such motives. To take a general 
point of view is to abstract oneself and one's immediate 
friends from the situation, and also to consider a partic­
ular event, situation, or motive, as one of a class of such 
events, situations or motives. This appears to be exactly 
what is required in the motives of the artificial virtues.
The recognition of the value of a set of rules or conven­
tions is a recognition that they are of value to all of 
society, not just to one's particular group, and that it is 
not any particular example of the operation of such a vir­
tue that is to be considered, but the effect of the general 
following of the conventions that is the source of this value.
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If this recognition is involved in the motive, then the typ­
ical motive underlying an artificial virtue involves the 
taking of a general point of view. I do not think it would 
be totally misleading t > say that the artificial virtues ap­
pear to be conventional patterns of taking a general point of 
view, with regard, each of them, to some particular aspect 
of social life.
It can thus be seen that the operations of tha prin­
ciples of sionpathy and the general point of view allow one 
to make a distinction between the artificial and natural 
virtues. The motives underlying the artificial virtues in­
volve both the operation of sympathy and the taking of a gen­
eral point of view, whereas the motives underlying the natural 
virtues do not involve the taking of a general point of view, 
and probably do not necessarily involve the operation of sym­
pathy, although this latter point is not clear li reference 
to the otherwregarding natural virtues.
In the previous chapter I commented that the taking 
of a general point of view is a necessary condition of moral 
evaluation, and that thus the ability to take such a point 
of view was a necessary condition of a man's being a true 
moral agent, in the sense of his being able to evaluate mor­
ally the motives and characters of himself or other people.
I would like to expand this point to cover the notion of 
the moral agent, insofar as he is considered to be a man 
capable of having certain moral virtues. None of the points 
which follow, as none of the previous points about the roles 
of sympathy and the taking of a general point of view in 
the motives of an agent, are contained within the text of 
the Treatise. They are all rather constructions from the
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general outline given by Hume, in an attempt to see what the 
principles he sets forth might imply for the areas of moral­
ity which he does not diseuse. This coming section in par­
ticular cannot be found in any of the particular points Hume 
makes about morality, and is completely speculative, although 
I believe that it is all consistent with,the points he does 
make. I do not believe that hume himself would have agreed 
with much of what I am about to suggest.
It appears to me that kune divides the motives under­
lying the virtues into three classes, roughly, those in which 
tho agent's interests only are considered, those in which the 
interests of those who are directly affected by the actions 
and tho motives of the agent are also considered, and finally 
those in which tho interests of all of society, however vida 
a group th^t might be, are considered. The first class ob­
viously coincides with the self-regarding natural virtues, 
the second, with the other-regarding natural virtues, and 
the third, with tha artificial virtues. It is only in the 
third class, as we have noted, that the taking of a general 
point of view is required of the agent. I should like to 
suggest that it is only those agents who aro capable of 
having, or who do have, virtues of the third class who can 
truly be counted as moral agents. A man who has only self- 
regarding virtues, that is, a man who takes only his own 
interoats into account in all his motives for acting would 
surely not, in any sense, be a^moral agent. It might be 
argued that such a man would be immoral, since he takes only 
his own interests into account, but this is not the sort of 
man I was intending to discuss hero. I am rather using the 
case of the man who is incapable of considering the interests
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of others, end who would not therefore have any other-regard­
ing vices, as well as not having any other-regarding virtues. 
X am thus using the case of the man who would be incapable 
of having any virtues of the second or third classes, since 
the only interests he i&i- capable of taking into account are 
his own. This man, as I said, just does not count as a 
moral agent. Interestingly enough, Hume does not seem to 
consider that such a man could even exist.
We may only affirm on this head, that if there ever 
was any thing, which cou'd be call'd natural in 
this sense, the sentiments of morality certainly 
may; since there never was any nation of the world, 
nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly 
depriv'd of them, and who never, in any instance, 
shew'd the least approbation or dl&like of manners.
These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution 
and temper, that without entirely confounding the 
human mind by disease or madness, *tis impossible 
to extirpate and destroy them. (T.474)
This passage of course re&rs to evaluation, rather than mo­
tives, but since it is arguing that no man has ever lacked 
the ability to feel moral approval or disapproval, and such 
approval or disapproval involves the taking of a general 
point of view, it can be deduced that there never existed 
any Incapable of taking a general point of view. how­
ever, whether or not such a man ever did exist, if he did, 
he could not be counted as a moral agent.
The second ease is that of the man capable of having 
other-regarding natural virtues, as well as self-regarding 
ones, but not of having artificial virtues. This would be 
the man who could consider his own interests and also those 
of people directly affected by his actions, but not the in­
terests of society in general. An example might be the 
man, beloved of second-rate American gangster movies, who 
is kind to his old mother, but who robs banks, steals cars.
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and generally takes whatever he wants for himself or for his 
old mother. Host importantly, he can not understand why he 
should do otherwise, so that the notion of taking a general 
point of view simply makes no sense to him. Z am definitely 
not including in this class people who feel that society has 
"done them in", and so they have a right to take what they 
can get) since these people irould presumably feel that if 
society had not treated them so badly, they would not have 
this right. The notion of the requirement of taking a gen­
eral point of view would make sense to such people, but they 
would argue that society is so structured that they must con­
sider themselves first, and not take a general point of view 
in deciding to act. The people I am referring to are those 
to whom the notion would not make sense. They are a diffi­
cult case, since they do appear to have some "moral sense", 
at least in regard to those people related to them, or their 
friends. However, I would like to argue that in the end, 
these people too do not really count as moral agents, and 
that the ability to take a general point of view, and to be 
able to incorporate this view into one's motives for acting, 
is a necessary condition of being a moral agent in the full 
sense of the word which they simply do not meet. Being 
able to take into account the feelings of the few people 
with whom one comes into contact, and even being able to 
consider a particular motive or action as one of a class of 
such motives and actions, is not sufficient to count as 
taking a general point of view. There must also be the 
operation of sympathy with society in general. The case 
is, I think, difficult because it is difficult to see where 
to draw the line. The man who considers only himself and
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his old mother appears not to be a moral agent, in the com­
plete senses but what about the man who is only capable of 
sympathising tith the interests of the people in hiw own 
city, or his class? In one way, he might be regarded as 
taking a general point of view, since he is discounting the 
interests of himself and his immediate relations and friends, 
and sympathising with a larger class of people, some of whom 
he has presumably never met. However, in another way he is 
not, since he is considering the interests only of a limited 
class. This is once again the problem of deciding how wide 
a class a man must sympathise with, before he has truly taken 
a general point of view. I had no real answer when I dis­
cussed the problem earlier, nor do I now. But some exten­
sions of sympathy clearly are not enough, others clearly are, 
and there is a wide area in the middle where it is not clear 
whether a man could be counted a moral agent or not.
The man discussed above, who, I have claimed, is not 
truly a moral agent, might be regarded as being-half-way 
there. Be at least has some of the characteristics required 
of the moral agent, although he lacks what appears to me to 
be one necessary condition, that of the ability to take the 
general point of view.
The last case is that of the man capable of having 
all three classes of the virtues mentioned# that is, the 
man capable of taking his ova, his friends' and relations', 
and society's interests into account in his motives. In 
other words, the man truly capable of taking a general 
point of view. I think thie man ie a clear case of what is 
meant by a "moral agent". In his motives, he considers not 
only himself, not only hie relations and friends, but also
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society as a whole, and he is capable of discounting his 
own interests and those of his friends in. his motive, in 
order to take a truly general point of view. I am not sug­
gesting that a true moral agent must always take a general 
point of view in his motives, since I think he must be cap­
able of the other classes of virtues as well. I am only 
suggesting that he must be capable of so doing, and that 
the notion of taking a general point of view does make sense 
to him, both as a concept and as a demand of moral action, 
even though he might not always take this i olnt of view.
Since this is the requirement for making true moral evalua­
tions, it is clear that there is a strong link between be­
ing a moral agent, and being able to evaluate morally; a 
man who fulfills the criteria for one position fulfills at 
the same time the criteria for the other.
In the end, then, I would argue that the signifi­
cance of the operations of sympathy and taking a general 
point of view is that they provide the criteria for having 
moral virtues and being able to make truly moral evaluations. 
They also, incidentally, provide some criteria for distin­
guishing between the natural and the artificial virtues, 
and allow one to argue that only the man who is capable of 
having the artificial virtues is truly a moral agent. The 
attificial virtues as described in the Treatise thus becrnme 
a very important part of morality and play a rather dif­
ferent role in the whole scheme of morality from that played 
by the natural virtues.
In this thesis on Hume's theory of morality, as out­
lined in the third book of A Treatise of Human Nature, I 
have considered three basic topics, the moral virtues, the
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operation of sympathy, and the doctrine of the general point 
of view. In general wl at I have attempted to do with regard 
to these three topics is to make clear what Hume meant by 
the terms involved, to trace the relationships between the 
various factors, to attempt to clear up any confusions or 
inconsistencies which emerged in tracing such relationships, 
and, in general, to attempt to present a consistent theory 
of morality based on the basic principles which Hume himself 
sets forth, departing from Hume's own account only when that 
account appeared to me to be inconsistent, or, occasionally, 
when certain conditions he laid down appeared to me to be 
superfluous or unnecessary. In the end, what I hope to have 
achieved is a clearer understanding and analysis of certain 
features of Hume's moral theory, and wlriat might be called an 
"improved" or "edited" version of the theory. I have not 
attempted a general evaluation of the theory, although I have 
at several different points indicated tay disagreement with 
individual points that Hume made. In the long run, I agree 
with a number of the points he makes, such as the requirement 
of the general point of view, and disagree with others, such 
as his reluctance to distinguish between moral and non-moral 
approval on tha basis of the objects of approval. I regard 
his account as enlightening at some points, such as the dis­
tinction between artificial and natural virtues, and inade­
quate at others, such as his account of moral duty. My own 
biases in ethics are more Kantian, but I do not think Hume 
ought to be disregarded or rejected on that account, since 
a number of the points he makes are very suggestive, and are 
apt to be ignored by people who consider ethics mainly from 
the point of view of duty. I think we do evaluate people on
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the basis of the sorts of characters they have, and not just 
on the basis of whether they conscientiously do what they 
believe is rlrht. I think such evaluation is justifiable, 
and ought not to be ignored. However, I do not think that 
is all, or even t2ie most part, of morality, and I think 
Hume's theory ought to be tampered with some Kantian duties*
To finish, I would like briefly to summarize the con­
clusions 1 have reached in this examination of certain prob­
lems in Hume's moral theory. I first of all considered Hume's 
account of the virtues, in general, and concluded that what 
Hume meant by a "virtue" was a disposition to have motives 
of a certain sort, these motives being of a type which could 
exist in people prior to there being any concept of morality, 
and not including in them any reference to the moral value 
of having such a motive or acting from such a motive. In ex­
amining the motives typical of the natural and the artificial 
virtues, I came to a number of different conclusions. In 
reference to the natural virtues, I argued that the underly­
ing motives should be analyzed in terms of purposes, rather 
than in terms of desiring to do specific sorts of actions, 
since the circumstances would determine what action should 
be done to fulfill a certain specific purpose, such as de­
siring to help another person. I claimed that analysis in 
terms of specific actions would in any case conflict with 
Hume's claim that motives rather than actions were the ob­
ject of moral approval. I also argued that there was, in 
the case of the natural virtues, no significant difference 
between the general desire, such as the general desire to 
be benevolent, and a disposition to have particular desires 
in particular situations, such as the desire to help that
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drowning mai> insofar as either could be considered the under­
lying motive of the virtue, and insofar os the general desire 
could bo regarded as merely a generalisation of the partic­
ular desires.
In the case of the artificial virtues, I argued that 
tha motives underlying thesa virtues could not be considered 
to have met either of Hume's original criteria for motive* 
underlying virtues, in that they were neither the sorts of 
motives which could exist prior to the concept of morality, 
since they were aroused by the recognition of the value of 
certain conventions, nor did they fail to include a reference 
to tha moral value of such a motive. I also argued that it 
might bo possible to draw a distinction between particular 
desires to act justly and tha general desire to do so, and 
that this might be one way of making at least the particular 
desires free of a regard to moral value. In the end though,
I considered this point as relatively unconvincing. I also 
suggested that such a distinction might weaken still further 
the already weak claim that Hume was a utilitarian.
In the chapter on sympathy, I first of all discussed 
the mechanics of sympathy, and considered a disagreement be­
tween Ardal and Bendenius a* to whether Hume considered the 
operation of sympathy as a necessary condition of all moral 
evaluation of virtues. I argued that, considering sympathy 
by itself, Ilendenius appeared to be correct, but that, since 
the operation of sympathy waa a necessary condition of 
taking a general point of view, and the taking of a general 
point of view a necessary condition of all moral evaluation, 
Ardal's claim that sympathy was a necessary condition of all 
moral evaluation was clearly valid. I suggested that with
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the joint operations of the doctrine of sympathy and its 
opposite, the doctrine of comparison, ary reaction by an 
observer to a L otlvo could be accounted for, and that this 
should be counted a flaw in Hume's theory, since it makes 
it logically irrefutable. X concluded the chapter by con­
sidering the possible errors about moral evaluation which 
could occur if the operation of sympathy were considered 
a necessary condition of moral evaluation.
The chapter on the general point of view began with 
an. analysis of what hume meant by a "geoeral point of view", 
and concluded that it meant not only discounting one's own 
feelings, whether of interest cr complete uninterest, and 
placing oneself in a more or lees midway point for consider­
ing the motive or character, but also meant considering the 
particular motive or character as an example of a class of 
such motives cr characters, and thus considering the motive 
or character in general, as well as taking a non-specific 
point of view of this character. I suggested that tha taking 
of a general point of view had many things in common with 
the establishment of the artificial virtues, in that this 
too might be regarded as a convention established for the 
better convenience of all of society, and not as a process 
of evaluation which might occur before such considerations 
about fulfilling common interests were taken. Z then con­
sidered the point.that taking a general point of view was 
a necessary condition of making moral evaluations, the 
possible errors which might result from this, and finally 
extended t2;e doctrine to cover motives as well as evalua­
tions, concluding that the doctrine of the general point of 
view and the operation of sympathy presupposed by this
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doctrine provided criteria for being a moral agent* My final 
conclusion was that the doctrine of tho ' ciicral point of view, 
the operation of sympathy, and the concept of an artificial 
virtue between them established a possible picture of what 
it means to be a moral agent, and that this point alone makes 
them of great value, both in Kuue's moral theory, and in any 
philosophical consideration of morality*
189.
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